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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies the early development of new ventures and small business and the 
entrepreneurship process from initial ideas to viable ventures. I unpack the micro-foundations 
of entrepreneurial actions and new ventures’ investor communications through quality signals 
to finance their growth path. This dissertation includes two qualitative papers and one 
quantitative study. The qualitative papers employ an inductive multiple-case approach and 
include seven medical equipment manufacturers (new ventures) in a nascent market context 
(the mobile health industry) across six U.S. states and a secondary data analysis to understand 
the emergence of opportunities and the early development of new ventures. The quantitative 
research chapter includes 770 IPOs in the manufacturing industries in the U.S. and 
investigates the legitimation strategies of young ventures to gain resources from targeted 
resource-holders. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
The study of entrepreneurship and small business is one of the fastest growing areas 
within economics, management, finance, and even law (Klein, 2008). Entrepreneurship has 
been considered as the core of the dynamics of capitalism (Baumol, 1993) and the 
entrepreneur is “the driving force of the whole market system” (Mises, 1949: 149). Extant 
research in entrepreneurship theory focuses on the emergence of an opportunity idea and the 
pursuit of an entrepreneurial opportunity (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010; Dimov, 2011; Read, 
Song, & Smit, 2009). As such, entrepreneurship has long been conceptualized as a process 
(Bhave, 1994; Davidsson, 2003; Gartner, 1985, 1990), including one's cognitive process of 
opportunity identification, judgment decisions about opportunities (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; 
Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008, 2013; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), and 
entrepreneurial actions to exploit opportunities (Autio, Dahlander, & Frederiksen, 2013; 
Minniti & Bygrave, 2001).  
Entrepreneurial action concerns the introduction of new goods, services, raw materials, or 
organizing methods that departs substantially from existing practices (Gruber et al., 2008; 
Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). The origin of entrepreneurial actions therefore exists at the 
nexus of individuals and opportunities (Shane, 2003; Venkataraman, 1997). To date, research 
on entrepreneurship has focused on the nature and source(s) of opportunities (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2010; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; McMullen, Plummer, & Acs, 2007), factors 
explaining which individuals or organizations are better able to identify and exploit 
opportunities (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2012; Short, Ketchen, Shook, & Ireland, 
2009), and entrepreneurial cognitions (R. A. Baron, 2004; R. K. Mitchell et al., 2002). 
However, the current literature seems to have different definitions of entrepreneurship so that 
different measures are applied (Westhead, Wright, & Mcelwee, 2011) and has an ambivalent 
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understanding of the contestable boundaries of claims in entrepreneurship theory, the micro-
foundations of entrepreneurial phenomena (Zahra & Wright, 2011), and its incorporation into 
strategy (Foss, Klein, Kor, & Mahoney, 2008; Klein, 2008). For example, the measures used 
by economists differ significantly from those used by researchers in psychology (Westhead et 
al., 2011). The economic approach emphasizes occupational choices of different individuals, 
cost and production functions, and risk-bearing abilities of entrepreneurs; while the 
psychological approach focuses more on individual differences such as the need for 
achievement, self-efficacy, and tolerance for ambiguity (Drnovšek, Wincent, & Cardon, 2010; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Rindova, Barry, & Ketchen, 2009). Although many empirical 
studies have been conducted, the dialogue between psychology-based and economics-based 
entrepreneurship research is rather limited (Zahra & Wright, 2011).  
In addition, although contextual influences on entrepreneurial actions have long been 
acknowledged (Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Welter, 2011), research on 
entrepreneurial behaviour has shown great interest in finding “general laws” of 
entrepreneurship (Autio, Kenney, Mustar, Siegel, & Wright, 2014; Hjorth, Jones, & Gartner, 
2008; Zahra & Wright, 2011). Rather than looking into the sources of environmental 
dynamics and relating them to entrepreneurial actions, some researchers tend to introduce 
statistical controls for context (Zahra & Wright, 2011). However, salience of research 
questions, theoretical merits of an argument, and causal relationships are usually context-
specific (Van de Ven, 2007). Even though controlling for the effects of industrial dynamism 
is one thing, looking into the various dimensions of contextual impacts can bring greater 
clarity about the relationships between contextual impacts and entrepreneurial actions. 
Contextualization involves the “linking of observations to a set of relevant facts, events, or 
points of view that make possible research and theory that form part of a larger whole” 
(Rousseau & Fried, 2001:1). Incorporating the different dimensions of entrepreneurial 
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contexts into theory building and testing may further enrich the understanding of the nature of 
entrepreneurship and its consequences (Welter, 2011).  
Environmental contingencies not only influence entrepreneurial actions but also 
determine the way that ventures accumulate resources and their growth path (Clarysse, 
Bruneel, & Wright, 2011). Extant entrepreneurship research has paid substantial attention to 
privilege growth of ventures (Davidsson, 2006; Davidsson, Steffens, & Fitzsimmons, 2009; 
Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006) and highly emphasises how resources (e.g., human, 
financial, technological, social capitals) are related to venture growth (Clarysse, Wright, & 
Van de Velde, 2011; Ensley, Pearson, & Amason, 2002; Heirman & Clarysse, 2004; Hindle 
& Yencken, 2004; Khaire, 2010). However, extant research mostly focuses on evaluating 
how much companies grow but has little consideration for how they grow (McKelvie & 
Wiklund, 2010). Growth results from both internal and external mechanisms (Gilbert et al., 
2006). Contextual impacts play a determinative role in explaining different growth patterns of 
ventures (Clarysse, Bruneel, et al., 2011; Dess & Beard, 1984). However, extant research 
pays less attention to resource configuration in different environmental contexts.        
1.1 Motivations and Focus 
This dissertation aims to contextualise the entrepreneurship process, thereby unpacking 
the micro-foundations of entrepreneurial actions and bridging psychology-based and 
economics-based entrepreneurship research. By doing so, this research contributes to defining 
the boundaries of theories and propositions to establish strong explanatory powers in relation 
to the claims in the entrepreneurship theory. 
Contextual influences on entrepreneurship can be distinguished between effects on entry 
behaviours and effects on post-entry behaviours (Autio et al., 2013). Influences on entry 
behaviours exhibit themselves as selection effects and are associated with who engages in 
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entrepreneurial behaviours. In the post-entry stage, selection effects continue to influence 
entrepreneurial behaviours and another set of contextual influences associated with strategic 
choices entrepreneurs engage in. These work through the perceived desirability or feasibility 
to influence the way that ventures exploit opportunities and this perceived desirability or 
feasibility would ultimately reflect contextual facts such as formal institutions (e.g., 
intellectual property perfection) (Autio et al., 2014). In the dissertation, I aim to investigate 
the contextual influences on entry and post-entry entrepreneurial behaviours.  
 
1.1.1 Focus on the impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on the decision making 
associated with entrepreneurial tasks (entry behaviours) 
Entrepreneurship research has long centred on the question “why, when and how some 
people and not others discover and exploit opportunities” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, 
p.219). Most research emphasizes how the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs make 
them more likely to be alert to certain opportunities such as their prior knowledge and 
experience (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Grégoire, Corbett, & McMullen, 2011; McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006) their self-image (J. R. Mitchell & Shepherd, 2010), genetic profile 
(Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkas, Hunkin, & Spector, 2008), and their personality traits (Zhao & 
Seibert, 2006) and how entrepreneurs connect their prior knowledge with the changes they 
alert in the environment to identify opportunities (Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). 
Extant research seems to suggest that entrepreneurs are more likely to recognise opportunities 
within a certain distance from their current knowledge (Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010; 
Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012). However, in the real business world we can also find several 
cases in which entrepreneurs pursue opportunities without obvious connections with their 
current knowledge. Entrepreneurial action is not just a reaction to objective conditions but 
may initiate from the interpretation of external stimulations by entrepreneurs (Wood & 
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McKinley, 2010) and the interpretation may include other cognitive factors involved such as 
emotion (Goss, 2007; Hjorth, 2007). If entrepreneurs are the central actor in new firm 
creation, the current literature lacks a consideration of a full range of entrepreneurial 
determinants underlying entrepreneurial decisions. Therefore, extant research can explain 
why some entrepreneurs choose to exploit opportunities found in the neighbourhood of their 
current activities but fails to explain why some entrepreneurs do not follow the same pattern.  
In this research, we aim to address the research question: What entrepreneurial 
determinants are influential in spurring a particular type of opportunity ideas in the first place 
and in directing the formation of opportunity beliefs. Specifically, I integrate research about 
the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities with cognitive research to focus on two 
opportunity characteristics which are likely to influence the formation of opportunity 
intention – the superficial and structural similarities between new ventures’ current 
technology and market knowledge and the knowledge required in a target market where they 
will operate (Gentner & Markman, 2006; Grégoire et al., 2010; Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012; 
Markman & Gentner, 1993). I aim to investigate the factors determining the way that new 
ventures use to identify opportunities and their decision making on the types of 
entrepreneurial tasks.  
Research Focus 1: How the variance in entrepreneurial determinants influences 
entrepreneurs’ cognitive-processes to approach different entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
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1.1.2 Focus on the micron-foundations of entrepreneurial phenomena (entry and post-
entry behaviours) 
Researchers have long conceptualized entrepreneurship as a process (Bhave, 1994; 
Davidsson, 2003; Gartner, 1985, 1990). Seen from a process perspective, scholars consider 
how entrepreneurs identify and exploit opportunities and usually distinguish entrepreneurial 
actions into the phases of opportunity search, evaluation, and exploitation (Choi & Shepherd, 
2004; Gruber et al., 2008, 2013; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) and study entrepreneurial 
behaviours in each discrete phase.  
Past studies have substantially advanced the understanding of discrete phases of 
entrepreneurial actions. In the literature on opportunity recognition, scholars have studied 
several characteristics of an entrepreneur (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Grégoire et al., 2010; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; J. R. Mitchell & Shepherd, 2010; Zhao & Seibert, 2006) which 
make him/her more alert to opportunities (Kirzner, 1973) and how entrepreneurs use prior 
knowledge as a basis to interpret what can be done (Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; 
Grégoire et al., 2010). In the literature on opportunity evaluation, current research focuses on 
how entrepreneurs develop a coherent judgment between what one perceives from the 
environment and one’s desire and beliefs about the value and feasibility of these potential 
opportunities to transmit third-person opportunities into the first-person opportunities 
(Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 2007). In the literature on opportunity exploitation, 
researchers focus on the growth of ventures, including marketing testing (Danneels, 2002, 
2007), resources integration and accumulation (Bruneel, Yli-Renko, & Clarysse, 2010; 
Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Hitt, Ireland, & Lee, 2000), organizational learning (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000), business model design (Andries & 
Debackere, 2007; Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper, & Woo, 2000), etc. However, the current 
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literature lack an integrative view which shows how entrepreneurs come up with 
entrepreneurial ideas and how entrepreneurial behaviours conducted in one phase impact on 
entrepreneurial behaviours in the next phase, which eventually turns an idea to a real business.    
This research aims to fill these gaps by considering the following research questions. 
Resource Focus 2-1: How entrepreneurs come up with entrepreneurial ideas 
Resource Focus 2-2: How entrepreneurial behaviours conducted in one phase impact on 
entrepreneurial behaviours in the next phase, which eventually turns an 
idea to a real business. 
 
1.1.3 Focus on new venture legitimation strategies to gain resources 
Young ventures are usually characterized by a high amount of intangible assets and 
negative cash flow and face substantial technological and/or market uncertainty during their 
first few years of operation. In the start-up process, they tend to rely on external sources of 
finance such as venture capital to commercialize their innovation (Baeyens & Manigart, 
2003). However, once they have grown out of the venture capital phase, they need to raise 
money on the stock market to finance their growth path. But substantial evidence shows that 
entrepreneurs tend to sell their shares at a price lower than the actual market value of their 
initial public offerings (IPOs) in order to attract investors (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). In the 
IPO market, information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders is the widely 
accepted explanation for IPO underpricing (Rock, 1986). Young ventures which are based on 
novel technologies generate many information asymmetries because it is difficult to assess 
their real potential (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007). However, 
although information asymmetry theory explains why underpricing happens in these cases, 
the theory has little to say on how to mitigate this underpricing.  
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This study attempts to address this gap by including an analysis of the signalling 
effect of patent stocks and introducing an institutional perspective to the debate. Conceptually 
speaking, patents not only reveal information regarding the technological and managerial 
capabilities of ventures but also provide legal rights against infringement (Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Levin, Klevoric, Nelson, & Winter, 1987; Teece, 1986). 
However the disclosure is only sufficient to someone who is “skilled in the art” to practice 
the innovation and provides limited information regarding the way in which the innovating 
firms will use the patent to capture profits (Heeley et al., 2007). Moreover, patents rarely 
confer perfect appropriability as they are supposed to do in theory. Their function, as well as 
the level of value appropriability, varies across industries (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Heeley et 
al., 2007; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Kash & Kingston, 2001). Since in some cases a venture’s 
innovation activities, including innovation input (R&D expenditures) and output (e.g., patent 
stocks), may not clearly convey its value, in light of this challenge prior studies have 
suggested that a venture can lease the reputation of third party affiliations (e.g., venture 
capitalist, alliances partners) to increase its own legitimacy to justify its actions as meaningful 
and trustworthy (Hsu, 2004; Jepperson, 1991; Podolny, 1994; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 
1999). However, the signalling effect of venture capital backing is too noisy. Some 
researchers argue that VCs provide access to resource bundles (Hsu, 2004) but others argue 
that once the industry effects and underwriter quality are controlled, there is no difference in 
underpricing between VC backed IPOs and non-VC backed IPOs (Bradley & Jordan, 2002). 
Besides, some research argues that VC backed IPOs experience larger underpricing backed 
IPOs because higher underpricing leads to more future flows of capital into venture capital 
funds (Lee & Wahal, 2004) and some found VC backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-
VC backed IPOs during normal periods of activity but are more underpriced than non-VC 
backed ones during “hot issue” periods (Franzke, 2004; Rossetto, 2008).   
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Apart from VCs, among varying quality signals, researchers have identified that the 
most central of these combines signalling theory with institutional theory (Certo, 2003). A 
venture’s legitimacy enhances its persistence and credibility (Parsons, 1960; Suchman, 1995) 
and helps to access resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When a venture’s quality is 
uncertain, its legitimacy serves as an extremely important factor to justify its actions as 
meaningful and trustworthy (Jepperson, 1991; Podolny, 1994; Stuart et al., 1999). However, 
current research has focussed more on how new ventures transfer their prestigious partners’ 
status to improve their performance (Stuart et al., 1999) but devotes less attention to how the 
impact of endorsing legitimacy changes in different contexts, especially in a R&D intensive 
market, and how public investors consider the information delivered by a venture’s endorsing 
legitimacy.  
Research Focus 3.1: How the signalling of patent stocks and endorsing legitimacy affects a 
venture’s IPO price when taking into account the level of information 
asymmetry.  
Research Focus 3.2: How the appropriability regime of the industry in which the venture 
operates moderates the importance of patent stocks and endorsing 
legitimacy. 
 
1.2 Outline of Dissertation 
I aim to investigate the above research focuses in the following ways and across the 
following chapters. During the past four years, I started from the third research focus with a 
quantitative study including 770 IPOs and then conducted a multiple-case research including 
seven new medical device manufacturers in the mobile health market to address the first and 
19 
 
the second research focuses. (The third paper in this dissertation is the first paper I did in my 
PhD study and then the second and the first papers in the dissertation respectively.)  
CHAPTER 2 addresses Research Focus 1 of this dissertation, that is, how the variance 
in entrepreneurial determinants influences entrepreneurs’ cognitive-processes to approach 
different entrepreneurial opportunities. I conducted an inductive case study to identify 
entrepreneurial determinants and integrate them with the research on opportunity 
characteristics, the superficial and the structural similarities between new ventures’ current 
knowledge and the knowledge required in the market where they choose to operate. The 
results show that the formation of opportunity beliefs is motivated by technology-driven, 
operation-driven, or user-driven-driving determinants. Entrepreneurial determinants 
determine the way that entrepreneurs identify and evaluate opportunities. Different 
determinants and approaches in opportunity identification influence entrepreneurs’ decision 
making on entrepreneurial tasks. These factors eventually lead new ventures to pursue 
opportunities with different levels of similarities with their current knowledge. 
CHAPTER 3 addresses Research Focus 2-1 and 2-2 of this dissertation, how 
entrepreneurs come up with entrepreneurial ideas and how entrepreneurial behaviours 
conducted in one phase impact on entrepreneurial behaviours in the next phase. In this paper, 
we focus on the “entrepreneurial process” and aim to empirically understand how 
entrepreneurial determinants influence the formation of their opportunity beliefs and how the 
entrepreneurial determinants and opportunity beliefs jointly influence new ventures’ 
entrepreneurial actions. The results show that in an almost homogenous environment, namely 
the nascent market of mobile health medical equipment, entrepreneurs motivated by different 
entrepreneurial determinants take different paths to identify opportunities. We indicate three 
entrepreneurial determinants for new firm creation: Technology-driven, operation-driven, and 
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user-driven determinants. Different determinants lead entrepreneurs to initiate diverse 
cognitive processes to interpret which resources are going to be transformed to which 
applications and how to complete the transformation. Different determinants also lead new 
ventures to conduct different opportunity exploitation strategies (pivoting strategies, 
diversification strategies, and business model refinement). 
CHAPTER 4 address the third Research Focus 3-1 and 3-2, that is how the signalling 
of patent stocks and endorsing legitimacy affects a venture’s IPO price when taking into 
account the level of information asymmetry and how the appropriability regime of the 
industry in which the venture operates moderates the importance of patent stocks and 
endorsing legitimacy. This study is the first research I did in my PhD study. I conducted a 
quantitative study including 770 IPOs issued by manufacturing firms during 1995-2006. The 
results show that in the industries with a tight appropriability regime, the level of innovation-
based information asymmetry does not even have a positive impact on IPO underpricing. 
Conversely, when the transparency of innovations to future returns is unclear, affiliations are 
more prevalent in serving as a credible and observable signal for the investment community 
to make an accurate assessment of firm value. Endorsing legitimacy mitigates the level of 
IPO underpricing and the innovation-based information asymmetry in those industries where 
the appropriability regime tends to be weak. 
CHAPTER 5 concludes this dissertation by reviewing the main findings and by 
discussing the theoretical contributions. 
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CHAPTER 2 – DIFFERENCES IN ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES: HOW 
ENTREPRENEURIAL DETERMINANTS IMPACT OPPORTUNITY 
RECOGNITION  
 
(The third paper of my PhD study) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although scholars in the field of entrepreneurship continually increase the general 
understanding of why, when and how some people and not others discover and exploit 
opportunities, questions about its nature nevertheless persist. In this study, we seek to 
complement recent research on the process of opportunity recognition by revisiting the role 
of entrepreneurial determinants of new venture creation in directing entrepreneurs’ attentions 
to recognise particular types of opportunities. We aim to explain why some entrepreneurs 
spot and act on distant opportunities but some do not. We do this by integrating the research 
about the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities with cognitive research. In an inductive 
multiple-case study, we illustrate three types of determinants of new venture creation 
(technology-driven, operation-driven, and user-driven determinants) and how these 
determinants influence the process of opportunity recognition, evaluation, and entrepreneurial 
decision making. Our findings show that entrepreneurial motivations affect decision making 
on the means of opportunity recognition and the types of opportunities that entrepreneurs spot 
and eventually exploit. Those opportunities may or may not have clear connections with their 
prior knowledge and experience.  
--------------------------- 
Acknowledgement 
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2.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship research has long centred on the question “why, when and how 
some people and not others discover and exploit opportunities” (Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000, p.219). Most of current research focuses on how entrepreneurs connect their prior 
knowledge and experience with the changes they alert in the environment to define what can 
be done (R. A. Baron, 2006; Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Grégoire et al., 2010; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Following these logics, entrepreneurs are more likely to 
recognise opportunities within a certain distance from their current knowledge. For example, 
the founders of Google, two computer scientists, alerted to the fact that people were 
overwhelmed by the information they found through search engines and then developed an 
internet site-ranking system (Vise & Malseed, 2008). However, in the real business world we 
can also find several cases in which entrepreneurs pursue opportunities without obvious 
connections with their current knowledge. The founders of Nike, for instance, were two 
sports lovers. One’s eureka moment happened when he was making waffles and thought that 
a waffle-patterned outer sole would improve traction and produce faster running times. The 
other one spotted the opportunity while writing a course assignment (Bragg & Bragg, 2005). 
They both lacked knowledge and experience related to the athletic footwear market but they 
established NIKE and it turned out to be a well-known global brand. Following the argument 
in the current literature, NIKE should not exist. Therefore the questions remain: Where do the 
entrepreneurial ideas come from? Why do some entrepreneurs spot distant opportunities and 
decide to act on them rather than working on those close to their current knowledge?  
Extant research in the opportunity identification literature concentrates on why, how, 
and with what consequence entrepreneurial beliefs are formed (Grégoire et al., 2010; Haynie, 
Shepherd, & McMullen, 2009; Read et al., 2009; Sarasvathy, 2001; Shepherd et al., 2007). 
Most research focuses on how individual characteristics of an entrepreneur – such as 
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knowledge and experience stock (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Grégoire et al., 2011; McMullen 
& Shepherd, 2006), images of themselves (J. R. Mitchell & Shepherd, 2010), genetic profile 
(Nicolaou et al., 2008) or personality traits (Zhao & Seibert, 2006) - impact their alertness to 
opportunities. In order for opportunity identification to happen, entrepreneurs connect the 
changes they are alert to with what they might be able to do to interpret these changes (R. A. 
Baron, 2006). This cognitive process includes the association between external information 
and individual knowledge (e.g., using prior knowledge as a basis to understand unusual 
changes (Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001)) and the association between components of 
entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g., aligning the structural capabilities of new technologies 
with structural causes underlying latent demands (Grégoire et al., 2010)).  In addition, some 
research focuses on the role of entrepreneurs' imagination and effectuation in transforming 
existing artefacts at hand into new ones to define opportunities (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & 
Wiltbank, 2008; Sarasvathy, 2001, 2003). Current research mostly focuses on the role of 
entrepreneurs in new firm creation and suggests that entrepreneurs are more likely to act on 
opportunities with similarities with their current knowledge or experience. This logic can 
explain why some entrepreneurs choose to exploit opportunities found in the neighbourhood 
of their current knowledge. However, it fails to explain why some entrepreneurs do not 
follow the same pattern (e.g., NIKE), which implies that some cognitive mechanisms which 
may direct entrepreneurs’ attention in recognising opportunities are underestimated.   
The mechanism for actualizing an opportunity often initially exists in entrepreneurs’ 
mind, which is usually referred to one’s entrepreneurial determinants (Shane, Locke, & 
Collins, 2003). Previous research has explored several determinants (e.g., needs for 
achievement, locus of control, tolerance for ambiguity, risk taking, self-efficacy, and self-
image) and their impacts on entrepreneurship, including such areas as entrepreneurial career 
intentions (Barbosa, Gerhardt, & Kickul, 2007; Hansemark, 2003; McMullen & Shepherd, 
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2006; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005), entrepreneurial cognition (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 
2003; J. R. Mitchell & Shepherd, 2010), new venture survival (Ciavarella, Buchholtz, 
Riordan, Gatewood, & Stokes, 2004). However, although there is a substantial amount of 
research considering the role of entrepreneurial determinants, most of them focus on the 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and how these characteristics increase/ decrease the 
likelihood of them to become entrepreneurs and the propensity of entrepreneurs to form first-
person opportunity beliefs toward particular opportunities in terms of the high/ low level of 
uncertainty, ambiguity, or risk. Few studies address the impact of entrepreneurial 
determinants on the types of opportunities that entrepreneurs may spot in the first place which 
may influence the following entrepreneurial process.  
Entrepreneurship theorists posit that entrepreneurs and opportunity characteristics 
jointly shape new firm creation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Recently some researchers 
have begun to examine the interrelationships between individual characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and the types of opportunities that they exploit. Grégoire and Shepherd (2012), 
for instance, theorize the effect of similarity differences between an opportunity idea’s means 
of supply and market context on the formation of opportunity beliefs and the moderating 
effects of individual entrepreneurial intent to engage in start-up activities and prior 
knowledge on the processing of cognitively demanding structural similarity. Dencker and 
Gruber (2014) consider how the type of opportunities that an entrepreneur exploits is 
contingent on the relevance of his/her knowledge and show that high-risk opportunities 
favour entrepreneurs with managerial experience; while low-risk opportunities favour 
entrepreneurs with industry experience. Both studies emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs’ 
prior knowledge and experience in opportunity recognition, decision making, as well as new 
firm performance but ignore other entrepreneurial determinants (e.g., emotion, personal 
frustration) which may also influence the opportunity-recognition process. Entrepreneurial 
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action is not just a reaction to objective conditions but may initiate from the interpretation of 
external stimulations by entrepreneurs (Wood & McKinley, 2010). If entrepreneurs are the 
central actor in new firm creation, the current literature mainly highlights the role of prior 
knowledge and experience in opportunity recognitions but lacks a consideration of a full 
range of entrepreneurial determinants underlying entrepreneurial decisions.  
In this research, we aim to address the research questions: what entrepreneurial 
determinants are influential in spurring a particular type of opportunity ideas in the first place 
and in directing the formation of opportunity beliefs. To ascertain this research question, we 
integrate the research about the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities with cognitive 
research and conducted an inductive multiple-case study (Eisenhardt, 1989), including seven 
new ventures working in the medical equipment market section in an nascent market, the 
mobile health (mHealth) market, in North America. We target a nascent market because it 
lacks a dominant business model (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). We chose new ventures because 
their strategic actions reflect their entrepreneurial determinants in relation to particular 
opportunities. 
Our findings illustrate three types of entrepreneurial determinants – technology-driven, 
operation-driven, and user-driven determinants – which direct the process of opportunity 
recognition. Ventures driven by technology aimed to look for a new market to exploit current 
technologies (we labelled them as technology-driven ventures); ventures driven either by the 
founders’ past operational experiences or personal frustration in using current products were 
looking for a technical solution to satisfy unmet needs in a particular market (in this case, the 
mHealth market) (we labelled them as operation-driven ventures and user-driven ventures 
respectively). Technology-driven ventures used their current technologies as a basis to search 
opportunities. As such, the opportunities they pursued usually had high technology 
similarities with their current knowledge. In addition, to avoid operating their new business 
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from scratch, they preferred opportunities with at least a medium level of structural 
similarities in terms of market knowledge. Operation-driven ventures were established to 
solve the problems found in their founders' past careers. Therefore, the opportunities they 
pursued tended to have high technology and market similarities with their prior knowledge 
and their prior knowledge helped them to evaluate the feasibility of the opportunities. User-
driven ventures were established because of their founders' dissatisfaction with current 
products. This entrepreneurial determinant directed their attention to solve the problems they 
faced even if these tasks had no obvious connection with their prior knowledge. In addition, 
they tended to generalized market demands from their own needs and relied on their 
knowledgeable peers to evaluate technological feasibility of the opportunities they targeted.   
In this research, we contribute to the opportunity recognition literature by revisiting 
the role of entrepreneurial determinants and indicating three entrepreneurial determinants for 
new firm creation and how different determinants lead to different processes of opportunity 
recognition and evaluation. We especially indicate the impact of emotional issues (e.g., 
personally frustration) on opportunity recognition to explain why some entrepreneurs 
generate opportunity beliefs at a distance. In addition, we integrate cognitive research with 
the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities to show how different entrepreneurial 
determinants eventually lead new ventures to pursue opportunities with different levels of 
similarities with their current knowledge. Besides, we conducted a multiple-case study to 
show empirically how different entrepreneurial determinants lead to the construction of 
multiple types of opportunity ideas, which has greater ecological validity than the previous 
tests which used experimental design methodology (Grégoire et al., 2010; Grégoire & 
Shepherd, 2012).  
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2.2 Theoretical Background: The Formation of Entrepreneurial Beliefs  
The opportunity-recognition process refers to “how entrepreneurs use simplifying 
mental models to piece together previously unconnected information that helps them to 
identify and invent new products or services and to assemble the necessary resources to start 
and grow businesses” (Mitchell et al., 2002, p.97). To date, the primary focus in the 
entrepreneurship research regarding opportunity recognition is on factors explaining which 
individuals or organisations are better able to identify opportunities (Gruber et al., 2008; 
Plambeck & Weber, 2009; Short et al., 2009). A significant portion of research, therefore, 
emphasises the differences in “alertness” to profit opportunities between entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1973), which is related to their knowledge and experience stocks 
(Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Shane, 2003). The literature shows that prior experience may not 
directly influence opportunity recognition, but that it is transformed into knowledge 
structures which can be observed in speech and action (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; 
Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Different researchers consider these knowledge structures as 
“beliefs” (Walsh, 1988). Beliefs guide and determine an entrepreneur’s actions (Haynie et al., 
2009; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Wood & Pearson, 2009) 
In order for opportunity identification to ensue, entrepreneurs “connect the dots” (R. 
A. Baron, 2006) between the changes they notice and what could be done to interpret the 
changes. Extant research indicates that the processes of opportunity recognition include 
associations between external information and individual knowledge and between 
components of entrepreneurial opportunities. The first cognitive association emphasizes how 
entrepreneurs’ knowledge interacts with external stimuli and how the association leads to the 
formation of insightful new business ideas. For example, entrepreneurs may be alert to new 
opportunities by using prior knowledge of how things are as a basis to understand unusual 
changes in the environment (Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). This counterfactual 
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thinking helps entrepreneurs consider association between what is and what might be and 
leads to the identification of alternate courses of actions. Baron (2004, 2006) advances the 
concept that entrepreneurs identify opportunity by recognising patterns in their environment 
and then connect the dots “between changes in technology, demographics, markets, 
government policies and other factors” (Baron, 2006, p.104). The second cognitive 
association emphasises entrepreneurs’ mental connections between the information 
components of opportunities in and of themselves. For example, Smith and Di Gregorio 
(2002) propose that opportunity recognition involves the combination of information from 
different domains such as manufacturers, customers and markets. More recently, Grégoire 
and his colleagues (2010) argue that entrepreneurs identify potential opportunities by aligning 
the structural capabilities of new technologies with structural causes underlying latent 
demands in a particular market. In this regard, Grégoire and Shepherd (2012) distinguish 
opportunities by emphasising the superficial and structural similarities between new 
technologies and a target market in which these new technologies can be introduced. They 
indicate that the more similar a new technology is to a market, the more positive beliefs that 
bringing in this technology in the market to constitute an opportunity will be. Also, they 
found that entrepreneurs with higher entrepreneurial intent tend to form more positive beliefs 
about less obvious opportunities although superficial similarities between technology and the 
market is absent. Dencker and Gruber (2014) take into account how the types of opportunities 
that entrepreneurs exploit conditions on the relevance of their knowledge endowment and 
consider how opportunity and founder characteristics interact to shape new firm performance. 
Their results show that high-risk opportunities favour entrepreneurs with managerial 
experience; while low-risk opportunities favour entrepreneurs with industry experience. 
The current research on the opportunity-recognition process mostly emphasizes the 
role of prior knowledge and experience in being alert to promising opportunities and in 
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helping entrepreneurs to make sense of disconnected facts. It suggests that entrepreneurs are 
more likely to recognise and select opportunities that they believe they have the means and 
ability to do and perceive to be positive and valuable to themselves (Ajzen, 1985, 1991; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005). However, the mental models to piece together unconnected 
information to invent new products/ services include not only how entrepreneurs connect 
information but also why they connect particular information, which is related to their 
entrepreneurial determinants to start a new business (Shane et al., 2003).   
Entrepreneurial determinants includes internal factors that impel action and external 
factors that work as inducements to action (Locke & Latham, 2004), which determines 
entrepreneurs’ ideas for interpreting and exploiting an opportunity (Shane et al., 2003). 
Previous research has explored several determinants (e.g., needs for achievement, locus of 
control, tolerance for ambiguity, risk taking, self-efficacy, and self-image) to develop theories 
of the entrepreneurial process including entrepreneurial career intention (Begley, 1995; 
Collins, Hanges, & Locke, 2004; Mueller & Thomas, 2001; Zhao et al., 2005), 
entrepreneurial cognition (Ardichvili et al., 2003; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; J. R. 
Mitchell & Shepherd, 2010), and new venture survival (Ciavarella et al., 2004). For example, 
Ardichvili and his colleagues (2003) propose a theoretical model to indicate how 
entrepreneurs' personality traits, social networks, and prior knowledge increase/ decrease the 
likelihood of an opportunity being recognised. Mitchell and Shepherd (2010) indicate that 
entrepreneurs' images of vulnerability and images of capability influence the process of first 
person opportunity recognition. However, these studies focus on the impact of 
entrepreneurial determinants on one’s propensity to become entrepreneurs or act on particular 
opportunities with high or low risk, uncertainly, or ambiguity but have little to say where 
these opportunities come from. Therefore, the explanations of the fact that some 
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entrepreneurs target distant opportunities even if necessary resources are currently not under 
their control remain missing.   
2.3 Method 
Given the lack of comprehensible theory on the understanding of the cognitive 
process underlying particular decision making which determines the types of opportunities 
that entrepreneurs eventually select, we conducted an inductive, multiple-case study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Inductive studies are particularly appropriate for developing theoretical 
insights for a phenomenon that extant research is under-addressed (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009). A multiple-case study includes comparative data which are likely to yield more 
accurate and generalizable theory than what a single-case study can provide (Eisenhardt, 
1991; Yin, 1994).  
 To understand how the variance in entrepreneurial determinants influences the types 
of opportunities that entrepreneurs recognise and eventually exploit, we specifically focus on 
two opportunity characteristics which are likely to influence the formation of opportunity 
intention to exploit particular opportunities – the superficial and the structural similarities 
between entrepreneurs’ current technology and market knowledge and the knowledge 
required in a target market. Superficial similarity increases as two objects, concepts, or 
situations have common basic information elements that resemble each other; whereas 
structural similarity increases when two objects, concepts, or situations have common logical 
relationships between their respective components and other superficial factors (Gentner & 
Markman, 2006; Markman & Gentner, 1993). For technology knowledge, a superficial 
similarity arises as the basic elements of a technology (e.g., its parts and components, the 
inputs it requires) are similar to a venture's current technology knowledge; whereas structural 
similarity arises as the intrinsic capabilities of a new technology (what it can do, the logical 
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or scientific mechanisms underlying it) are similar to a venture's current technology 
knowledge. For market knowledge, superficial similarity arises as the basic characteristics of 
a particular market (e.g., market participants, customers, customer demands) are similar to a 
venture's current market knowledge; whereas structural similarity arises as the higher-order 
market condition (e.g., operational rules, regulations, problems of market activities) is similar 
to a venture's current market knowledge.   
2.3.1 Research setting 
We targeted new ventures in the medical device manufacturing market in the mobile 
health (mHealth) industry in North America (mainly in the U.S.) (see Table 1). ‘Mobile 
health’ is referred to as a new way to provide healthcare by using mobile devices to collect 
and deliver clinical health data between practitioners, researchers, and patients to provide 
real-time monitoring and direct care (Germanakos, Mourlas, & Samaras, 2005). We chose the 
medical equipment market because it emerged as a new field including distinctive categories 
(e.g., healthcare services, insurance, government, connectivity technology), which causes a 
high level of market complexity. Companies in a complex market may have various strategic 
actions. Also it is a nascent market without a dominant business model (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) 
to influence or guide each company's decision. In addition, we targeted new ventures because 
their strategic actions may strongly reflect their judgment of the path to recognise 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 1 Data representation 
Active new ventures in the medical 
device segment in the mHealth market1 No. Status No. 
Area 
North America 2 17 
Being acquired before 20133 5 
Bankruptcy before 2013 3 
No-response 2 
In Sample 7 
Alive new ventures in the North America 9 
Europe 6 - - 
Total 23 Sample coverage probability 78% 
 
We undertook the following steps to identify targeted companies: (1) Reviewing all 
strategic alliances listed in the three MobiHealthNews Year End Reports (2009, 2010, 2011); 
(2) identifying each company’s North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
code on Hoover’s online database4; (3) selecting firms in the electro-medical and electro-
therapeutic apparatus manufacturing (NAICS code: 334510), surgical and medical instrument 
manufacturing (NAICS: 339112), and medical, dental, and hospital equipment and supplies 
merchant wholesalers (NAICS code: 423450); and (4) ruling out firms founded before 20005. 
 
                                                             
1 In this research we focused on active players in the medical device department in the mHealth market by 
choosing new ventures featuring alliance relationships in 2009, 2010, or 2011 as reported in the 
MobiHealthNews Year End Reports. 
2 To avoid bias resulting from healthcare systems and policies in different countries or areas, we focused on the 
market with the largest number of players. In this case, we targeted the market in North America (all focal firms 
work in the U.S. market).   
3 This research begins from 2013. Thus, we selected new ventures that were alive in the medical device 
department in the mHealth market in 2013. 
4 Hoover's online databasE (http://www.hoovers.com/) 
5 In 1997, Ericsson launched its GS 88 "Penelope" and described concept of Penelope as a “Smart Phone” 
(Sager, 2012). In 2000, NTT launched the first 3G network. The combination of the smartphone and 3G 
network offers the possibility of the development of mHealth (De Vriendt, Laine, Lerouge, & Xu, 2002). 
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2.3.2 Data sources 
We include seven new ventures in North America6. Data sources include exploratory 
interviews, archival data, and formal semi-structured interviews. (1) The seven exploratory 
interviews were conducted to understand the dynamics of the mobile health market in Boston 
in 2012. The informants include policy makers in the US government, clinicians, healthcare 
providers, and researchers in the medical and engineering schools. (2) The archive data 
included 933 news items about focal firms collected from the Factivia database, three years 
of MobiHealthNews Year End Reports (2009, 2010, 2011), each company's product portfolio 
on the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) website, and the founding team’s portfolio 
on company websites. (3) We undertook three rounds of interviews, including 24 semi-
structured interviews (see Table 2) and we taped and transcribed the interviews turning into 
409 pages of double spaced interview transcripts. The first round was conducted from late 
March until May 2013 and includes seven phone interviews and one face-to-face interview 
and was. We applied event tracking interview technique to guide informants to find an 
overview of events that happened in the previous years (Eisenhardt, 1989). The second round 
was conducted six months later (October 2013) and included nine face-to-face interviews. 
We extended our understanding to why the founders of focal firms initiated their business and 
what resources they had. The last round was also conducted six months after (late April to 
early June 2014) and included seven phone interviews to confirmed our findings with focal 
firms to ensure no misunderstanding would make the results bias.  
                                                             
6 All of the seven ventures focus on the U.S. market. 
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Table 2 Data inventory 
New 
Venture 
Location Year 
Founded 
Age No. of 
founders 
No. of 
interviews 
Interview details 
Date 
Time 
Mins Type Informant 
A 
Greater 
Boston 
area, MA 
2005 9 1 3 
18/04/2013 66 Phone 
Founder 24/10/2013 73 Face-to-face 
13/05/2014 47 Phone 
B Boca 
Raton, FL  
2008 6 3 3 
25/04/2013 63 Phone 
Co-founder 
 10/10/2013 65 Face-to-face 
28/04/2014 54 Phone 
C 
Annapolis 
MD 2003 11 1 5 
29/05/2013 81 Phone Founder 
22/10/2013 56 Face-to-face 
Lead 
hardware 
Engineer 
22/10/2013 27 Face-to-face CTO 
24/10/2013 61 Face-to-face Founder 
04/06/2014 65 Phone Founder 
D San Diego 
CA 
2007 7 3 3 
17/04/2013 64 Phone 
Founder 16/10/2013 57 Face-to-face 
28/04/2014 46 Phone 
E 
King of 
Prussia, 
PA 
2008 6 4 4 
18/03/2013 70 Phone 
Founder (VP 
of sales and 
marketing) 
23/04/2013 82 Face-to-face  
09/10/2013 113 Face-to-face 
29/04/2014 69 Phone 
F San Diego 
CA 
2004 10 2 3 
20/03/2013 52 Phone 
VP of market 
development 
15/10/2013 91 Face-to-face 
02/05/2014 49 Phone 
G 
Toronto, 
Canada  2002 12 2 3 
23/04/2013 81 Phone 
General 
manager 
14/10/2013 90 Face-to- 
28/04/2014 51 Phone 
 
2.3.3 Data analysis 
We started from developing the time line of each focal firm by reviewing news items, 
industry reports, and interviews transcripts and then began open coding of interview 
transcripts by using Nvivo after most data had been collected (Eisenhardt, 1989). By doing so, 
we preserve the integrity of replication thinking logics in cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). 
Data analysis followed a cross case analysis to identify similar constructs (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). We followed the Gioia template (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013) to order 
open coding and then gradually combined the vivo codes into first order codes.  
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Following the standards of content analysis (Krippendorff, 2012; Neuendorf, 2002), 
two coders independently code the raw data: One author and a junior researcher who was 
blind to the theoretical rationales. We calculated interrater reliability including percentage of 
agreement and Cohen’s κ for all coding dimensions made by two coders. We reached 93.8% 
agreement (κ=0.930) which reaches the acceptable level of interrater reliability. The two 
coders discussed discrepancies and gradually had agreements on all statements. To ensure 
reliability and common understanding with the second author, first order codes were marked 
in line with the different components of opportunity recognition and the nature of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. In the next round of coding, we tentatively combined first order 
codes into fewer and theoretically grounded second-order codes through axial coding (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1997). We also cross-checked the second order codes with literature on 
opportunity recognition and the characteristics of entrepreneurial opportunities to avoid 
ignoring theoretically relevant knowledge (Suddaby, 2006). This interaction between theory 
and data helped us to sharp construct definitions and the theoretical relationship between 
constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
2.4 Findings  
This research aims to investigate how entrepreneurs come up with their opportunity 
ideas and how variations in entrepreneurial determinants influence the entrepreneurs’ 
attention to recognise and exploit different types of opportunity ideas. We clarify the 
entrepreneurial determinants which influence entrepreneurs’ cognitive processes to recognise 
different types of opportunities and how these determinants influence the formation of 
entrepreneurial intention to exploit particular opportunities.  
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2.4.1 Entrepreneurial Determinants and the Processes of Opportunity Recognition and 
Evaluation    
Our data indicates that opportunity recognition is motivated by three entrepreneurial 
determinants: Technology-driven, operation-driven, or user-driven determinants. Three of the 
seven ventures (Companies A, B, and C) in the sample were established with a technology 
prototype and the goal was to leverage current technology to other profitable market 
segments (Quotations 1-3 in Table 3). For example, Company A had a platform to deliver a 
service through a TV set which can be used in the energy management, security, and medical 
markets. Company B had a product prototype with tracking technology which is helpful for 
pet tracking, Alzheimer patients, and elderly people. Company C had remote physiological 
monitoring technology and a product which worked in the researchers, sport, military, and 
first-responder markets. The main goal of these ventures was to maximize the value of their 
current technology, so they conducted a study to evaluate the potential of each opportunity. 
The medical device market was chosen because the market was growing and provided 
foreseeable ROI (Quotations 7-9 in Table 3).  
Two ventures (Companies D, and E) were motived by their founders’ past operational 
experiences (Quotations 10-12 in Table 3). The founders of Company D noticed the demands 
of chronic disease patients because they had a long history in the healthcare solution market. 
The founders of Company E worked in the life safety security market and found there was no 
sophisticated product which can match with customers’ needs. While evaluating potential 
value of the opportunities they targeted, these two ventures did not conduct a complete study 
but relied on their founders’ prior knowledge (Quotations 13-14, and 16 in Table 3). In 
addition, they particularly conducted empirical tests (e.g., establishing a product prototype 
(Quotation 15 in Table 3) or acquired key technology (Quotation 17 in Table 3)) before 
starting new business to ensure that they have the abilities to realise their product concept.   
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Three ventures (Companies D, F, and G) were motivated by their founders’ personal 
frustration in searching for a product to solve the problems they faced in their everyday lives 
(Quotations 18-20 in Table 3). For example, the founders of Companies D and G were 
searching for a product to take care of their family members suffering from chronic diseases 
or age-related conditions. One of the founders of Company F, a cardiologist, was looking for 
a solution to continually monitor the heart pressure of heart disease patients7. These founders 
started their new business because they failed to find a suitable product in the current market 
to satisfy their needs. Their opportunity ideas came from their everyday lives which may not 
had obvious connections with their current resources. While evaluating technology feasibility, 
Companies F and G - whose founders did not worked in the medical device markets - relied 
on the consensus of knowledgeable peers (Quotation 21 and 24 in Table 3). But in most cases, 
they did not empirically create a product prototype before they started their new business. 
When evaluating the market feasibility of the targeted opportunities, these two ventures 
(Companies F and G) usually generalized market demands from their founders’ needs. For 
instance, the founders of Company G believed that other elderly people, like their 
parents/grandparents, needed a device to deal with their age-related conditions (Quotation 23 
in Table 3). 
                                                             
7 Although he worked in the healthcare market, his role was as a medical device "user" 
instead of a "producer". Therefore, he did not have knowledge regarding operating a medical 
device company.  
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Table 3 Data structure of entrepreneurial motivations 
Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
Representative Data 
Technology-
driven 
forces 
Technology 
leveraging  
1 "Between 2001 to 2005, our solution was very flexible. We thought we can 
create an application box that is connected to TVs. …we thought we can apply 
to energy management, security, healthcare, all of those. So we were starting 
looking around, [assessing] what is a different industry which our system can 
help." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
2 "What we see is the trend that chronic disease patients will be [in their] homes 
and their conditions will deteriorate and then they get very sick. They end up in 
hospital and get two or three weeks care and then they go back home. So it is 
continuously up and down. That’s where the costs of health care are 
dramatically exponential. So providing the connectivity for patients using their 
TV sets and bringing some medical devices into the home will provide an 
environment which can continuously monitor their health, provide guidance in 
order to keep their disease level [steady]. [Interview with Founder of Company 
A, 18 April 2013] 
  
3 "He [one of the founders] wanted to do something about tracking and mPRES 
was only one of the ideas. He said pet tracking, Alzheimer tracking, mPERS. He 
didn't know. His business plan is very unfocused. But I like the tracking idea. 
And [Another founder] was the one helped the market research" [Interview 
with Co-founder of Company B, 10 Oct. 2013] 
  
4 "We started with the goal of physiological monitoring and the product required 
a sensor, a wireless connection, and analytical software. ... The four main 
reasons to monitor human beings remotely were for human performance or 
fitness, industrial safety, medical. … We can measure anybody remotely, which 
in one of them has always been for medical reasons [Interview with founder of 
Company C, 29 May 2013] 
  
5 "Since we have had the hardware, the hardware itself is not a product because 
no one can use just a hardware. ... The software side tends to be more market 
specific. For example, the sport software has something in common with the 
medical software but it is directed toward sports and it [a medical device] is 
directed toward medical. The hardware for both of them is actually the same. 
[Interview with Lead Hardware Engineer of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
Feasibility 
assessment  
6 "What we found was the energy industry was no revenue. There is no clear ROI 
to build it. In security, again, very low margins. There was no return on 
investment for a new solution. Healthcare seems like the only one where we 
seem to fit. We saw there were a lot more needs. ... Healthcare is a very 
interesting and complex environment where you not only need to work with 
nurses, you not only work with doctors, [but] you have to work with 
pharmacists to get the complete cares. So the need for communication and 
connectivity are much more complex and can save a lot of money. So there was 
potential for ROI for saving a lot of money and justifying the cost for 
implementation." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
7 "We decided pretty early on. The entire focus [on the healthcare market was] 
because we were trying to see if there was any other possible markets [or] 
business models in other segments. [But] no [other business model] is 
sustaining for us. I think it took us probably two years before we decided that it 
was our entire focus." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 13 May, 2014] 
  
8 "The other big advantage was this company [a partner and this partnership 
happened before Company A focused exclusively on the mHealth market] was 
an expert in delivering one of the solutions [a solution for diabetes patients]. So 
it was a great learning experience for us to discover how they think about 
delivering care and delivering medical devices. So how they manufacture, how 
to get FDA approvals, all those things are our other benefits from this 
partnership. And they, of course, got a lot of tests regarding how patients think 
about the solution" [Interview with Founder of Company A, 13 May, 2014] 
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order Codes 
First-           
order Codes               
Representative Data 
  
9 “He [one founder] had a prototype of a tracking device which is similar to our 
mobile device. The functionality is similar. ...he [another founder] was the one 
helped the market research and said let's go for mPRES ... And we noticed that 
industry was really lacking technology innovation. ... So we saw a window of 
opportunity for us to go and disrupt the market place by bringing in a new idea 
to do the same business....... In the U.S., the elderly population is growing 
because of the baby boom and the trend which is to keep costs down. Also the 
elderly people want to stay at their own homes as long as possible because that 
makes them feel comfortable." [Interview with co-founder of Company B, 25 
April 2013] 
  
10 "We got confirmation from him [an advisor] that the market [PERS market] 
still has not changed probably in 20 years.  ... I think we all knew that they 
would [like our product]. We didn't need the whole market research to know 
[that] they would like the mobility piece because we know elderly people like to 
be active [and] not just staying at home." [Interview with Founder of Company 
B, 28 April 2014] 
 
 
11 "We like the elderly market because it is growing because of the baby boomers. 
So we knew the market will expand and we didn't how many people are willing 
to pay that much money for pets to tracking pets. It is not big enough to make a 
company... We thought about Alzheimer but it was not that established. There is 
no one else doing that which could be used as a benchmark to establish a 
business model. We had to create the whole business model from scratch. That 
would be very difficult. Within the PERS industry, it has already been 
established with how they do and the prices. We thought we would be better to 
disturb that market and be the first one in that market." [Interview with co-
founder of Company B, 10 Oct. 2013] 
 
 
12 The main reason [to enter the medical market] was the demand was growing so 
is the profitability of that market. … Sport market is a quite niche market. There 
are not many players in that market. They are mainly multinational companies 
like Nike, Adidas, and large companies. They need a lot of the technology we 
have." [Interview with CTO of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
 
13 "The biggest issue was the whole medical market for monitoring; no one knew 
who was going to pay for it. That was the big change. And now Obama and 
some other changes in performance-based procedures, then there were much 
more interest because they will get penalized if they don't do it." [Interview with 
CTO of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
Operation-
driven 
forces 
Perception 
form related 
operational 
experience 
14 "We are actually starting from chronic disease because my last company that I 
sold to [a company] was [name of a company]. It was a cure care ... very long 
after patient was in trouble.  I decide to get earlier on disease progression. And 
so I decide to do chronic diseases. …it is not till the later on, we realized that 
diabetes cost a lot. Very expensive side effects. If we were doing it over based 
on the market size, we probably do congestive heart failure not diabetes 
because congestive heart failure has bigger population." [Interview with Co-
Founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 2013] 
 
 15 "They [the founders] knew the industry very well. And it [the personal 
emergency response market] was a very competitive market because everyone 
was selling basically the same thing. .. And most of the equipment used at that 
time was less sophisticated. So the main driving force is to find a better product 
to penetrate the existing large market. [Interview with VP of sales and 
marketing of Company E, 9 Oct. 2013] 
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order Codes               
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 16 "The founders at the time the company started were in the home security 
market. …everybody was familiar with the medical home alarm business. … 
Most of time, you saw somebody fall down. You assume they can talk through 
the pendant but actually they cannot. ... Most of time people get injured in their 
homes, like elderly people, because they fall. The other thing is that the way 
that the traditional system works ... you have to be [using] speaker boxes or all 
those systems to talk back when you press the buttons. But the fact is that as 
homes became larger and people fall in showers when the door closed, these 
are representative of serious shortcomings. So the founders of the company 
thought they were able to provide a solution. That could really and truly 
improve the performance and reliability of this type of system. This was basis of 
the company" [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 
April 2014] 
 
Feasibility 
assessment 
17 "I understand the market and get to put it together " [Interview with co-founder 
of Company D, 16 Oct. 201] 
 
 18 "We just created the product and the whole concept because we knew there 
were customers for glucose monitors. … It was pretty simple because glucose 
meters have been around for years. They are very standard in term of using 
consumable test strips and discipline and results, these kinds of things. So the 
glucose meter technology is very well developed when we entered the market. 
What we wanted to do was add the features of wireless connectivity. ... We 
added another concept to that which was online monitoring" [Interview with 
co-founder of Company D, 28 April 2014] 
 
 19 “My partners and I [one of the founders] decided that we wanted to build a 
blood glucose meter together [which used a] mobile phone and we had a 
prototype. Actually we have had the prototype before we started the company 
because we were doing other things, and once we went through the prototype 
developing process, we knew we could actually make this device. That's why we 
founded this company.” [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 17 April 
2013] 
 
 20 "There are a lot of users and studies have been done [regarding the personal 
emergency respondence system]. The founders had a background in the 
completive products." [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company 
E, 29 April 2014] 
 
 21 "What happened was the founders were introduced to an engineer who had a 
patented approach to talk through the pendent. … So they felt that well "we'll 
come up with a product that everybody just talks through the pendant. That 
would allow us to go into the market place and have this patented feature" ... 
One of founders knew him [the engineer] before the company started.  So that 
was the root of how things happened." [Interview with VP of sales and 
marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
User-driven 
forces 
Perception 
form 
personal life 
experience 
22 "All three of the founders including myself have diabetes in family. So we saw 
the relative suffering of this disease. So we thought there must be a better way 
to manage this glucose data." [Interview with Co-Founder of Company D, 16 
Oct. 2013] 
23 "[The founder, a cardiologist] said ‘it would be very cool if you [co-founder] 
are able to produce [a product] to give me blood pressure continually.’ [The 
founder, a cardiologist] deals with a lot of high potential patients. And in the 
U.S., we know 70 million [people] in the U.S. have potential. So this could be a 
big deal and it had have not been down very successfully before. [Interview 
with VP of market development of Company F 15 Oct. 2013] 
24 "[The founder] was working for his father [the co-founder] at that time and 
looking for a way to stay in touch with his grandparents. They are remote. And 
he wanted to help to manage their aging conditions." [Interview with General 
Manager of Company G, 14 Oct. 2013] 
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Feasibility 
assessment 
25 "The family friend [one of the founders, a cardiologist] identified a clinical 
problem and said if you [another founder] could [develop] continuous blood 
pressure that would be very helpful for the clinical communities and patients. 
So that's why [the second founder mentioned in the paragraph] said "I am 
going to do that exactly." And then [the second founder mentioned in the 
paragraph] developed the continuous blood pressure monitor. So he was 
respondent to a clinical need and solved that problem.” [Interview with VP of 
Market Development of Company F, 2 May 2014] 
 
 26 “[One founder, a cardiologist] said "it would be very cool if you are able to 
produce a device to give me blood pressure continually” … [the founder] is a 
cardiologist. So he deals with a lot of high potential patients. And in the U.S., 
we know 70 million [people] in the U.S. have potential. So this could be a big 
deal and it had not been done very successfully before.” [Interview with VP of 
Market Development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2014] 
 
 27 "They saw their own needs and figured out this was the need that others had, so 
they thought it could be a business they can develop and then [one of the 
founders] wanted to start the business." [Interview with General Manager of 
Company G , 28 April 2014] 
 
 28 “…the founder, the father had products made in the Orient for 25 to 30 years. 
When they [two founders] researched the market, they found one of the big 
complaints was the wiring and hook-up to the devices and they knew that would 
never work in the direct to the consumer market model. That was too 
complicated. So the manufacturers [who produced products for one of the 
founders before] told them they had experience in Bluetooth. So early on, they 
know they can take advantage of these relationships in the Orient to develop 
products with Bluetooth before anybody else understood the value of 
Bluetooth.” [Interview with General Manager of Company G, 14 Oct. 2014] 
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2.4.2 The nature of entrepreneurial opportunities 
Firstly, we identified the level of superficial and structural similarities between focal 
firms’ ‘technology’ knowledge and what was required in the target market. We found that 
five ventures (Companies A, B, C, D, and E) focused on the opportunities with high 
superficial and structural similarities in terms of technology knowledge (Quotations 25-29 
and 32-37 in Table 4). In the interviews, we found Companies A, B, and C usually added new 
functions to their current products or product prototypes which resulted in high superficial 
(Quotations 25-27 in Table 4) and high structural similarities with their current technologies 
(Quotations 32-34 in Table 4). For example, Company C leveraged the sensor, wireless 
connection, and data transformation technologies – used in other market segments – in the 
new business in the mobile health market and leveraged the remote physiological monitoring 
technology in relation to a vital signs monitor.       
The founders of Companies D and E had a long history working in related market 
segments. They usually had some technology which they developed in their past career can 
be leveraged to the new business (Quotations 28-29 and 35-37 in Table 4). For example, 
Company D leveraged telecommunications, tracking technology, and the knowledge of 
healthcare records and self-service software solutions in aid of the creation of a new device. 
Company E had life safety security technology and accessed the patents of remote 
communication and alarm system through the founders’ personal connection (Quotations 37 
in Table 4). However, the opportunities Companies F and G targeted tended to lacked 
obvious similarities with their founders’ prior technology knowledge (Quotations 30-31 and 
38-39 in Table 4). For example, the founders of Company F were a doctor and an expert in 
GPS technology; while the founders of Company G came from the toy industry. They all 
lacked technology knowledge or experiences related to the medical device market.   
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Secondly, we reviewed the similarities in the ‘market’ knowledge of focal firms. 
Companies A and B targeted opportunities with a medium level of structural similarities (e.g., 
medical regulation and operational rules) with their existing market knowledge (Quotations 
47-48 and 53 in Table 4) although the superficial similarities (e.g., target customers) may not 
be significant (Quotations 44-45 in Table 4). For example, in the former business, Company 
A had a partnership with a big medical device company and learned how to operate in the 
medical device market (structural similarities in operational rules) (Quotations 53 in Table 4). 
In addition, in the former business, Company A worked with medical service providers and 
medical device manufacturers to deliver medial education through a service platform. 
Although in the new business the main customer turned out to be insurance companies, 
Company A still needed to work with medical device providers and healthcare service 
providers (medium superficial similarities) (Quotation 40 in Table 4). For Companies B and 
C, while working in other market segments, they accumulated experience regarding 
regulation issues such as FDA regulations because of their former customers' requests 
(Quotations 47-48 in Table 4).  
The founders of Companies D and E both had related market knowledge in terms of 
market participants, customer, customer demands, regulation, and operational knowledge 
which can guide their business development (Quotations 41-42, 49, and 54-56 in Table 4). 
However Companies F and G targeted the opportunities without significant superficial and 
structural similarities with the market knowledge their founders had (Quotations 46, 51-52, 
and 59-60 in Table 4). Only one founder of Company F, a cardiologist, had some market 
knowledge regarding the customer in the medical device market but his role was as a medical 
device user instead of a provider.   
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Table 4 Data structure of opportunity selection 
Second-
order Codes 
First-   
order Codes     
Representative Data 
Technology 
similarities 
Superficial 
similarities 
(Basic 
elements of 
technology) 
High similarities 
29 [Old technology/product]  
A service platform to collect and transmission clinical data [Information 
from the interview with the founder of Company A, 18 April 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
"What we see is the trend that chronic disease patients will be [in their] 
homes and their conditions will deteriorate and then they get very sick. They 
end up in hospital and get two or three weeks care and then they go back 
home. So it is continuously up and down. … So providing the connectivity 
for patients using their TV sets and bringing some medical devices into the 
home will provide an environment which can continuously monitor their 
health, provide guidance in order to keep their disease level [steady]. 
[Interview with Founder of Company A, 18 April 2013] 
 
 30 [Old technology/product]  
A product prototype with the tracking technology [Information from the 
interview with the founder of Company B, 25 April 2013] 
 
 [Old technology/product]  
"One of the other gentlemen who is our CEO is a double E engineer and so 
he has already understood the product and the process in creating new 
products." [Interview with co-founder of Company B, 25 April, 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
"...he [the cofounder] looked at all the opportunities that were available for 
what the prototype could do. And he searched the mobility piece for the 
PERS industry, and we determined the existing leaders in the market place 
had not really focused any attention on the mobility piece." [Interview with 
Co-founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
  
31 [Old technology/product]  
A physiological monitoring device with sensor, wireless connection, and 
data transformation technology [Information from the interview with the 
founder of Company C, 29 May 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
"From entering in the medical market to six months later, we shipped our 
first product. That's because we have had FDA and we already had 80% of 
the product.…. The only need for R&D is the gap we faced." [Interview with 
Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
  
[New technology/product] 
"We started with the goal of physiological monitoring and the product 
required a sensor, a wireless connection, and analytical software. ... The 
four main reasons to monitor human beings remotely were for human 
performance or fitness, industrial safety, medical. … We can measure 
anybody remotely” [Interview with founder of Company C, 29 May 2013] 
  
32 [Old technology/product]  
Healthcare information, software, and teleconferencing [Information from 
the interview with a co-founder of Company D, 17 May 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
"My technology which I have worked in my whole career has been 
communication talk, communication technology. So I feel comfortable in the 
technology [sector] and I worked in telecom outside of healthcare, in 
[another market]. And then I got involved in healthcare. That's sort of the 
coming through for the technology standpoint, through the all companies I 
have done. So we looked at how could we apply telecommunication 
technology to diabetes to make the data collection more efficient" [Interview 
with co-founder of Company D, 28 April 2014]  
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(Cont.) 
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technology) 
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33 [Old technology/product]  
Life safety security technology [Information from the interview with VP of 
sales and marketing of Company E, 23 April 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
“[One founder] was doing something in security systems and he got 
interested in the post alarm systems. And he and a marketing guy... the guy 
worked in manufacturing those devices and they know a lot about what the 
industry is doing and [were able to] envision a new product.” [Interview 
with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 9 Oct. 2013] 
   Low similarities 
  
34 [Old technology/product]  
“He [one founder] came from the automotive industry. … [He] was 
something like GPS tracking.” [Interview with VP of market development 
of Company F 15 Oct. 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
A vital sign monitor [Information from the interview with VP of market 
development  of Company F , 23 April 2013 and FDA website] 
  
35 [Old technology/product]  
“Actually [one founder] was in a toy business and so there was nothing to 
do with health care, nothing to do with anything that we are doing now, 
except for selling products to persons. So [the founder] sold the company 
and decided to fund his son's idea.” [Interview with General Manager of 
Company G, 14 Oct. 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
Medical devices for chronic disease / a connection gateway a web platform 
for clinical data collection and transmission [Information from the interview 
with General Manager of Company G, 23 April 2013 and FDA website] 
 Structural 
similarities 
(Intrinsic 
capabilities 
of new 
technology) 
 High Similarities 
 
36 [Old technology/product]   
"In process automation, my focus was networking communications like the 
company that I worked with before; they built solutions for automation 
industries, factories, park stations. So if you look at the concepts, they have 
remote control and provide different services in process automation so that 
the concepts are very similar. But this was appealing to consumers. This is 
appealing to the mainstream markets. [Interview with Founder of Company 
A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
A service platform to automatically collect and transmission clinical data 
[Information from the interview with the founder of Company A, 18 April 
2013 and FDA website] 
  
37 [Old technology/product]  
"Part of that [product] is the hardware and software system because we 
control signalling and data. We also have lots of expertise in the distributed 
software systems to be able to keep all these things up and running. That's 
our key experience from the web-hosting industry that is where we came 
from when we were a hosting company 10 years ago." [Interview with co-
founder of Company B, 25 April 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
A mobile personal emergency respond system [Information from the 
interview with the founder of Company B, 25 April 2013] 
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38 [Old technology/product]  
"The first product we created was for researchers. So it was [a product 
name] and the main reason we developed that was we developed some 
technology for smart fabric for sensing activities. So we wanted to find a use 
in a product ... And initially it was for researchers to be able to monitor 
patients or subjects on a lap-top environment. ... With that development and 
with scholarly researching for that, we did a bit with the U.S. Army ... we 
supply physiological monitoring systems for soldiers. ...once we developed 
the military products, we had some good success in that market. Within it, 
we had some investment from [an investor] who allowed us to transit to take 
the product to recharge to the firefighter market." [Interview with CTO of 
Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
[New technology/product] 
A vital signs monitor [Information from the interview with the founder of 
Company C, 29 May 2013 and FDA website] 
  
39 [Old technology/product]  
"...  I worked with [a given company] ... on the electronic healthcare record 
system. We developed the communication network which can transmit these 
healthcare records around the world because [the employees of the 
company] are constantly moving from one place to the next. And the record 
had to follow them. ... Then I left that company and did another company 
that we sold to [another company name]. That was applying 
telecommunication technology to operating rooms. ...we developed a way to 
transmit the audio and video in the ER operating rooms to different places, 
to doctors' offices or to other operating rooms. So that was 
telecommunication applied to the surgery. Then the next company was a 
tracking company that we tracked people and patients and equipment 
around the hospitals. And that was ZigBee technology which was a form of 
low data rate networking. ... And then after I left there and started 
[Company D], that was an application of telecommunication technology to 
glucose monitoring. "  [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 April 
2014] 
[New technology/product] 
A glucose meter and a web platform for clinical data collection and 
transmission [Information from the interview with a co-founder of Company 
D, 17May 2013 and FDA website] 
  
40 [Old technology/product]  
[The CTO, one of the founders] has over 25 years of corporate and 
entrepreneurial experience in a wide range of software and technology 
enterprises. Prior to joining [Company D], [the CTO] served as the 
president and founder of a company] where he was the chief architect of the 
[the company’s] self-service healthcare solutions. He served as the chief 
technology officer and founder of another company]’s subsidiary, He was 
responsible for the continued development of existing and new healthcare 
and education self-service software solutions. [The CTO] developed the 
technology used in automated self-service patient services using touch 
screen kiosks and wireless PC tablets and the Internet.” [Company website 
of Company D]  
[New technology/product] 
A glucose meter and a web platform for clinical data collection and 
transmission [Information from the interview with a co-founder of Company 
D, 17May 2013 and FDA website] 
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of new 
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41 [Old technology/product]  
“Prior to joining [Company E], he [one co-founder] was a senior security 
consultant for [a company], a structured wiring company. He is also a co-
founder of [another company], one of the nation’s top 30 home integration 
companies.” [Company website of Company E] 
 
[Old technology/product]  
“[One consultant, one founder’s friend, who joined the company since it was 
founded] is the original inventor of the PERS technology…. he won Best 
Invention of the Year at the Consumer Electronics show in [a named place] 
with his revolutionary new medical alert system” [Company website of 
Company E]  
[New technology/product] 
A mobile personal emergency respond system [Information from the 
interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 23 April 2013] 
  Low Similarities 
 
42 “Everything is completely new. … They [the two founders] had nothing at 
hand" [Interview with VP of market development of Company F, 2 May 
2014] 
 
43 “In my knowledge, the founders of our company had no experience of FDA 
clearance devices but did jump right into developing ... I think they just 
learned what they needed as the business evolved”. [Interview with General 
Manager of Company G, 28 April 2013] 
Market 
similarities 
Superficial 
similarities 
(Basic 
capabilities 
of the 
mHealth 
market) 
High Similarities 
44 [Old market/ market knowledge] 
"We decided pretty early on [before Company A entered into the medical 
device market]. The entire focus [was on the healthcare market was] 
because we were trying to see if there was any other possible markets [or] 
business models in other segments. [But] no [other business model] is 
sustaining for us. I think it took us probably two years before we decided 
that it was our entire focus." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 13 
May, 2014] 
 
“In [a certain year before Company A entered into the mHealth market], the 
concept which we were looking at was to build a service platform where you 
can deliver services though TV in the home. So it was a period of time [two 
years before Company A entered into the mHealth market]. We started 
talking to a company called [a company name, a large medical equipment 
company]. …they asked us to build a prototype and build a solution …so 
they can get education about diabetes by using the TV. So it was one of the 
vertical services that we can satisfy using our flexible systems.” [Interview 
with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
[New market/ market knowledge] 
Insurance companies/ Hospitals/ Medical devices providers [Information 
from the interview with the founder of Company A, 18 April 2013] 
  
45 [Old market/ market knowledge] 
[The CEO’s] career includes ten years at [a named company], the 
FORTUNE 500 engineering, and technology applications company … 
Following [the company mentioned before], [the CEO] founded [another 
company], a systems integration company. … In [a year], [the CEO] co-
founded [a company, a telecommunication company]. In 2004, [the CEO] 
founded [a company, a healthcare technology company].” [Company 
website of Company D] 
[New market/ market knowledge] 
Hospitals/ Insurance companies/ Mobile health solutions integrator/ Medical 
devices providers [Information from the interview with a co-founder of 
Company D, 17May 2013] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
Representative Data 
 
Superficial 
similarities 
(Basic 
capabilities 
of the 
mHealth 
market) 
(Cont.) 
46 [Old market/ market knowledge] 
"The founders, by the time the company started, were in the home security 
market." [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 
2014] 
[New market/ market knowledge] 
End users (elderly people and their families) [Information from the 
interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 23 April 2013] 
 
47 “[One founder] is a cardiologist … he deals with a lot of high potential 
patients.” [Interview with VP of market development of Company F, 15 
Oct. 2013] 
 Low Similarities 
 
48 “…this is a whole new industry for all of us. I think as a successful 
entrepreneur, we have to react very quickly, making very small changes and 
learning: learning by doing.” [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 
28 April 2014] 
  
49 "The first product we created was for researchers. So it was [a product 
name] and the main reason we developed that was we developed some 
technology for smart fabric for sensing activities. … With that development 
and with scholarly researching for that, we did a bit with the U.S. Army ... 
we supply physiological monitoring systems for soldiers. ...once we 
developed the military products, we had some good success in that market. 
Within it, we had some investment from [an investor] who allowed us to 
transit to take the product to recharge to the firefighter market." [Interview 
with CTO of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
  
50 "The two funders' background was primary consumer products." [Interview 
with General Manager of Company G, 23 April 2013] 
 Structural 
similarities 
–Regulation 
High Similarities 
 
51 "[One of the co-founders] knew a lot [about the regulation issue] from his 
experience and then ... because in the previous company that I mentioned 
that we had sold, [that it] was for medical software. So he was very familiar 
with the FDA process, so we actually have hired an FDA resource, a quality 
resource." [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
 
52 “A lot of FDA approvals in those early days were for military products. …. 
It was part of the military contract.” [Interview with CTO of Company C, 
22 Oct. 2013] 
 
53 “[In] the company that I had and sold to [a company name], we didn't 
really know much about the regulatory, quality systems, and developing 
products under a quality system. So at [a company name], I learned a lot 
about that.” [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 April 2014] 
  Low Similarities 
  
54 "Medical devices, I think there is always complexity, like FDA certification. 
It is a big challenge. So to conquer that, I think the clear thing was to find 
an expert who knows that. And we were able to successfully to find 
somebody who is exceptional and has very deep knowledge of medical 
devices. So we have to comprise our existing innovative thinking with 
somebody who knew how to bring a medical device to market." [Interview 
with founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
55 “[One founder] is a cardiologist…. He [another founder] came out from the 
automotive industry. … [He] was [doing] something like GPS tracking.” 
[Interview with VP of market development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013]  
 
“He [one founder, a cardiologist] didn't really work here ….he [one 
founder, a cardiologist] doesn't get directly involved in day-to-day 
operations” [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 30 
April. 2014] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
Representative Data 
  
56 “Actually [one founder] was in a toy business and so there was nothing to 
do with health care, nothing to do with anything that we are doing now, 
except for selling products to persons.” [Interview with General Manager of 
Company G , 14 Oct. 2013] 
 Structural 
similarities–
Operational 
rules 
 
High Similarities 
 
57 "The other big advantage was this company [a partner and this partnership 
happened before Company A focused exclusively on the mHealth market] 
was an expert in delivering one of the solutions [a solution for diabetes 
patients]. So it was a great learning experience for us to discover how they 
think about delivering care and delivering medical devices. " [Interview 
with Founder of Company A, 13 May, 2014] 
 
58 "I [The co-founder] understand the market and get to put it together " 
[Interview with co-founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 201] 
  
59 “Throughout his [the CEO’s, one of the founders’] career he has 
specialized in healthcare delivery and organizational process improvement 
through the use of telecommunications and information technology… [The 
CEO’s] career includes ten years at [a named company], the FORTUNE 
500 engineering, and technology applications company … Following [the 
company mentioned before], [the CEO] founded [another company], a 
systems integration company. … In [a year], [the CEO] co-founded [a 
named telecommunications company]. In 2004, [the CEO] founded [a 
company, a healthcare technology company].” [Company website of 
Company D] 
 
 
60 "The current CEO for example, was in the home security business. And the 
first marketing sales person actually worked for other company who made 
one of these monitoring devices. … What happened was everybody was 
familiar with the medical home alarm business."  [Interview with VP of 
sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
  Low Similarities 
  
61 “…this is a whole new industry for all of us. I think as a successful 
entrepreneur, we have to react very quickly, making very small changes and 
learning: learning by doing.” [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 
28 April 2014] 
  
62 "We hire people to pull the DNA in. I need to change the DNA of the 
company. ... I had a very experienced team including myself that knew the 
question to ask to modify our platform to go to a particular market and solve 
the problem for that market. So we are extremely experienced. So we start to 
design a medical product in March and start to work on patients in 
December. ... So we are really good at that. But the sales and understanding 
the regulations, I knew I needed to change the DNA of the company to be a 
medical company. And so we hired people who already have that 
experience."  [Interview with founder of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013]  
  
63 "We hired sales because we didn't know how to sell. … And we hired 
clinicians because we needed people in the company who have been doctors 
and nurses so they could tell us how our products are needed to work." 
[Interview with Founder of Company C, 4 June 2014] 
  
67 “He [one founder] came out from the automotive industry. … [He] was 
[doing] something like GPS tracking.” [Interview with VP of market 
development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013] 
  
65 “Actually [one founder] was in a toy business and so there was nothing to 
do with health care, nothing to do with anything that we are doing now 
except for selling products to persons.” [Interview with General Manager of 
Company G , 14 Oct. 2013] 
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2.4.3 The interrelationships between entrepreneurial determinants, types of 
opportunities identified, and entrepreneurial decision making     
 This research aims to understand empirically what entrepreneurial determinants are 
influential in spurring a particular type of opportunity ideas in the first place and in directing 
the way to form opportunity beliefs. In the interviews, we found three types of 
entrepreneurial determinants – technology-driven determinant, operation-driven determinant, 
and user-driven determinant – that direct entrepreneurs’ attention in opportunity search. In 
our sample, we found three of the seven ventures (Companies A, B, and C) aimed to discover 
a new market domain to maximise the value for their current technologies. We labelled them 
as “technology-driven ventures”. Companies D and E aimed to find a technical solution for 
particular unmet demands observed in their founders’ past careers. We labelled them as 
“operation-driven ventures”. Companies F and G were looking for a solution to solve 
problems found in their founders’ daily lives. We labelled them as “user-driven ventures”. 
Before investigating the impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on the process of 
opportunity recognition and decision making, we reviewed the founders’ backgrounds and 
focal firms’ resources at “the founded year” to understand whether the entrepreneurial 
determinants resulted from the different resource endowment levels. The results (See Table 5) 
do not reveal systematic differences in founders’ entrepreneurial experiences and sources of 
funding, but show differences in market knowledge and technology resources. We found 
technology-driven and operation-driven ventures all had some technology resources related to 
medical devices when they were established; whereas user-driven ventures did not. For the 
market knowledge, companies D and E had substantial market knowledge related to the 
medical device market, Companies A, B, and C have some related knowledge, but 
Companies F and G had very limited market knowledge. The result indicates that the 
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endowment of resources do not have a significant impact on the types of opportunities that 
the ventures pursued.  
Table 5 Value chains comparison at “the founded year” 
Ventures 
Technology-driven ventures 
Operation-driven 
ventures 
User-driven ventures 
A B C D E F G 
Age 9 6 11 7 6 10 12 
Entrepreneurial 
experiences 
No 
Some                           
(not in the 
medical 
market) 
No 
Some                          
(in the 
medical 
market) 
No 
One                               
(not in the 
medical 
market) 
One                         
(not in the 
medical 
market) 
Market 
knowledge 
Some 
related to 
the medical 
market 
Some 
related to 
the medical 
market 
Some 
related to 
the medical 
market 
All 
founders 
knowledge 
related to 
the medical 
market 
All 
founders 
knowledge 
related to 
the medical 
market 
Limited 
related to 
the medical 
market 
No 
Human 
resources 
Some 
personal 
connections 
Some 
personal 
connections 
Limited 
personal 
connections 
Some 
personal 
connections 
Some 
personal 
connections 
Some 
personal 
connections 
Some 
personal 
connections 
Technology 
resources 
Some Some Some Some Some No No 
Sources of 
funding 
Private 
funding 
Private 
funding/ 
Venture 
capitals 
Private 
funding/ 
Venture 
capitals 
Private 
funding 
Private 
funding 
Private 
funding/ 
venture 
capitals/ 
institutional 
investors 
Private 
funding 
 
In the next stage, we compared the impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on the 
cognitive process of opportunity recognition, evaluation, entrepreneurial decision making in 
three types of ventures.  
Technology-driven ventures 
Technology-driven ventures aimed to search for a new market space to exploit their 
technology for more profits. This determinant directs technology-driven entrepreneurs to be 
alert to opportunities with high superficial and structural similarities with their current 
technology knowledge. Within a certain distance, they believed their technology had a higher 
utility to generate profits.  
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In the phase of opportunity evaluation, they did not have special preferences for 
particular opportunities as long as they can bring in a similar amount of profits. Their 
opportunity evaluation process, thus, was relatively rational. In order to realise the potential 
profits, the level of uncertainty certainly played an important role in their cognitive process. 
Before selecting an opportunity, they conduct market research to consider rationally whether 
the potential reward for this particular opportunity was worth the potential cost and whether 
they had necessary resources and ability to exploit the opportunity. As cognitive research has 
suggested, when interpreting ambiguous stimuli in the face of uncertainty, people tend to 
have a distinct preference for reasoning that involves a high order of structural relationships 
(Gentner, 1989; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). We found technology-driven 
ventures tended to avoid operating in a market from scratch. Therefore they favoured 
opportunities with at least a medium level of structural similarities to their prior market 
knowledge.  
Operation-driven ventures  
The founders of operation-driven ventures were motivated by the problem they found 
in their past operational experiences. Their long history in the related market segments helped 
them be alert to the lack of a sophisticated product which can better satisfy customer 
demands. Instead of searching for possible opportunities in terms of what technology-driven 
ventures did, their entire focus was on looking for a technical solution to solve particular 
demands they observed. Therefore, the opportunities that operation-driven entrepreneurs 
pursued usually had high market similarity with their prior knowledge. In addition, the 
targeted opportunities were not far away from their founders’ past work experiences. 
Although exploiting prior technology resources was not their key determinant to start the new 
business, the technology resources that they developed in their past career usually can aid 
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their new product development. Thus, the opportunities they eventually pursued naturally had 
higher technology similarities with their prior technology resources.   
In the opportunity evaluation phase, different from technology-driven ventures 
conducting market research to compare the viability of potential opportunities, operation-
driven ventures relied on their founders’ knowledge and their cognitive process tended to be 
implicit. Their founders’ market knowledge - in terms of how the market worked, how to 
interact with other players in the market, the regulation policies, customer acceptance, and 
other associated issues - naturally led them to only focus on opportunities with high market 
feasibility. In addition, while evaluating the technology feasibility, they not only relied on 
their own technology abilities but empirically developed a product prototype or acquired key 
technologies before their market entries.  
User-driven ventures  
The founders of user-driven ventures were motivated by personal frustration in 
searching for a suitable product to solve their own problems in their everyday lives. This 
determinant directed their attention to developing a technical solution to satisfy their own 
needs. Different from technology-driven ventures and operation-driven ventures which relied 
on prior technology or operational experience to recognize opportunities, user-driven 
ventures recognised opportunities based on their founders' life experiences. The cognitive 
process of opportunity recognition tended to be dominant by their emotional concerns. In 
most cases, their decision making tended to be irrational to such an extent that they started 
the new business without sufficient resources at hand. Therefore, we found that user-driven 
ventures were more likely to act on opportunities with low superficial and structural 
seminaries with their founder's prior knowledge.  
User-driven ventures spotted opportunities because of their founders' personal 
frustration. Those opportunities usually had no clear connection with their prior knowledge 
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and experience. Therefore, in the phase of opportunity evaluation, they relied on their peers’ 
affirmation to ensure the feasibility of their ideas. However, the peers' affirmation was mainly 
about the technological feasibility rather than the market feasibility. They tended to 
generalized market demands from their own needs. In the interviews, we founded their 
entrepreneurial determinant triggered their perceptions of a possible envisioned future that 
was desirable and feasible. Therefore, once their knowledgeable peers had an agreement 
regarding technological feasibility, they established a new business.   
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusions  
This study illustrates the relationship between entrepreneurial determinants and the 
types of opportunities that new ventures recognise and exploit (see Figure 1). Technology-
driven ventures aim to maximise the value of their current technology such that they are alert 
to opportunities within a certain technological distance to their current technology and under 
a certain level of market uncertainty. Therefore, they are located at the bottom right corner in 
Figure 1. Operation-driven ventures are motivated by a perception of unmet needs from their 
founders' past operational experiences. They usually have some technology to support their 
opportunity ideas or personal connections developed in past career to access key technologies. 
In addition, they have substantial market knowledge to guide their business development. 
Thus, they are located in the upper middle to right corner in Figure 1.  Meanwhile user-driven 
ventures are motivated by founders’ dissatisfaction with current products to solve problems 
happen in their daily lives. Although they have rather limited technology resources and 
market knowledge, they decide to start the new business. Thus, they are located at the bottom 
left corner in Figure 1. These findings demonstrate that entrepreneurial decisions on acting 
different entrepreneurial opportunities in terms of different levels of similarity with their 
knowledge are determined by entrepreneurial determinants. Entrepreneurial determinants also 
determine the way entrepreneurs evaluate opportunities, which make entrepreneurs decided 
to pursue different types of opportunities. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical and 
practical implications of our observations. 
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Figure 1 The relationships between entrepreneurial motivation and attention to different types of opportunity ideas 
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2.5.1 Implications for theory 
One way in which our findings contribute to theory is that they present antecedent 
factors which direct the development of the entire entrepreneurial process of a venture and 
contribute direct evidences about the mental connection to recognise opportunities, thereby 
contributing to previous research investigating the process of opportunity recognition. We 
illustrate three entrepreneurial determinants - technology-driven determinant, operation-
driven determinant, and user-driven determinant - which direct entrepreneurs' cognitive 
process. Consistent with research in cognitive psychology (Gentner, 1989), some of our 
results confirm that prior knowledge provides relevant bases for assessing the meaning of the 
external spur (R. A. Baron, 2006; Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Grégoire et al., 2010; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). This research further enrich previous research investigating 
pattern recognition among entrepreneurs (R. A. Baron, 2006; R. A. Baron & Ensley, 2006). 
Differences in cognitive processes are not necessarily caused by differences in the perceived 
quality of the information received but related to the different meanings that a given piece of 
information may induce (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). Our results show that not every 
firm which perceives opportunities based on prior knowledge has been through the same 
cognitive processes. For example, both technology-driven ventures and operation-driven 
ventures recognise opportunities based on their prior knowledge but the former one aims to 
maximize the value of their current knowledge and the later one aims to solve particular 
problems they perceived through the proxy of their prior knowledge, which lead to different 
entrepreneurial processes. Besides, the former one selects opportunities after conducting a 
complete market research but the later one has a clear goal in mind before the establishment 
of new ventures. In this research, we revisit the role of entrepreneurial determinants which 
includes internal factors that impel action and external factors that work as inducements to 
action (Locke & Latham, 2004). Entrepreneurial determinants are related to one’s mental 
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model reflecting why one intends to undertake some entrepreneurial actions (and, by 
extension, what he/she does not intend) (Krueger, 2000). Our findings show how different 
entrepreneurial determinants direct entrepreneurs to diverse cognitive processes to recognise 
and exploit opportunities.  
In addition, we indicate a special scenario – user-driven ventures. Entrepreneurs 
operate in a social world (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; R. K. Mitchell et al., 2002; Shepherd 
et al., 2007) and the ways they recognise opportunity ideas and form opportunity beliefs are 
not simply a response to objective conditions but may have subjective concerns involved. In 
some cases, the weight of subjective concerns in influencing entrepreneurial decision is 
higher than that of objective conditions. For example, for user-driven ventures, their 
founders’ personal frustration strongly forces them to look for a technical solution to satisfy 
their demands. This determinant triggers their perceptions of a possible envisioned future that 
was desirable and feasible (Stevenson, Roberts, Grousbeck, & Bhide, 1994) and makes them 
underestimate the potential operational risks resulted from the lack of necessary knowledge 
and resources.  
Our results show empirically that in an almost identical market, different paths of 
opportunity recognition can co-exist. The approach to recognise opportunities is an option for 
entrepreneurs and determined by their entrepreneurial determinants. The entrepreneurs of 
technology-driven ventures followed an opportunity search-evaluation-exploitation process, 
while the entrepreneurial beliefs of the operation-driven ventures and user-driven ventures 
emerged from entrepreneurs’ imagination.  
Moreover, we associate entrepreneurial determinants with the nature of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Entrepreneurship theorists have posited that entrepreneurs and 
opportunity characteristics jointly shape new firm creation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
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Our findings contribute to previous research investigating the interrelationships between 
individual characteristics of entrepreneurs and the types of opportunities that they exploit 
(Dencker & Gruber, 2014; Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012) by bringing in multiple cognitive 
mechanisms underlying entrepreneurial decision making into the dialogue. Entrepreneurial 
actions may arise from the interpretation of external stimuli by actors and different 
individuals may interpret the same stimulus differently (Walsh, 1988), which is related to 
one’s mental model reflecting why one is motivated to undertake some entrepreneurial 
actions (and, by extension, what he/she is not motivated) (Krueger, 2000). We investigate the 
role of entrepreneurial determinants in entrepreneurial decisions making and how 
entrepreneurial determinants directs entrepreneurs' attention to recognise opportunities in the 
first place and the following evaluation process. Our findings present a next step 
understanding of why some entrepreneurs spot and work on distant opportunities but some do 
not, thereby enriching the opportunity recognition literature.  
In addition, since entrepreneurs play central roles in new firm creation, we conducted 
a multiple-case study to show empirically how different entrepreneurial determinants lead to 
the construction of multiple types of opportunity ideas, which has greater ecological validity 
than the previous tests which used experimental design methodology (Grégoire et al., 2010; 
Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012). 
 
2.5.2 Implications for Practice 
The results of this study provide some guidance to practitioners. Although there is 
extensive information on the types of opportunities as they relate to performance and on the 
role of determinants (e.g., needs for achievement, locus of control, tolerance for ambiguity, 
and risk taking, self-efficacy, self-image) on the likelihood to engage in entrepreneurial 
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careers or to invest in particular opportunities with high/low uncertainty, risk, or ambiguity, 
less is known about where opportunities come from in the first place and why some people 
form opportunity belief at distance. Our results specifically suggest entrepreneurial decision 
makers should recognised that  their own entrepreneurial determinants can direct their 
attentions to be alert to particular types of opportunities and influence their decision making 
process. In this way, our findings guide practitioners that while making entrepreneurial 
decisions, they should revaluate the impact of their entrepreneurial determinants on the 
process of opportunity recognition and evaluation to avoid possible bias and an increasing 
operational risk because their determinant makes them underestimate the potential challenges. 
By introducing the impact of entrepreneurial determinants into opportunity-
recognition process, practitioners can be more aware of the relevant mechanisms which might 
restrict the scope of their opportunity recognition and make them perceive some information 
differently. In addition, practitioners may be able to anticipate the specific kinds of skills they 
may need to effectively exploit opportunities if they take into account the imp act of their 
entrepreneurial determinants in their entrepreneurial decision making.  
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CHAPTER 3 - Revisiting Opportunity Identification, Entrepreneurial 
Actions and Resource Application: An Inductive Study of Entrepreneurial 
Processes in a Nascent Market 
(The second paper of my PhD study) 
Abstract 
Researchers have long conceptualized entrepreneurship as a process. Nevertheless, 
the extant literature lacks an integral understanding of micro-foundations of entrepreneurial 
phenomena to identify opportunity ideas and turn them to real business. In this paper, we 
focus on the “entrepreneurial process” and aim to empirically understand how entrepreneurial 
determinants direct new ventures’ entrepreneurial actions to exploit opportunities. The results 
show that in an almost homogenous environment, namely the nascent market of mobile 
health medical equipment, entrepreneurs with different entrepreneurial determinants take 
different paths to identify opportunities. We indicate three entrepreneurial determinants for 
new firm creation: Technology-driven, operation-driven, and user-driven determinants. 
Different determinants lead entrepreneurs to initiate diverse cognitive processes to interpret 
which resources are going to be transformed to which applications and how to complete the 
transformation. Different determinants also lead new ventures to conduct different 
opportunity exploitation strategies (pivoting strategies, diversification strategies, and business 
model refinement). 
--------------------------- 
Declaration 
I would like to thank for the help and support of my co-author, Prof. Bart Clarysse (also my 
supervisor) with this paper. The first version of this paper was accepted by BCERC (Babson 
College Entrepreneurship Research Conference) in 2014. The second version of this paper 
has been accepted by the 2014 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual International 
Conference.  
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3.1 Introduction  
Entrepreneurial success stories such as Google (Girard, 2009), Amazon.com (T. 
Davila, Epstein, & Shelton, 2012; Feeny & Oztel, 2001) and Netflix (Byrne, 2011) have 
attracted the attention of both practitioners and academic scholars. One source of discussion 
is why the entrepreneurs behind these companies came up with these venture ideas or how 
they made them real and successful. For instance, two computer scientists, Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin, observed that search sites such as Yahoo produced so much information that the 
user no longer knew what to look at (Vise & Malseed, 2008), so they developed an internet 
site-ranking system and founded Google. The eureka moment of Jeff Bezos, Amazon’s 
founder, came in while he was sitting at his desk at his Wall Street office and found a site 
stating that the number of users of the newly commercialized internet was growing at the rate 
of 2,300% a year (Quittner, 1999). Reed Hastings, the founder of Netflix, got his business 
idea from his large late fee for “Apollo 13”. After that, he introduced the “online pay-per-
rental model” to interrupt the traditional video rental industry (Byrne, 2011). The above 
entrepreneurs formed entrepreneurial beliefs through different paths, but eventually all of 
them created successful companies. However, questions remains: How do they come to these 
ideas and how do they successfully exploit them especially if they do not have related prior 
knowledge?  
Researchers have long conceptualized entrepreneurship as a process (Bhave, 1994; 
Davidsson, 2003; Gartner, 1985, 1990). Seen from a process perspective, scholars consider 
how entrepreneurs identify and exploit opportunities and usually distinguish entrepreneurial 
actions into the phases of opportunity search, evaluation, and exploitation (Choi & Shepherd, 
2004; Gruber et al., 2008, 2013; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) and study entrepreneurial 
behaviours in each discrete phase. In the literature on opportunity recognition, scholars have 
studied several characteristics of an entrepreneur - such as one’s prior knowledge and 
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experiences (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Grégoire et al., 2010; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), 
self-images of him/herself (J. R. Mitchell & Shepherd, 2010), and personality traits (Zhao & 
Seibert, 2006) - make him/her more alert to opportunities (Kirzner, 1973). In order to identify 
opportunities, entrepreneurs use prior knowledge as a basis to interpret what can be done 
(Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Grégoire et al., 2010). In the literature on opportunity 
evaluation, current research focuses on how entrepreneurs develop a coherent judgment 
between what one perceives from the environment and one’s desire and beliefs about the 
value and feasibility of these potential opportunities to transmit third-person opportunities 
into the first-person opportunities. The judgment comes from the rules that entrepreneurs 
have learned from their past experience and knowledge structures (Shepherd et al., 2007). In 
the literature on opportunity exploitation, researchers focus on the growth of ventures, 
including marketing testing (Danneels, 2002, 2007), resources integration and accumulation 
(Bruneel et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 2000), organizational learning (Teece et 
al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2000), business model design (Andries & Debackere, 2007; Nicholls-
Nixon et al., 2000), etc. These studies mainly centre on the question about how to develop 
and reconfigure resources for new venture survival. Recently, some research (Danneels, 2011) 
further associates the direction of resource application with managerial cognition and 
indicates the mental model held by managers involving resources identification and the 
understanding of their fungibility influences a firm's resource application strategy. 
In addition, some scholars consider the entrepreneurial process as one complex loop. 
They suggests that entrepreneurs start by recombining resources at hand for different 
applications (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Lévi-Strauss, 1966; Rao, 1998; Sarasvathy, 2001) and 
then wait for a response from the market to adjust their initial beliefs (Sarasvathy, 2008).  
However, the current literature – no matter whether it considers the entrepreneurial 
process in discrete phases or as one complex loop – lacks an integrative view which shows 
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how entrepreneurs come up with entrepreneurial ideas and how entrepreneurial behaviours 
conducted in one phase impact entrepreneurial behaviours in the next phase.    
To address these questions, we conducted a multiple-case study (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
including seven new ventures in the medical device manufacturing market in the mobile 
health (mHealth) industry in North America (mainly in the US). We chose a nascent market 
as our research context because it lacks a dominant business model (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) to 
direct new ventures' strategic actions. In addition, we focus on new ventures because their 
business models in terms of opportunity identification and exploitation are relatively simple, 
which is an ideal situation to analyse the formation of entrepreneurs’ opportunity beliefs and 
their impacts.  
 Our findings unpack empirically the influences of entrepreneurial determinants for 
new firm creation to opportunity identification and opportunity exploitation. In an almost 
homogeneous environment, entrepreneurs with different entrepreneurial determinants take 
different paths to identify opportunities. Three of the seven ventures in our sample can be 
labelled as “technology-driven ventures”. They start with a particular technical prototype and 
only exploit opportunities after rigorous opportunity search and evaluation. Therefore, their 
entrepreneurship process is more like a planned behaviour (search-evaluation-exploitation). 
In contrast, four of the seven ventures in our study begin with a perception of unmet needs in 
a particular market. Two of them are motivated by founders' operational experience and two 
are motivated by founders' personal frustration in searching for a satisfactory product. We 
label them as “operation-driven ventures” and "user-driven ventures" respectively. Both of 
them focus on the search for a technical solution to solve a particular problem their founders 
observed, e.g. by using mobile technology. The entrepreneurs of these four ventures had a 
very clear goal in mind before they started their companies such that they do little market 
research and have few interactions with customers in their “first” product development. In 
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this case, related market experiences and knowledge become critical. In addition, our results 
indicate the impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on new ventures' resource application 
strategies. Entrepreneurs starting with different entrepreneurial determinants have different 
mindset to exploit opportunities, which direct their attention to apply particular resources and 
eventually leads to different exploitation modes (e.g., pivoting, diversification, business 
model refining).  
 In this research, we contribute theoretically to the entrepreneurship literature by 
highlighting the sources of opportunities and the micro-foundations of entrepreneurial 
phenomena to turn opportunity ideas to real business. First, we extend theories of opportunity 
identification by illustrating three types of entrepreneurial determinants which influence 
opportunity search and evaluation. Second, we give insights to research on the evolving 
entrepreneurial micro-foundations process by investigating empirically the interrelationships 
between entrepreneurs’ decisions made in each phase of the entrepreneurial process and the 
entrepreneurial actions conducted in the next phases, which eventually leads new ventures 
exploit opportunities in diverse ways. Third, our research bridges entrepreneurial theories 
with strategy and organizational theories. Our results show that founding decisions have 
lasting effects on shaping the ventures' evolution to generate innovative possibilities, which 
explains the inter-firm differences in the strategies of their business development.    
 In addition, our research enriches the knowledge on the factors determining one’s 
subjective perception of selecting particular resources to develop a new product. We 
associate the literature of competence-based new product innovation and the literature of 
opportunity identification and further consider the role of entrepreneurial determinants in the 
interrelationships between opportunity identification, resource application, and new product 
innovation.  
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3.2 Theoretical Background 
Extant research in entrepreneurship theory has focused on the emergence of an 
opportunity idea and the pursuit of an entrepreneurial opportunity (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 
2010; Dimov, 2011; Read et al., 2009). The current research usually consider entrepreneurial 
actions in discrete phases (opportunity search/recognition, evaluation, and exploitation) 
(Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2007; Wood & McKinley, 
2010; Wood & Pearson, 2009). In the literature on opportunity recognition, researchers focus 
on the factors influencing one's abilities to be alert to profit opportunities (Kirzner, 1973), 
which is related to their knowledge and experience stock which eventually constructs their 
opportunity nexus (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Grégoire et al., 2010; Shane, 2003). Prior 
experience is processed and transformed into knowledge structures which can be observed in 
speech and action (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Different 
scholars refer to these knowledge structures as ‘beliefs’ (Walsh, 1988) which guide and 
determine an entrepreneur’s actions  (Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Wood & Pearson, 2009). Recent studies have further 
indicated that entrepreneurs connect their prior knowledge with the changes they are alert in 
the environment to define what can be done (R. A. Baron, 2006; Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 
2001), e.g., by aligning the structural capability of new technology with the structural causes 
of potential demands in a particular market to recognize opportunities (Grégoire et al., 2010; 
Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012). Some researchers focus on the founding-team level and 
consider how the variation in the similarity of the founding teams' background influences 
opportunity search and recognition after new ventures are established (Gruber et al., 2008, 
2013). The results indicate that founding teams with more diverse industry experiences and 
external knowledge can recognise more and varied market opportunities before their first 
market entry. Besides this, serial entrepreneurs are more likely to recognise opportunities 
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compared to novice entrepreneurs and founding teams with a mix of prior entrepreneurial 
experience and experience in technology (or marketing) recognize more opportunities than 
those with technology (or marketing) experience only.   
After the opportunity search phase, entrepreneurs’ next decision is whether ‘this is an 
opportunity for me’. The extant research shows that entrepreneurs rely on a number of 
characteristics related to opportunities to judge the feasibility and desirability of the 
opportunities (Shepherd et al., 2007). For example, Choi and Shepherd (2004) reveal that 
“entrepreneurs are more likely to exploit opportunities when they perceive more knowledge 
of customer demand for the new product, more fully developed necessary technologies, 
greater managerial capability, and greater stakeholder support.” In related work, Mitchell and 
his colleagues (2000) identify three types of cognitive scripts used to make sense of new 
information, including arrangement, ability, and willingness scripts. Arrangement scripts 
refer to those considerations associated with access to resources and market demands. Ability 
scripts include the entrepreneur’s skill to execute entrepreneurial actions. Willingness scripts 
have to do with the entrepreneur’s motivation to act.  
After substantial opportunity search and evaluation, in the phase of opportunity 
exploitation, entrepreneurs may anticipate the specific kinds of skills they may need to 
effectively exploit opportunities. In the literature on opportunity exploitation, resources focus 
on new ventures' strategic actions for their growth paths. Some researchers focus on the 
impact of resource integration and reconfiguration on venture growth. The resources include 
financial, human, social, and technological resources such as the know-how and 
entrepreneurial experiences of the founding teams (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990), investments from venture capitalists (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hsu, 
2004), external networks to acquire or learn knowledge and resources (Bruneel et al., 2010; 
Hitt et al., 2000), and technology leveraging (Hicks & Hegde, 2005). Others emphasize the 
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interactions between market understanding and product innovation (Danneels, 2002, 2007) to 
consider how the interrelationships between resources allocation, resources transformation, 
and market competences impact venture growth. Resources lie upstream from the end 
product. They may be utilised in a range of applications for different market domains 
(Danneels, 2003, 2007; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Innovative activities are contingent on the 
agent’s subjective perception of which products or services that the firm can or cannot do for 
which markets (Penrose, 1959). Recently, some research (Danneels, 2011) associates the 
direction of resource application with managerial cognition and indicates that the way 
managers identify resources and their the understanding of their fungibility impacts a firm's 
resource application.  
In addition to resource reconfiguration and application, some researchers focus on the 
business model design and evolution (Andries & Debackere, 2007; Andries, Debackere, & 
Looy, 2013; Bucherer, Eisert, & Gassmann, 2012; Morris, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2005). 
They investigate the characteristics of new ventures' business models and consider how new 
ventures evolve their initial value propositions into a viable business model.  
However, although extant research provides substantial understanding of entrepreneurial 
actions in each entrepreneurship phase, entrepreneurship is a process (Bhave, 1994; 
Davidsson, 2003; Gartner, 1985, 1990) such that the entrepreneurial behaviours in each phase 
is supposed to be strongly associated instead of being independent. Current research lacks 
integral consideration of the transition of entrepreneurial actions between phases to consider 
the evolution of opportunity ideas and its interactions with entrepreneurs' cognitive processes.  
In addition, resource application for new product creation includes not only managers’ 
resources identification and understanding of the nature of resources but a series of 
entrepreneurial decisions of which resources are going to be transformed to which 
applications and how. Extant literature lacks an in-depth understanding of how the factors 
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which determine entrepreneurs' venture ideation interact with a venture’s resource application 
strategies to generate new innovative possibilities. 
3.3 Methods  
This research selected the emerging mobile health market as a research context. Given 
the lack of research empirically considering individual difference in opportunity 
identification and its impact on the following entrepreneurship process, we conducted 
multiple-case research (Eisenhardt, 1989), including seven new ventures, in order to analyse 
the decision models that entrepreneurs used to identify and evaluate opportunities and new 
ventures’ opportunities exploitation strategies. Multiple cases are effective because 
comparative data are likely to yield more accurate and generalizable theory than a single-case 
study (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 1994).  
3.3.1 Research setting 
We used medical device manufacturers in the mobile health (mHealth) industry in the 
North America (mainly in the U.S.) as our target (see Table 6). ‘Mobile health’ is a new way 
to provide real time healthcare service by integrating the use of mobile devices for clinical 
health data collection and delivery between practitioners, researchers and patients 
(Germanakos et al., 2005). The mHealth industry is an excellent research context for two 
reasons. Firstly, the medical equipment market in the mHealth industry emerged as a new 
field that includes distinctive categories such as healthcare services, insurance, governmental 
regulation, and communication and connectivity technology. It has a high level of market 
complexity. Secondly, the mHealth industry is a nascent market which is ill-structured and 
lacks a dominant business model (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). New ventures' strategic actions may 
strongly reflect their judgments of the path needed to identify and exploit opportunities.  
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 To construct our sample, we firstly reviewed the lists of strategic alliances in three 
MobiHealthNews Year End Reports (2009, 2010, 2011) and then identified the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code of each player on the list on 
Hoover’s online database8. The medical device market includes the following segments: 
electro-medical and electro-therapeutic apparatus manufacturing (NAICS code: 334510), 
medical, dental, and hospital equipment and supplies merchant wholesalers (NAICS code: 
423450), and surgical and medical instrument manufacturing (NAICS: 339112). After 
selecting medical devices manufactures, we ruled out companies founded before 20009 to 
only focus on new ventures.  
Table 6 Data representation 
Active new ventures in the medical device 
segment in the mHealth market10 No. Status No. 
Area 
North America 11 17 
Being acquired before 201312 5 
Bankruptcy before 2013 3 
No-response 2 
In Sample 7 
Alive new ventures in the North America 9 
Europe 6 - - 
Total 23 Sample coverage probability 78% 
 
3.3.2 Data sources 
This research includes seven new ventures in North America (all of them focus on the 
US market). Data sources include exploratory interviews, archival data (news and industrial 
                                                             
8 Hoover's online databasE (http://www.hoovers.com/) 
9 In 1997, Ericsson launched its GS 88 "Penelope" and described concept of Penelope as a “Smart Phone” 
(Sager, 2012). In 2000, NTT launched the first 3G network. The combination of the smartphone and 3G 
network offers the possibility of the development of mHealth (De Vriendt et al., 2002). 
10 In this research we focused on active players in the medical device department in the mHealth market by 
choosing new ventures featuring alliance relationships in 2009, 2010, or 2011 as reported in the 
MobiHealthNews Year End Reports. 
11 To avoid bias resulting from healthcare systems and policies in different countries or areas, we focused on the 
market with the largest number of players. In this case, we targeted the market in North America (all focal firms 
work in the U.S. market).   
12This research begins from 2013. Thus, we selected new ventures that were alive in the medical device 
department in the mHealth market in 2013. 
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reports), and formal semi-structured interviews with focal firms. (1) The seven exploratory 
interviews were conducted to understand the dynamics of mobile health in Boston in 2012 
with experts, including policy makers in the US government, doctors, healthcare service 
providers, and researchers in the medical and engineering schools at Harvard University and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2) The extensive archive included 933 news items 
about focal firms collected from the Factivia database, three years of MobiHealthNews Year 
End Reports (2009, 2010, 2011), and the product portfolio of each company on the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and company website. We reviewed three annual market 
reports to map out the relative positions of market players, the status of technology 
development, the bargaining power between different players, and an overview of market 
conditions. We used those news items, reports, and FDA and company website information to 
reconstruct the history of each focal firm. We highlighted each company's key partners, 
investors, new product launches, participation in eco systems, pilot projects, and main 
customers. By doing so, we portrayed the business models and network relationships of focal 
firms to understand the process of their new product development and commercialization. (3) 
We conducted three rounds of interviews, including 24 semi-structured interviews (see Table 
7) and we taped and transcribed the interviews resulting in 409 pages of double spaced 
interview transcripts. The first round included seven phone interviews and one face-to-face 
interview and was conducted from late March until May 2013. The interviews ranged from 
52 to 81 minutes. On average each interview took 70 minutes. We confirmed each 
partnership with informants and the strategic concerns behind each partnership’s formation, 
activity and strategic change. The second round was conducted six months later in October 
2013 and included nine face-to-face interviews. The interviews ranged from 27 to 113 
minutes. Each interview took an average of 70 minutes. We extended our understanding of 
why the founders of focal firms initiated their business and their entrepreneurship process. 
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The last round was also conducted six months after (late April to early June 2014) and 
includes seven phone interviews. The interviews ranged from 49 to 69 minutes. On average 
each interview took 54 minutes. In this round, we confirmed our findings and quotations with 
focal firms to ensure no misunderstanding would bias the results. 
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Table 7 Data inventory 
New 
Venture Location 
Year 
Founded Age 
No. of 
founders Background of Founders 
No. of 
interviews 
Interview details 
Date 
Time 
(Mins) Type Informant 
A 
Greater 
Boston area, 
MA 
2005 9 1 
‧CEO: Process control systems 
industry  
3 
18/04/2013 66 Phone 
Founder 24/10/2013 73 Face-to-face 
13/05/2014 47 Phone 
B 
Boca Raton, 
FL  2008 6 3 
‧Previous CEO: Sales (left the 
company) 
‧Current CEO: Wireless messaging, 
medical notification and alert 
management solutions 
‧Chairman: Web hosting   
3 
25/04/2013 63 Phone 
Co-founder 
 10/10/2013 65 Face-to-face 
28/04/2014 54 Phone 
C Annapolis, 
MD 
2003 11 1 
 ‧CEO: Electronic engineer, head of a 
consulting company 
5 
29/05/2013 81 Phone Founder 
22/10/2013 56 Face-to-face 
Lead Hardware 
Engineer 
22/10/2013 27 Face-to-face CTO 
24/10/2013 61 Face-to-face Founder 
04/06/2014 65 Phone Founder 
D 
San Diego, 
CA 2007 7 3 
 ‧CEO: Healthcare information  
technology, medical imaging 
systems, and medical technology 
integration 
‧Chairman: Telephone 
communications services 
‧CTO: Healthcare solutions, Software 
technology 
3 
17/04/2013 64 Phone 
Founder 16/10/2013 57 Face-to-face 
28/04/2014 46 Phone 
E 
King of 
Prussia, PA 
2008 6 4 
 ‧Prior CEO: Sales (left the company) 
 ‧Current CEO: Life safety security 
 ‧VP of Strategic Alliance: Life 
safety security 
 ‧VP of Corporate Development: 
Brand development 
4 
18/03/2013 70 Phone 
Founder (VP of 
sales and 
marketing) 
23/04/2013 82 
Face-to-face (The 
interview was 
conducted in London, 
UK) 
09/10/2013 113 
Face-to-face 
(The interview was 
conducted in Atlanta, 
GA ) 
29/04/2014 69 Phone 
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New 
Venture 
Location 
Year 
Founded 
Age 
No. of 
founders 
Background of Founders 
No. of 
interviews 
Interview details 
Date 
Time 
(Mins) 
Type 
Informant 
F 
San Diego, 
CA 
2004 10 2 
 ‧CEO: GPS engineering (left the 
company) 
 ‧Advisor: Cardiologist (board 
member) 
3 
20/03/2013 52 Phone 
VP of market 
development 
15/10/2013 91 Face-to-face 
02/05/2014 49 Phone 
G 
Toronto, 
Canada  
2002 12 2 
‧CEO: Toy industry 
‧President: Consumer electronic 
products 
3 
23/04/2013 81 Phone 
General manager 14/10/2013 90 
Face-to-face   (The 
interview was 
conducted in San 
Diego, CA) 
28/04/2014 51 Phone 
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3.3.3 Data analysis 
We started reviewing news items, industry reports, and interviews to reconstruct the 
history of each case and then began open coding of interview data by using Nvivo to support 
our axial coding process. After most data had been collected in order to preserve the integrity 
of replication thinking logics in cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994), we began the cross-case 
analysis to identify similar constructs across the cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We 
compared several constructs at once in tables to highlight the similarities and differences 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Starting from the emerging constructs and themes, we gradually 
combined the vivo codes into first order codes. Following the standards of content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2012; Neuendorf, 2002), two coders independently code the raw data: One 
author and a junior researcher who was blind to the theoretical rationales. We calculated 
interrater reliability including percentage of agreement and Cohen’s κ for all coding 
dimensions made by two coders. We reached 95.56% agreement (κ=0.953) which reaches the 
acceptable level of interrater reliability. The two coders discussed discrepancies and 
gradually had agreements on all statements. To ensure reliability and common understanding 
with the second author, first order codes were labelled in line with the different components 
of the genesis and the formation of entrepreneurial beliefs and the strategic actions in the 
opportunity exploitation. In a further round of coding, we tentatively combined first order 
codes into fewer and theoretically grounded second-order codes through axial coding (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1997). We also cross-checked the second order codes with the theoretical findings 
in the literature on opportunity identification and exploitation to avoid ignoring theoretically 
relevant knowledge (Suddaby, 2006). This interaction between theory and data helped us to 
sharp construct definitions and the theoretical relationship between constructs (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Given our focus on the entrepreneurial process, we also tracked event sequences in 
each case (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009).  
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3.4 Findings 
We found that entrepreneurial determinants impact the formation of first-person 
opportunity beliefs. Also, the focal firms with different entrepreneurial determinants 
manifested different entrepreneurial processes.  
3.4.1 Pre-Market entry: Entrepreneurial determinants and the formation of the first-
person opportunity beliefs  
Our data indicates that entrepreneurial determinants of new firm creation emerged from 
technology-driven, operation-driven, or user-driven determinants. Three of the seven ventures 
(Companies A, B, and C) started with a technology prototype which acted as guidance to help 
them be alert to profitable market spaces where they can exploit current technologies. The 
medical device market was usually one of their options (see Quotations 1-11, Table 8). For 
example, the founder of Company A described the evolution of opportunity recognition as 
that:  
 "Between 2001 to 2005, our solution was very flexible. We thought we can create 
an application box that is connected to TVs... ...we thought we can apply to energy 
management, security, healthcare, all of those. So we were starting looking around, 
[assessing] what is a different industry which our system can help.13"  
A similar story happened on Companies B and C. One recognised the tracking-
technology can be applied to pet tracking, Alzheimer patients, or the elderly populations and 
one alerted remote physiological monitoring technology can be applied to the academic, 
sports, military, first responder, and medical markets. The medical device market was chosen 
by these companies because it could provide foreseeable ROI. For example, the founder of 
Company B described his decision making process as that:  
                                                             
13 Quotation from the interview with the founder of Company A on 24 Oct., 2013 
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"We like the elderly market because it is growing because of the baby 
boomers. ...we didn't know how many people are willing to pay that much money 
for pets to track pets. ... We thought about Alzheimer but it was not that established. 
There is no one else doing that which could be used as a benchmark to establish a 
business model. We had to create the whole business model from scratch14." 
However, demand can only turn to profit if market conditions can support market 
development. Hence, the policy of reimbursement and regulation became the second key 
concern of entrepreneurs. For example, the founder of company C mentioned that:  
“We have been doing health control for 5 to 6 years but I kept the company out of 
healthcare because I felt the regulation and political politics, and industry, and the 
funding, were not there15.” 
Companies D and E were established because their founders’ perceived unmet needs in 
the healthcare market from their past operational experience (see Quotations 12-14, Table 8). 
The founders of Company D realized the importance of monitoring the deterioration of 
patients because of their twenty-year experience of the healthcare solution and device 
market16. Company E was established because the founders had a long history in the life 
security market and were aware that current products mismatched the needs of elderly people 
because they did not usually fall down at locations close to the alarm devices17. Companies D 
was also motivated by founders' personal frustration in searching for a product to solve their 
own problems and the same thing happened on Companies F and G (see Quotations 15-17, 
Table 8). For example, the founders of Company D and G aimed to take care of their family 
members with chronic diseases or aging condition but failed to find a suitable product18. 
                                                             
14 Quotation from the interview with the founder of Company B on 10 Oct., 2013 
15 Quotation from interview with the founder of Company C, 24 Oct., 2013 
16 Information from the interview with the founder of Company D on 16 Oct., 2013 
17 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 9 Oct., 2013 
18 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company D on 16 Oct., 2013 and the general manager of 
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Company F was started because one founder, a cardiologist, knew continuous monitoring of 
blood pressure may increase substantially the cure rate of cardiovascular diseases19. However, 
in this case, he is a medical device user not a producer.  
The entrepreneurial determinants of these four ventures (Companies D, E, F, and G) 
were not to maximise the investment returns of their technologies. For example, one founder 
of Company D mentioned that  
“…if we were doing it over based on the market size, we would probably do 
congestive heart failure, not diabetes20.”  
But it does not mean that they choose target markets blindly. For example, the founders 
of Companies D and G examined the size of the chronic disease market.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Company G on 14 Oct., 2013 
19 Information from the interview with the VP of market development of Company F on 15 Oct., 2013 
20 Quotation from interview with the founder of Company D, 16 Oct., 2013. 
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Table 8 Overview of data structure (Pre-market entry)  
Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
Representative Data 
Technology-
driven 
source 
Technology 
distance 
evaluation 
1 "Between 2001 to 2005, our solution was very flexible. We thought we can create an application box that is connected to TVs. …we 
thought we can apply to energy management, security, healthcare, all of those. So we were starting looking around, [assessing] what is 
a different industry which our system can help." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
2 "He [one of the founders] wanted to do something about tracking and mPRES was only one of the ideas. He said pet tracking, Alzheimer 
tracking, mPERS. He didn't know. His business plan is very unfocused. But I like the tracking idea. And [Another founder] was the one 
helped the market research" [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 10 Oct. 2013] 
  
3 "We started with the goal of physiological monitoring and the product required a sensor, a wireless connection, and analytical 
software. ... The four main reasons to monitor human beings remotely were for human performance or fitness, industrial safety, 
medical. … We can measure anybody remotely, which in one of them has always been for medical reasons [Interview with founder of 
Company C, 29 May 2013] 
 
 
4 "Since we have had the hardware, the hardware itself is not a product because no one can use just a hardware. ... The software side 
tends to be more market specific. For example, the sport software has something in common with the medical software but it is directed 
toward sports and it [a medical device] is directed toward medical. The hardware for both of them is actually the same. [Interview with 
Lead Hardware Engineer of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
Assessing 
potential 
profits from 
exploiting 
current 
technology 
5 "What we found was the energy industry was no revenue. There is no clear ROI to build it. In security, again, very low margins. There 
was no return on investment for a new solution. Healthcare seems like the only one where we seem to fit. We saw there were a lot more 
needs. ... Healthcare is a very interesting and complex environment where you not only need to work with nurses, you not only work with 
doctors, [but] you have to work with pharmacists to get the complete cares. So the need for communication and connectivity are much 
more complex and can save a lot of money. So there was potential for ROI for saving a lot of money and justifying the cost for 
implementation." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
6 "We decided pretty early on. The entire focus [on the healthcare market was] because we were trying to see if there was any other 
possible markets [or] business models in other segments. [But] no [other business model] is sustaining for us. I think it took us probably 
two years before we decided that it was our entire focus." [Interview with Founder of Company A, 13 May, 2014] 
  
7 "... he [the cofounder] looked at all the opportunities that were available for what the prototype could do. And he searched the mobility 
piece for the PERS industry, and we determined the existing leaders in the market place had not really focused any attention on the 
mobility piece. ... We thought they were lazy and that was a good chance for us to use disruptive technology to break into the industry 
before they knew it." [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 Representative Data 
  
8 “He [one founder] had a prototype of a tracking device which is similar to our mobile device. The functionality is similar. ...he [another 
founder] was the one helped the market research and said let's go for mPRES ... And we noticed that industry was really lacking 
technology innovation. ... So we saw a window of opportunity for us to go and disrupt the market place by bringing in a new idea to do 
the same business....... In the U.S., the elderly population is growing because of the baby boom and the trend which is to keep costs 
down. Also the elderly people want to stay at their own homes as long as possible because that makes them feel comfortable." [Interview 
with co-founder of Company B, 25 April 2013] 
 
  
9 "We like the elderly market because it is growing because of the baby boomers. So we knew the market will expand and we didn't know 
how many people are willing to pay that much money for pets to tracking pets. It is not big enough to make a company... We thought 
about Alzheimer but it was not that established. There is no one else doing that which could be used as a benchmark to establish a 
business model. We had to create the whole business model from scratch. That would be very difficult. Within the PERS industry, it has 
already been established with how they do and the prices. We thought we would be better to disturb that market and be the first one in 
that market." [Interview with co-founder of Company B, 10 Oct. 2013] 
 
 
10 The main reason [to enter the medical market] was the demand was growing so is the profitability of that market. … Sport market is a 
quite niche market. There are not many players in that market. They are mainly multinational companies like Nike, Adidas, and large 
companies. They need a lot of the technology we have." [Interview with CTO of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
 
11 "The biggest issue was the whole medical market for monitoring; no one knew who was going to pay for it. That was the big change. 
And now Obama and some other changes in performance-based procedures, then there were much more interest because they will get 
penalized if they don't do it." [Interview with CTO of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
Operation-
experience- 
driven 
source 
Demand 
perceptions 
form past 
operational 
experiences 
12 "We are actually starting from chronic disease because my last company that I sold to [a company] was [name of a company]. It was a 
cure care ... very long after patient was in trouble.  I decide to get earlier on disease progression. And so I decide to do chronic 
diseases. …it is not till the later on, we realized that diabetes cost a lot. Very expensive side effects. If we were doing it over based on the 
market size, we probably do congestive heart failure not diabetes because congestive heart failure has bigger population." [Interview 
with Co-Founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 2013] 
13 "They [the founders] knew the industry very well. And it [the personal emergency response market] was a very competitive market 
because everyone was selling basically the same thing. .. And most of the equipment used at that time was less sophisticated. So the main 
driving force is to find a better product to penetrate the existing large market. [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 
9 Oct. 2013] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 Representative Data 
  
14 "The founders at the time the company started were in the home security market. …everybody was familiar with the medical home alarm 
business. … Most of time, you saw somebody fall down. You assume they can talk through the pendant but actually they cannot. ... Most 
of time people get injured in their homes, like elderly people, because they fall. The other thing is that the way that the traditional system 
works ... you have to be [using] speaker boxes or all those systems to talk back when you press the buttons. But the fact is that as homes 
became larger and people fall in showers when the door closed, these are representative of serious shortcomings. So the founders of the 
company thought they were able to provide a solution. " [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
User-
experience- 
driven 
source 
Demand 
perceptions 
form 
personal life 
experience 
15 "All three of the founders including myself have diabetes in family. So we saw the relative suffering of this disease." [Interview with Co-
Founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 2013] 
16 "[The founder, a cardiologist] said ‘it would be very cool if you [co-founder] are able to produce [a product] to give me blood pressure 
continually.’ [The founder, a cardiologist] deals with a lot of high potential patients. And in the U.S., we know 70 million [people] in the 
U.S. have potential. So this could be a big deal and it had have not been down very successfully before. [Interview with VP of market 
development of Company F 15 Oct. 2013] 
17 "[The founder] was working for his father [the co-founder] at that time and looking for a way to stay in touch with his grandparents. 
They are remote. And he wanted to help to manage their aging conditions." [Interview with General Manager of Company G, 14 Oct. 
2013] 
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3.4.2 Post market entry: Opportunity exploitation  
According to the industry reports and the interviews, we found that the healthcare 
device market can be divided into five segments based on users’ health status and the 
purposes of their use of healthcare products (see Table 9). The mobile health (mHealth) 
market mainly takes care of pre-sick people (e.g. the elderly population) and patients with 
chronic diseases, meaning that their products are mostly FDA Class I or Class II devices. 
 
Table 9 Market structure of healthcare device  
Health 
status 
Fitness Wellness Pre-sick Chronic disease 
Serious 
disease 
Product 
type 
Entertainment Health check 
Non-regulated or FDA 
Class I devices21 
FDA Class II 
devices22 
FDA Class III 
devices23 
Product 
Example 
Remote 
performance 
measurement 
for athletes 
Weight scale 
Personal emergency 
response system, 
stethoscope 
Diagnostic tests, 
cardiac catheters  
Devices that 
are used in 
ICUs 
 
In the data (see Table 10), we found that the two ventures (Companies A and C) 
worked in other market segments (e.g., non-regulated or FDA Class I device markets) and 
                                                             
21According to FDA regulation, " Class I means the class of devices that are subject to only the general controls 
authorized by or under sections 501 (adulteration), 502 (misbranding), 510 (registration), 516 (banned devices), 
518 (notification and other remedies), 519 (records and reports), and 520 (general provisions) of the act. " 
(http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=860.3) 
22 According to FDA regulation, “Class II means the class of devices that is or eventually will be subject to 
special controls. A device is in class II if general controls alone are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance 
of its safety and effectiveness and there is sufficient information to establish special controls, including the 
promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries, development and 
dissemination of guidance documents (including guidance on the submission of clinical data in premarket 
notification submissions in accordance with section 510(k) of the act), recommendations, and other appropriate 
actions as the Commissioner deems necessary to provide such assurance.” 
(http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=860.3)  
23According to FDA regulation, “Class II means the class of devices that is or eventually will be subject to 
special controls. A device is in class II if general controls alone are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance 
of its safety and effectiveness and there is sufficient information to establish special controls, including the 
promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries, development and 
dissemination of guidance documents (including guidance on the submission of clinical data in premarket 
notification submissions in accordance with section 510(k) of the act), recommendations, and other appropriate 
actions as the Commissioner deems necessary to provide such assurance.” 
(http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=860.3) 
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then leveraged their technologies to enter into the FDA Class II device segment. Two 
ventures (Companies B and E) started from a non-regulated medical segment (life safety 
security for the elderly population). The other three ventures (Companies D, F, and G) 
immediately started in the FDA Class II device segment but only Company D had related 
market experience. 
Table 10 The evolution of business development 
Company Before entering into the mHealth market After entering into the mHealth market 
A 
A software system company providing a service 
platform connected through TV to provide 
various services  
In FDA Class II device market  
(The product concept and technology remain 
the same )   
B 
- 
(One founder worked in the life security market) 
In a non-regulated device market 
C 
A consulting company and a remote 
physiological monitor serving in the academic, 
the sports, the military, and  first responder 
markets 
In a FDA Class II device market  
(The product concept and technology remain 
the same )   
D 
-                                                                                               
(Founders worked in the healthcare solutions 
market) 
In a FDA Class II device market 
E 
-                                                                         
(Founders worked in the life security market) 
In a non-regulated device market 
F - In a FDA Class II device market 
G - In a FDA Class II device market 
 
To exploit opportunities, ventures need to establish their managerial and 
organizational process. In the interviews, we found the entrepreneurial actions of focal firms 
include three phases: “market testing strategies” to integrate and reconfigure their resources 
and to understand market demands; “building resources” to manufacture medical devices, and 
“performance review and strategy modification” to redefine the direction of their business 
development. 
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Market-testing strategies.  
Delineating customer solutions. Two ventures in our sample (Companies A and C) 
started their opportunity exploitation by delineating customer solutions (see Quotations 18-20, 
Table 11). They consulted their potential customers and experts while they were developing 
the ‘first’ medical devices to further understand the market requirements24. Two ventures 
(Companies B and E) entered the mobile health market by entering an existing market 
segment (the life safety security market) with better solutions. The market segment has 
existed for more than 20 years with a well-established product concept and business model. 
These two ventures did not need to especially delineate customer needs25 (see Quotations 21 
and 23, Table 11). The other three companies (Companies D, F, and G) all introduced new 
medical devices with brand new product concepts but interestingly instead of being close to 
their potential buyers to understand the market demands, they created their devices internally 
to solve the problems their founders observed (see Quotations 22, 24, and 25, Table 11). 
Company D relied on their founders' prior knowledge to ensure what they did was what 
customers expected; while Companies F and G simply generalized market demands from 
their own needs. For example, the general manager of Company G mentioned that: 
"They saw their own needs and figured out this was the need that others had, so 
they thought it could be a business they can develop and then [one of the founders] 
wanted to start the business.26"  
 Leveraging experiences in business operations. All founders in our sample tried to 
leverage prior experiences to their new business (see Quotations 26-35, Table 11). However 
Companies F and G lacked complete market understanding and related market experiences as 
                                                             
24 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company A on 18 April, 2013 and on 13 May, 2014 and 
with the founder of Company C on 24 Oct., 2013 and 4 June, 2014. 
25 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company B on 18 April. 2013, the founder of Company 
B on 28 April, 2014, and the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014. 
26 Quotation from interview with the general manager of Company G, 28 April, 2014. 
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guidance. They usually misunderstood the fit between the experiences they were leveraging 
and the market requirements (see Quotations 34-35, Table 11). For example, while the 
general manager of Company G reviewed the mistakes they made in the early stage, he 
mentioned:  
"The two funders' background was primary consumer products. … Initially, the 
market was developed directly to consumer products for care givers to manage 
their parents or family members with chronic diseases. … They didn't start 
marketing the product. It was their belief that they didn't want anybody to know 
what they were doing. They thought it was the right decision to be somewhat 
secretive about the market. That came from their history of being in the consumer 
product market where once you announce something, everybody could copy it. … 
They didn't understand the difference between the mobile health industry and the 
consumer product industry. Consumer products change very rapidly and healthcare 
changes very slowly. So, on my side, I believe they realized they made a mistake27."  
 Leveraging technology resources. Companies A, B, C, and D had technology 
resources which can aid new product creation28 (see Quotations 36-43, Table 11). Company 
E had personal connections to acquire key technology before entering into the market29. 
However, the only technological resource that Company F could apply was their founders’ 
educational backgrounds30; while Company G did not have related technology resources to be 
leveraged. 
                                                             
27 Quotation from interview with the general manager of Company G, 23 April, 2013. 
28 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company A on 24 Oct., 2013 and on 28 April, 2014. with 
the founder of Company B on 25 April, 2013, with the lead hardware engineer of Company C on 22 Oct., 2013, 
with the founder of Company C on 4 June, 2014, and with the founder of Company D on28 April, 2014. 
29 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014. 
30 “One [one reason why the founder felt he can make the product] was his education. That was the driver, to 
find whether he can achieve the goals that he was trying to achieve. … He is a PhD in physical chemistry from 
[a given university]." [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 2 May, 2014]” 
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Leveraging human resources. Most of the founders of focal firms leveraged their 
personal connections to access resources (see Quotations 44-49, Table 11). Only the founder 
of Company C is from other country and had no strong connection with the U.S. market31. 
The founders of Company F had no relationship which could directly help their business in 
the mHealth market.  
                                                             
31 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company C on 4 June, 2014. 
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Table 11 Overview of data structure (Post-market entry - Market testing strategies) 
Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
  Representative Data 
Market 
testing 
strategies 
Delineating 
customer 
solutions 
Delineating customer Solutions 
18 "... we had discussions with multiple segments like hospital systems, insurers which are the payers. We also talked to physician groups. In 
the U.S., some physicians form their own groups. It is like a smaller hospital but they don't do surgery or all those things. They are more 
doctor groups. So they were in those market segments that we were discussing and understanding, and analysing the environment in 2005 
to 2007. [Interview with founder of Company A, 18 April 2013] 
19 "I think the advantage of being a medical industry person is you know more people so you can keep all relationships going faster and you 
understand some of the vagaries so as the release experimentation [thereby] you should be able to succeed faster. However, what you may 
do is not to ask many questions and respond to market feedbacks dynamically. We have nothing to prove the result. We want to sell you 
solutions. So we are going to ask what you want to be solved. So we will give you our thesis and then have a conversation to see if the 
thesis makes sense ... We are not going to simplify the problem. We know it is complicated because we have done it before. We know the 
radio is complicated. The sensor is complicated. We know it is consumer experience. Most of these medical companies don't consider 
patients as consumers. They are still considering them in the old paradigm which is the patient is a patient." [Interview with founder of 
Company C, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
20 "We hired clinicians … so they could tell us how our products needed to work. … We treated every customer as a consumer no matter 
whether you are a doctor, nurse, or patient….So what we did was we built up expertise on what a certain kind of product needed to do and 
how to sell it." [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
Not delineating customer Solutions 
  
21 "We got confirmation from him [an advisor] that the market [PERS market] still has not changed probably in 20 years. … We didn't need 
the whole market research to know [that] they would like the mobility piece because we know elderly people like to be active [and] not 
just staying at home." [Interview with Founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
  
22 "[We didn't get potential buyers involved in our first product development.] We just created the product and the whole concept because we 
knew there were customers for glucose monitors. … It was pretty simple because glucose meters have been around for years. They are 
very standard in term of using consumable test strips and discipline and results, these kinds of things. So the glucose meter technology is 
very well developed when we entered the market. What we wanted to do was add the features of wireless connectivity. ... We added 
another concept to that which was online monitoring, so we could gain revenue from the online monitor." [Interview with co-founder of 
Company D, 28 April 2014] 
  
23 "There are a lot of users and studies have been done [regarding the personal emergency respondence system]. The founders had a 
background in the completive products." [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
  
24 "The family friend [one of the founders, a cardiologist] identified a clinical problem and said if you [another founder] could [develop] 
continuous blood pressure that would be very helpful for the clinical communities and patients. So that's why [the second founder 
mentioned in the paragraph] said "I am going to do that exactly." And then [the second founder mentioned in the paragraph] developed 
the continuous blood pressure monitor. So he was respondent to a clinical need and solved that problem.” [Interview with VP of Market 
Development of Company F, 2 May 2014] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
  Representative Data 
 
Delineating 
customer 
solutions 
(Cont.) 
25 
"They saw their own needs and figured out this was the need that others had, so they thought it could be a business they can develop and 
then [one of the founders] wanted to start the business." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 28 April 2014] 
 
Leveraging 
experiences 
in business 
operations 
26 "The other big advantage was this company [a partner and this partnership happened before Company A focused exclusively on the 
mHealth market] was an expert in delivering one of the solutions [a solution for diabetes patients]. So it was a great learning experience 
for us to discover how they think about delivering care and delivering medical devices. So how they manufacture, how to get FDA 
approvals, all those things are our other benefits from this partnership. And they, of course, got a lot of tests regarding how patients think 
about the solution" [Interview with Founder of Company A, 13 May, 2014] 
 
 
27 "[The product concept is] mature. And the business model is mature, too. We don't have to invent a business model. We had to adapt to it 
and that business model was a very difficult one because the medication means that customers would not buy equipment. They are renting 
it ...that’s very expensive to get to start it because you have to finance the equipment and start-up acquisition costs at the beginning." 
[Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
 
 
28 "[One of the co-founders] knew a lot [about the regulation issue] from his experience and then ... because in the previous company that I 
mentioned that we had sold, [that it] was for medical software. So he was very familiar with the FDA process, so we actually have hired 
an FDA resource, a quality resource." [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
 
 
29 "We have worked in several markets which are highly regulated and require FDA [approval] ...there are a lot of rules and regulations. 
The rules are different. We have worked with lots of different rules. Some are similar in philosophy... We were set up and experienced with 
facing similar challenges as in the market places." [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
 
 
30 "I understand the market and get to put it together " [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 201]  
 
 
31 "I learned from [a company]. Single use item creates the utility, and so we were quite interested in the fact it could be our meter or any 
glucose meters there that patients used every day and so they have to keep buying them [test strips] and buying them. So they create the 
revenue stream. That was our business model and then the idea was to make a connected meter so that is more appealing than 
unconnected meters. So the revenue stream would come to us from our competitors." [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 April. 
2014] 
 
 
32 "[In] the company that I had and sold to [a company name], we didn't really know much about the regulatory, quality systems, and 
developing products under a quality system. So at [a company name], I learned a lot about that. So when we started the company, we 
started right from the first step, working the quality system and thinking about the regulatory issues. So [for] the people they are coming 
from unregulated area into a regulated area, I think there is a steep learning curve ..." [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 
April. 2014] 
 
 
33 [One founder], for example, is in the security industry. ... [Another founder] was doing something in security systems and he got interested 
in the post alarm systems. … They knew the industry very well. And the company pulls sale and marketing persons to work for it. 
[Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 9 Oct. 2013] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 Representative Data 
 
 
34 "The two funders' background was primary consumer products. … Initially, the market was developed directly to consumer products for 
care givers to manage their parents or family members with chronic diseases." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 23 April 
2013] 
 
 
35 "They didn't start marketing the product. It was their belief that they didn't want anybody to know what they were doing. They thought it 
was the right decision to be somewhat secretive about the market. That came from their history of being in the consumer product market 
where once you announce something, everybody could copy it. And so they decided to only go to selected companies that we had [already 
approached] between 2006 and 2009. ... They thought it would be too easy to be copied. They didn't understand the difference between the 
mobile health industry and the consumer product industry. Consumer products change very rapidly and healthcare changes very slowly. 
So, on my side, I believe they realized they made a mistake." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 23 April 2013] 
 
Leveraging 
technology 
resources 
36 "In process automation, my focus was networking communications like the company that I worked with before, they built solutions for 
automation industries, factories, park stations. So if you look at the concepts, they have remote control and provide different services in 
process automation so that the concepts are very similar. But this was appealing to consumers. This is appealing to the mainstream 
markets. [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
 37 "I think all of these [issues] related to what happens in process automation. If you see process automation, their solutions are much more 
integrated ... they control the whole automation plan. So they bring in different sensors, different solutions, and different control logics. 
All those solutions are integrated. ... So that is relevant to how we leverage to build up some of our solutions." [Interview with Founder of 
Company A, 28 April. 2014]  
  
38 "Part of that [product] is the hardware and software system because we control signalling and data. We also have lots of expertise in the 
distributed software systems to be able to keep all these things up and running. That's our key experience from the web-hosting industry 
that is where we came from when we were a hosting company 10 years ago." [Interview with co-founder of Company B, 25 April 2013] 
 
 39 "One of the other gentlemen who is our CEO is a double E engineer and so he has already understood the product and the process in 
creating new products." [Interview with co-founder of Company B, 25 April, 2013] 
 
 40 We sell to doctors with a prescription device, a FDA clearance device. It is difficult. It takes time ... So what we have been doing is 
leveraging one area to go to another." [Interview with Lead Hardware Engineer of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
 41 "As a consultancy, there are some advantages and some disadvantages. The advantage is you are exposed to a lot of technology and lots 
of market problems. … you have been charged by the hour or a fixed price; you become operationally excellent at innovation, and so you 
get innovation excellent." [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
 
 42 "From entering in the medical market to six months later, we shipped our first product. That's because we have had FDA and we already 
had 80% of the product. Three different products for three different markets, and so we were sort of breaking out three different puzzles. 
The only need for R&D is the gap we faced. So 80% [R&D investment can] reuse." [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
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Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 Representative Data 
 
 43 "...  I worked with [a given company] ... on the electronic healthcare record system. We developed the communication network which can 
transmit these healthcare records around the world because [the employees of the company] are constantly moving from one place to the 
next. And the record had to follow them. ... Then I left that company and did the company [another company name] that we sold to 
[another company name]. That was applying telecommunication technology to operating rooms. ...we developed a way to transmit the 
audio and video in the ER operating rooms to different places, to doctors' offices or to other operating rooms. So that was 
telecommunication applied to the surgery. Then the next company was a tracking company that we tracked people and patients and 
equipment around the hospitals. And that was ZigBee technology which was a form of low data rate networking. ... And then after I left 
there and started [Company E], that was an application of telecommunication technology to glucose monitoring. Now we broke into the 
application of telecommunication technology to collect different kinds of biometrics like blood pressure, ECG, different things. So the 
issue is the companies were a little bit different. They were all in healthcare but they were all different segments of healthcare." [Interview 
with co-founder of Company D, 28 April. 2014]  
 
Leveraging 
human 
resources 
44 "I always play a very front role, as you probably know. Personal connections always help regardless with which companies [one engages 
with]. ...that is another key thing that you built and your roll from that" [Interview with Founder of Company A, 13 May, 2014] 
 
45 "He [one of the co-founders] has a lot of experience from the past working in an engineering product development role, mainly on 
hardware. Because his first job was working for a very large company with a lot of structure, he learned how they do things and that was 
why he could develop his relationship with our manufacturing partner in [a country]." [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 28 
April 2014] 
  
46 "I don't think personal connection per se give you anything more. I think personal connections are commercial relationships. You got your 
personal relationship because you brought in value. … I am from [a given country]. I don't have any personal relationship in my market 
which is in America. It might be the reason." [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
  
47 "I understand the market and get to put together and of course my telecommunication background but you end up with the relationships 
you worked with. That helps you." [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 2013] 
  
48 "What happened was the founders were introduced to an engineer who had a patented approach to talk through the pendent. … So they 
felt that well "we'll come up with a product that everybody just talks through the pendant. That would allow us to go into the market place 
and have this patented feature" ... One of founders knew him [the engineer] before the company started.  So that was the root of how 
things happened." [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
 
  
49 "[One founder's] experience is in sales and business development and sourcing product in the Orient. So we have all our hardware made 
in the Orient.  He is there now and so he has a deep relationship on the Orient to allow us to have the product we need to make the system 
work." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 14 Oct. 2013] 
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Building resources  
 R&D for new technologies and constructing supply chain systems. All focal firms 
invested in R&D for necessary technology (see Quotations 50-66, Table 12). Companies A 
and C leveraged their supply chain systems used in former business to the new one32. For the 
remaining focal firms, the founders construct their supply chains based on their personal 
connections33.  
 Improving human resources. Interestingly, we found focal firms improved their 
human resources at different stages of their business development. Except for the founders of 
Companies B, D and E had related market experiences, the other ventures hired experts to 
define proper business models. Company A and C realized they need to hire experts while 
developing their first devices (see Quotations 67-69, Table 12). For example, the founder of 
Company Ｃ mentioned that: 
"I had a very experienced team including myself that knew the question to ask to 
modify our platform to go to a particular market and solve the problem for that 
market. ... But the sales and understanding the regulations, I knew I needed to 
change the DNA of the company to be a medical company. And so we hired people 
who already have that experience.34"   
 However, Company F and G hired experts to re-define business models ‘after’ they 
realized their original strategies did not work35 (see Quotations 70-71, Table 12). 
                                                             
32 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company A on 24 Oct, 2013 and with the founder of 
Company C on 4 June, 2014. 
33 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company B on 10 Oct., 2013,  with the founder of 
Company D on 17 April, 2013 and 28 April, 2014, with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014, with the 
founder of Company F on 30 April, 2014, and with the general manager of Company G on 14 Oct., 2013.  
34 Quotation from interview with the founder of Company C, 22 Oct., 2013. 
35 Information from the interviews with the VP of Market Development of Company F on 30 April, 2014 and 
with the general manager of Company G on 28 April, 2014. 
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 Accessing financial resources. All foal firms had similar financial supports (see 
Quotations 72-86, Table 12). Most focal firms gradually added institutional investors as their 
strategic partners. 
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Table 12 Overview of data structure (Post-market Entry - Building resources) 
Second-
order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
Representative Data 
Building 
resources 
R&D for 
new 
technologies 
50 "[We have Bluetooth but] we don't limit to Bluetooth. Bluetooth is easier and convenient. We also have wire cable or USB devices, we 
also have internet devices, and we have Zigbee devices.  So our devices are not limited." [Interview with founder of Company A, 18 April 
2013] 
51 "The prototype was just a box. ... And he [one of the founders] hired contracted engineers to make a prototype. ... And then what we did 
was that we used that as a basis and then [another founder] did the modified product.  And then [Another founder] worked with the 
company in [A country] to do our final product development round. " [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 10 Oct. 2013] 
52 "We did everything internally. Because by doing so, we can have complete control of all solutions…...As a multi-skilled product, we have 
a fashion designer, mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, four different types of software designers, and the only way to come up 
with those solutions is to keep all those people in one office working together to solve the multi-skilled operation." [Interview with founder 
of Company C, 29 May 2013] 
53 "All the software is designed by our company and the hardware is designed by a partnership with a company in [A country]." [Interview 
with co-founder of Company D, 17 April 2013] 
54 "We evolved a solution to the problem. You can technologically say we make people become mobile because they can … have the ability 
to communicate when they need help. Our device covers a whole house. You can be 200 meters around the house. So people can be not 
limited mainly in the house."  [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 23 April 2013] 
55 
"He [one of the founders] spent the first 4 years developing the science for continuous blood pressure." [Interview with VP of market 
development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013]  
56 "This company is built on really two things. We have a very smart science group and also a very capable engineering group as well. And 
for a medical device, you usually get one or the other. We are pretty unique because we have both. And we have a lot of expertise in both" 
[Interview with VP of market development of Company F 15 Oct. 2013]  
57 "Unlike most companies in our market, we develop our own dedicated cellular gateway. As I said it is running on a machine to machine 
network. Everybody else is pretty much running their programs on smart phones and tablets, which is more costly." [Interview with 
General Manager of Company G , 23 April 2013] 
 
  
58 "our core competency was developing wireless Bluetooth technology for devices to [connect to] the Internet and from that, we then had to 
build the devices which could connect our product technology …… and then no one wanted to take our data and put that in their software, 
so we had to build software as well. So over the early years, we had to hire engineers and computer programmers. ...... And our 
uniqueness was they were not required PC but they were working over panel telephone modem and that was how we were successful ...... 
we had a very low cost and easy to use solution used their telephone lines." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 23 April 
2013] 
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order Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 Representative Data 
 
Constructing 
supply chain 
systems 
59 "Yes we do [share the supply chain system of the former company founded by the founder of company A]. It was just a lot of market 
research that we have to do to find the right partners and manufacturers. [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
60 "We worked with a company in [a given country] whose has engineers there. ... We out-sourced our technology and ideas to them. We 
paid them to finish manufacturing stuff. ...  They worked with [a company] and [one of the founders] worked in [the company]." 
[Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 10 Oct. 2013]  
 
61 "What we needed to do was to look after the factories. Once you get into a low volume, you have a low volume factory and then you have 
a medium factory and a high volume factory. ... you just discovered and you did a lot by yourself as you grow the business. I think it is 
simple growth" [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
 
62 "All the software is designed by our company and the hardware is designed by a partnership with a company in [a given country]. We 
have a long term and close relationship. We are the legal manufacturers of the device software." [Interview with Co-Founder of Company 
D, 17 April. 2013] 
 
63 "We found the company because one of my partners had a lot of experience in Korea. We had connections with manufacturing companies 
in Korea." [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 April, 2014]  
 
64 "The company that manufactures the devices is able to get the approval process, so we have a contract with them."  [Interview with VP of 
sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
 
65 "The second thing is then we have to decide whether we are going to outsource the supply chain to find somebody else who can make it for 
us or we […] manufacture ourselves. So we made the decision. So we hired a CTO, [a person's name]. He has done this before. He built 
up a medical device company and developed a product which is very good. And then the executive team made this decision that we will 
manufacturer it locally. So we did all the manufacturing quality [by] ourselves." [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company 
F, 30 April. 2014] 
 
  66 "The father's experience is in sales and business development and sourcing product in the Orient. So we have all our hardware made in the 
Orient.  He is there now and so he has a deep relationship on the Orient to allow us to have the product we need to make the system work." 
[Interview with General Manager of Company G , 14 Oct. 2013] 
 
Improving 
human 
resources 
67 "Medical devices, I think there is always complexity, like FDA certification. It is a big challenge. So to conquer that, I think the clear thing 
was to find an expert who knows that. And we were able to successfully to find somebody who is exceptional and has very deep knowledge 
of medical devices. So we have to comprise our existing innovative thinking with somebody who knew how to bring a medical device to 
market." [Interview with founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
68 "We hire people to pull the DNA in. I need to change the DNA of the company. ... I had a very experienced team including myself that 
knew the question to ask to modify our platform to go to a particular market and solve the problem for that market. So we are extremely 
experienced. So we start to design a medical product in March and start to work on patients in December. ... So we are really good at 
that. But the sales and understanding the regulations, I knew I needed to change the DNA of the company to be a medical company. And 
so we hired people who already have that experience."  [Interview with founder of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013]  
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First-order                
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 69 "We hired sales because we didn't know how to sell. … And we hired clinicians because we needed people in the company who have been 
doctors and nurses so they could tell us how our products are needed to work." [Interview with Founder of  Company C, 4 June 2014] 
 
 70 "This company has two chapters. If you look at the first chapter, the founder had zero experience in the medical devices before and the 
cardiologist had no experience either. But in the second chapter, [a person] and I do have experience in medical devices. ...  So they didn't 
sell anything in the first four or five years. It was a scientific project and for science, they didn't really focus on what kind business they 
wanted, but they were trying to accommodate the clinical need. Once they have done that, they hired a CEO to identify the market place." 
[Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 30 April, 2014] 
 
  71 "They were referred to me because they needed someone to sell and I was recommended to them as someone who could do this.  They had 
the basis of the product that could be sold. They hired me because of the sales capacity more than the product develop capacity." (The 
general manager is the first employee with healthcare background) [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 28 April, 2014] 
 
Accessing 
financial 
resources  
72 "For us, the founding was just done by myself. …  So originally I started it by putting my own money on and then we have angle groups. 
One of the angle group which is a small club of private investors." [Interview with founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
73 "It was a period of time in 2003 and 2004. We started talking to a company called [a company name] and [the company] found it tricky 
that now patients can talk to or communicate with their doctors right from the TV, using the home TV. So they asked us to build a 
prototype and build a solution [to work on the demonstration project] ... it [the demonstration project] was a funded project. ... [The 
company] is the only one who funded the demonstration". [Interview with founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
 74 "At the beginning, there was just the three of us, so we had to be very bounded by who did what. I was more like a strategic investor and 
the only investor. So they used my money. I invested [an amount of] dollars to do the development." [Interview with co-founder of 
Company B, 10 Oct. 2013]  
 
 75 "We have probably 30 to 40 investors now [2014]. … There is a venture capital partner who just bought some shares a month ago. So it is 
our first institutional investor. So there is very little institutional money going into the company." [Interview with Founder of Company B, 
28 April 2014] 
  
76 Company C has venture capital funds [Data source: VentureXpert database] 
  
77 Company C has institutional investors in the early stage of the Company D evelopment [Data source: Interviews with founder of Company 
C, 29 May 2013/24 October 2013 and news from Associated Press Newswires APRS on 18 June 2009] 
 
 78 "A company invested us for medical reasons as well as safety reason and I did the analysis just over two years ago from now. … And the 
entire focus on the company investment is in the healthcare. " [Interview with founder of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013]  
  
79 "‘This new investment adds a significant strategic partner in [company name] and capital to accelerate commercialization of our game-
changing mHealth solution,’ said Company C Founder & CEO. ‘The team [Company C] is unique in that it has deployed monitoring 
systems to help medical practitioners in the most extreme environment.’” [News from Business Wire, 16 Aug. 2012] 
  
80 "I have two other partners and we all sold companies in the past. … So we all have money to fund the company." [Interview with Co-
Founder of Company D, 17 April. 2013] 
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 81 "It [funding] was our money plus a large contact we had early on that funded the development. ... After we started it [Company E], we got 
a contract with a company in [a given place]. They have purchased [products] and [the company] hired us as the management team to go 
out and merchandise [these products].”  [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 April, 2014] 
 
 82 "The company was initially under private investments." [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
 
 83 Company F has institutional investors in the early stage of the company’s development [Data source: Interviews with VP of market 
development of Company F, 20 March 2013/ 24 October 2013; News from PR Newswire (U.S.) on 31 March 2008 and on 13 December 
2011] 
  
84 "We started with some angles and then we went to round A and then to B to have [a certain amount of dollars]. In the C round, I cannot 
remember exactly, I think overall, we are in the middle of closing D round." [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 
30 April. 2014] 
  
85 Company F has venture capital funds. [Data source: VentureXpert database] 
 
  86 "[One founder] sold the company and decided to fund [the other founder]'s idea. … [It is] self-founded by family and friends. [Interview 
with General Manager of Company G , 14 October 2013] 
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Performance review and strategy modification.  
 Performance review. All focal firms considered market conditions and customer 
reactions to their products while reviewing their performance. However, Companies A and C 
emphasized more the market environment such as policy and potential profits 36 (see 
Quotations 87, 89-90, Table 13); while Companies B, D, E, F, G paid more attention to the 
customer reaction to their products and their product portfolios37 38 (see Quotations 88, 91-94, 
Table 13);.  
 Strategic experiments. Companies B and E didn’t change their market focus because 
their technology (tracking technology) had some limitations to its being leveraged in other 
market segments39  40  (see Quotations 95-96, Table 13). But Company E evolved a new 
marketing approach41 (see Quotations 102, Table 13). Companies A and C tried to approach 
different market segments when the development of initial market segments was not as good 
as expected 42 (see Quotations 98-99, Table 13). For example, Company A entered into the 
military healthcare service market because the mobile health market for hospitals, insurance 
companies, and patients was slow in adapting new technology43. Company C did not enter the 
mobile health market till the political environment was ready for their innovations 44 . 
Companies A and D changed their focus on their product portfolios from hardware to 
software to react to changes in market demand 45 46  (see Quotations 97, 100, Table 13). 
                                                             
36 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company A on 24 Oct, 2013, with the lead hardware 
engineer of Company C on 22 Oct., 2013, and with the founder of Company C on 23 Oct., 2013. 
37 The life safety security market where Companies B and E operated was an existing market with a clear market 
structure such that it was not urgent for market participants to especially concentrate on market conditions.  
38 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company B on 28 April, 2014, with the founder of 
Company D on 28 April, 2014, with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014, with the founder of company 
F on 15 Oct., 2013, and with the founder of general manager of Company G on 28 April, 2014. 
39 Information from the interview with the founder of Company B on 28 April, 2014 
40 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
41 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
42 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
43 Information from the interview with the founder of Company A on 24 Oct., 2013 
44 Information from the interview with the founder of Company C on 29 May, 2013 
45 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company A on 24 Oct., 2013 and with the founder of 
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Companies D and G expanded their product portfolios and tried to penetrate into the fitness, 
wellness, or serious disease markets47 48 (see Quotations 101, 103-104, Table 13).    
Interacting with customers to upgrade products. All focal firms had strong 
connections with their customers “after they had the first devices” 49 (see Quotations 105-108, 
Table 13).    
 Business Model and product redesign. Company F faced a serious challenge while 
commercializing their first device 50 (see Quotations 109-114, Table 13). The VP of market 
development described it as that:   
"...in the U.S. all those diagnostic clinics have patients to go there four times a 
week. ... They have their patients to be diagnosed and they get constant blood 
pressure. So we thought maybe this is a good opportunity where we can sell our 
continuous blood pressure. ... And then we realized it is a large market but it is not 
much money in it. [A diagnostic clinic] and [Another diagnostic clinic] run 40% 
each on the diagnostic clinics in the U.S. And [The second diagnostic clinic 
mentioned in this paragraph] buys all the equipment from [The first diagnostic 
clinic mentioned in this paragraph]. So really you only have one customer. If [the 
first diagnostic clinic mentioned in this paragraph] says ‘we don't want to buy your 
product,’ then we are out.51" 
 Therefore, the board hired experts to redefine the target market and redesign the 
business model and product. The VP of market development of Company F mentioned that: 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Company D on 16 Oct., 2013 
46 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
47 Information from the interviews with the founder of Company D on 28 April, 2014 and with the general 
manager of Company G on 15 Oct., 2014. 
48 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
49 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
50 Information from the interview with the founder of Company E on 29 April, 2014 
51 Quotation from interview with the VP of market development of Company F on 15 Oct., 2013. 
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"He [the CEO at that time] hired myself and [another person]. ... I was from [a 
medical device company] and he was from [another medical device company]. ... 
[The current CEO] and I probably have interviewed 250 nurses to just go through 
every single detail we could to say “what do you think of this?”, “What do you 
think of this?”, “How's about this?”, and “What's your problem here?” That 
allowed us to be able to produce a product that we think now it is ground breaking 
and we got a lot of feedback to say it is actually what people want52."  
                                                             
52 Quotation from interview with the VP of market development of Company F on 15 Oct., 2013. 
100 
 
Table 13 Overview of data structure (Post-market entry: Performance review and strategy modification) 
Second-order 
Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
Representative Data 
Performance 
review and 
strategy 
modification 
Performance 
review 
95 "I think in 2010, we realized this industry is going to take time to grow. And we were seeing that other competitors were going out of this business, not 
doing so well. So in 2010, one of the things we did was we started working with the department of defence veteran administration." [Interview with 
Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 96 "[We are concerned with] market reaction. We start selling and we would like the market to tell us if they liked it. Like I said, we don't have a chance 
to change to switch strategy. We don't have enough money." [Interview with Co-founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
 97 
"One of the things we learned from the Fire Department is they have very limited budgets and they have a very long cycle time for purchasing. If the 
Fire Department wants to buy something, they usually have to go through the accounting commission, which a long budget process because when they 
buy a system for a lot of people, it is not cheap. ... As it goes to a capital expenditure through a government entity, it takes a very long cycle time and 
especially when it does not already have a perceived value to it. [Interview with Lead Hardware Engineer of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
 
98 "I thought that consumer business was good revenue but we would not become a large consumer brand. We don't have the money for marketing. Sport 
is too small to get the sales. First responders and the Army would take 10 years to adapt … So I re-structured the company. …stop doing R&D on 
those products [sold in sport, first respondence, and defence market] and just sold the products we have. … The consumer market is just made on 
Amazon. And the entire focus on the company investment is in the healthcare”.[Interview with Founder of Company C, 22 Oct. 2013] 
 
 99 "We have to always keep our eyes on the market to make sure the product and our offering are meeting the market needs. … We review our 
performance against our competitors and look at what markets are there and what are the specific market niches, then we adjust our strategies 
accordingly. We early on had very good clinical trial business and so we have continued to focus on the clinical trial business to develop a strong 
reputation in that business." [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 28 April. 2014]  
 
 100 "… increasing cash flow because the accounting system in our industry is very different from … the tradition in a product sale company. The 
accounting principle does not allow you to recognize profits. For a certain period of time for rental … financial performances vs. financial growth are 
two different things. So our goals are to increase the number of subscribers and to have a positive cash flow meaning that you get beyond the cost of 
operation, including the equipment and marketing." [Interview with VP of sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
 
 101 "...in the U.S. all those diagnostic clinics have patients to go there four times a week. ... They have their patients to be diagnosed and they get constant 
blood pressure. So we thought maybe this is a good opportunity where we can sell our continuous blood pressure. ... And then we realized it is a large 
market but it is not much money in it. And equally [A diagnostic clinic] and [Another diagnostic clinic] run 40% each on the diagnostic clinics in the 
U.S. And [The second diagnostic clinic mentioned in this paragraph] buys all the equipment from [The first diagnostic clinic mentioned in this 
paragraph]. So really you only have one customer. If [the first diagnostic clinic mentioned in this paragraph] says ‘we don't want to buy your 
product,’ then we are out." [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013] 
  
  102 "The actual revenue model where we penetrate into [has] an acceptable degree and [a] growing user base. And in the B2B model, we are adding 
more customers and expanding existing customers with new sales, and we found it is true so we continuously grow the company." [Interview with 
General Manager of Company G , 28 April. 2014] 
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Second-order 
Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 
Representative Data 
 
Strategic 
experiments 
No Strategic experiments 
 
103 “I think there is some limitation and half-flexibility for our platform to be adapted to different markets. It would be difficult to do that." [Interview 
with Founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
 
 104 "We don't have a chance to change to switch strategy. We don't have enough money. We have to be focused. We are still confident that we can at least 
make a decent business out of it regardless." [Interview with Founder of Company B, 28 April 2014] 
   Strategic experiments 
 
 105 "Our original model was to sell our hardware and then provide services. But as the model for other industries has changed, the mobile industry 
doesn't charge too much with hardware but focuses on monthly revenue, the revenue by customer using the solution. So we evolved from a hardware 
company to a service company. Hardware is important but not the critical thing for the solution."  [Interview with Founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 
2013] 
 
 106 "We thought we are going to focus on that group [the Department of Defence Veteran Administration] because what we found was all the commercial 
health insurance companies, hospital systems, physicians groups, home healthcare agencies are all in the market segment which is actually waiting 
for the reform of the healthcare effect. So we anticipated it is going to take more time. And the expectation was correct because even now if you see, 
these companies are not buying a lot of products yet." [Interview with founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
  
107 "For consumer business, we always include consumer market to have a good cash flow but we feel it is not very scalable enough to be a focus for a 
company. So for the medical business, the environment is ready for adaption. It is 90% of the focus of our company. We feel that we have to focus to 
grow revenue." [Interview with Founder of Company C, 29 May. 2013] 
  
108 "From the very first day of the company, we had both [hardware and software]. We have the software platform online and we have a mobile 
application, and we have the meter. Over time, as the market has evolved, the relative value of those different pieces has changed. When we first 
started to focus on the most valuable … offering, we felt it would be the meter. For the platform, there was a point in time, we felt we might not even 
continue with it because we are getting a lot of integration companies that want to integrate our meter into telehealth systems and so we provided that 
to them. So then there was less interest in the platform. And now today, that has shifted. There are a number of glucose meters out there competing 
with ours and we have been building on this platform for six years." [Interview with co-founder of Company D, 16 Oct. 2013] 
  
109 
“Since we had the last talk, we are now working with a company with a Class 3 implantable device. But the reason why they want to work with us is 
because we have a Class 2 platform and they want data from their Class 3 devices to be integrated with those Class 2 devices. ... So we have a 
transition to a greater care and more complex care, and that transition is what we are trying to approach with mobile health, so, like, I have a 
customer working with a professional soccer team. Obviously, these players are athletes and in good shape but they are looking at activities. They are 
looking at sleep quality. And then we have people. They are middle age, overweight. We are trying to motivate them to be more active." [Interview 
with co-founder of Company D, 28 April. 2014] 
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Second-order 
Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 
Representative Data 
 
 110 "The business model is not the business model they started out with. Traditionally, it is a consumer device, it was advertised by television, and printed 
media or it was sold to companies to provide the service themselves ... It was sold through pretty intensive direct marketing. One of the classic 
problems is very high customer acquisition cost. What we did at beginning was that we were kind of taking advantage [of the fact] that we had a co-
marketing deal together with some infomercials and we tried to work with people who were in the direct market tier. And then there were two major 
problems. One is they had very high customer acquisition costs. If you are making it with somebody else in their marketing systems, they want to take 
the bigger piece of the pie. If you do this by yourself, you have to have a large investment. Also the fact is the payback is important because 85% of 
this business is the recovering revenue. We don't actually sell a unit. You place it for somebody for no cost. And you provide the service for using it. ... 
And then we evolved to the model with [a given company] ... selling through them, [thus] reducing the acquisition cost largely." [Interview with VP of 
sales and marketing of Company E, 29 April 2014] 
 
 111 "Their original idea was direct to consumers for family care givers.  ...... they met a doctor here in south California socially. He convinced them this is 
the product he needs for his business. So the doctor convinced [founders] to deliver it as a business to business model not direct to a consumer model. 
He also convinced them that once they have a platform, the end consumers will also be there. That was a correct decision. The market is just slow to 
evolve but everyone expects it." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 10 Oct. 2013] 
 
 112 "We announced an arrangement earlier this year with a strategic partner [names a given company]. [The company] is the largest home security 
company in the America. ... They wanted to get into wellness, so they chose us as a leader in that market and so together they are going to direct 
market to consumers to use our technology. ... With [the company’s] offering to support their technology and with the call centres, they will assist us 
in direct consumer marketing and that is going to be a new growth area for us." [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 10 Oct. 2013] 
 
 Interacting 
with 
customers to 
upgrade 
products 
113 "That was just listening to our customers in the healthcare [context], a lot of solutions actually work for doctors and nurses but our focus is how to 
provide interfaces for the patients. So all of our thinking points are what is the easiest and simplest way to provide care to them rather than looking 
from the doctor’s prospect in delivering care. So we look at what is simple and we found that even connecting a small box to the TV was not that easy 
in those days.  HDMI was not there and a lot of things were complex. So we decided to build a tablet. So we build a tablet before iPad and all these 
things came in. But it was mainly because what our customers were looking for was the integrated system which does not require installation, not 
complicated to use. iPhone was just coming in, so we looked at the ease of use for iPhone and tried to apply it on a tablet. And we released our 
product before iPad was really there." [Interview with founder of Company A, 24 Oct. 2013] 
 
 114 "In the first four year of the company, we were operating both as a consultancy for cash flow as well as doing product design and then took products 
to the early adopters and then refined the products by the feedback from these early adopters to allow us to know the business problems that our 
solutions could solve." [Interview with founder of Company C, 29 May 2013] 
 
 115 "I think my personal focus is move forward for a complete solution. ...... I am talking to our customers [about] what's I don't have but you need in 
terms of the overall solution" [Interview with the co-founder of Company E, on 16 October, 2013] 
 
 116 "They did that [the first product development] on their own. After we had the first product …we were very interactive with our customers. Our 
customers continuously drive our product development.” [Interview with General Manager of Company G , 28 April 2014] 
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Second-order 
Codes 
First-order                
Codes 
 
Representative Data 
 
Business 
Model 
redesign 
117 "He [the CEO at that time] hired myself and [another person]. ... I was from [A medical device company] and he was from [Another medical device 
company]. ...In my background, I spent 3 years in [the first medical information system service company mentioned in this paragraph] managing 
wireless health division. In that time, I recognized patients deteriorate on the general floor. And so we were trying to figure out a way a way about 
which market we are targeting and what we are trying to do and value proposition and so on." [Interview with VP of Market Development of 
Company F, 15 Oct. 2013] 
 
118 "He [one founder, a cardiologist] didn't really work here. He is a founder but never worked here. [Another founder] left but the doctor is still the 
majority shareholder of the company. But he doesn't get directly involved in day-to-day operations. ...  We [the CEO and the VP of market 
development who both have medical device backgrounds] investigated everything because we have to make sure we are right [including] home, AMS, 
American medical systems, military, EMS." [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 30 April. 2014]  
 
 
119 "Most hospital's position was that they knew this patient is so sick and could have a cardiac arrest. They would not promote from the general floor. If 
you do have a cardiac arrest on the general floor, you have 1/20 chance to survive. If you are in the ICU you have 1/5 chance to survive. Even though 
you are considered to be sicker, your chance to survive is higher because you get people around you and you get monitoring facilities. So then you 
need to consider what you are going to do on the general floor. ... Now you noticed that nurses are doing exactly the same thing in the general floor ... 
So how could we get more monitors to the general floor? What nurses take when they go into the patient's room is ECG, blood pressure, breath rate, 
SpO2, body temperature. So okay, we need these five vital signs and put them into a small package that we can put on every patient. We should be 
able to provide a much safer environment for the patient. I should also have a work-flow improvement process for nursing stuff”. [Interview with VP 
of market development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013] 
 
 
120 "[The current CEO] and I probably have interviewed 250 nurses, probably about two thousand hours to just go through every single detail we could 
to say ‘what do you think of this?,’ ‘What do you think of this?’, and so on. ‘How's about this?’ ‘What's your problem here?’ That allowed us to be 
able to produce a product that we think now, it is ground breaking and we got a lot of feedback to say it is actually what people want. ... I would say it 
took [the current CEO] and I six months to do another research, maybe 6 to 9 months to do enough research in 2008. So by 2009, maybe the second 
quarter of 2009, we were able to go to the board and say, ‘Here is what we want to do’. [Interview with VP of market development of Company F, 15 
Oct. 2013] 
 
Product 
redesign 
121 "Now we have a continuous blood pressure technique. ... What we are able to find out is the vital signs. ... We should be able to provide much safer 
environment for the patient. We should also have a work-flow improvement process for nursing stuff, and maybe potentially save the hospital's 
money." [Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013] 
 
  122 The first four years was the development of the continuous blood pressure monitor but we didn't sell this product. ... There is no value or only limited 
value in selling this product into the hospitals. Although they can do continuous blood pressure, they still need to do other things. ... here in 2008 to 
2009, what we want to do for this devices is to incorporate this but we have a new trajectory to go to [A Product, the Vital Signs Monitor]." 
[Interview with VP of Market Development of Company F, 15 Oct. 2013] 
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3.4.3 The interrelationship between entrepreneurial determinants, entrepreneurial 
attention on resources application, and opportunity identification  
 We indicate three entrepreneurial determinants for new venture creation: Technology-
driven, operation-driven, and user-driven determinants. We labelled focal firms based on 
their founders’ initial determinants to start the new business. Companies A, B, and C were 
labelled as “technology-driven ventures” because they aimed to discover a new market 
domain to exploit their technology at hand. Company D and E were labelled as “operation-
driven ventures” because they aimed to solve the problems observed by their founders in their 
past career. Companies F and G were labelled as “user-driven ventures” because they were 
founded to solve the problems that their founders failed to find a suitable product to satisfy 
their needs.  
 Before we further consider the impact of entrepreneurial determinants on opportunity 
identification and exploitation, we compared the backgrounds and resources stocks of focal 
firms and their founders at “the founded year” to ensure focal firms’ entrepreneurial actions 
were determined by their founders' entrepreneurial determinants rather than by their different 
resources endowment levels. The results (see Table 14) did not present significant differences 
in founders' entrepreneurial experiences and financial resources. The main differences lay in 
new ventures' technology and market knowledge. Although both technology-driven ventures 
and operation-driven ventures had technology resources which can be leveraged to the new 
business, not all of them were motivated to maximum their current technologies. In addition, 
user-driven ventures started new business even if they had no necessary resources at hand.  
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 Table 14 Ventures’ background and opportunity selection before market entry at "the founded year" 
Venture Types 
1 2 3 
Technology-driven 
ventures 
Operation-driven 
ventures 
User-driven ventures 
Numbers of 
ventures 
3 2 2 
Number of 
founders 
1-3 3-4 2 
Venture status 
before entering 
in the mHealth 
Most of them in non-
regulated market segments 
or FDA class I segments 
- 
(established in mHealth) 
- 
(established in  mHealth) 
Financial 
resources 
Private funding 
(One with venture capital 
funding) 
Private funding 
Private funding 
(One with venture capital 
funding and an institutional 
investor) 
Entrepreneurial 
experience 
Company A: No 
Company B: Yes 
Company C: No 
Company E: Yes 
Company G: No 
Yes 
Market 
experience 
Mostly unrelated  Related Mostly unrelated 
Technology 
experience 
Related Related Not related 
 
In the next stage, we compared the process of opportunity identification in three types of 
ventures. Technology-driven ventures were motivated to maximise the value of current 
technology at hand which is a fungible capability that can generate profits in multiple markets 
(Danneels, 2011; W. Mitchell, 1992). Their founders may have market-related resources in 
other market domains but their entrepreneurial determinants led their attentions to leveraging 
their technology resources and using them as guidance to search opportunities (Gaglio & 
Katz, 2001; Kirzner, 1997; Shane, 2003), especially those with a short technology distance to 
their current technology. Since increasing the economic return of their existing technologies 
was their first priority, they did not have special preference toward particular opportunities 
(e.g., the mobile health market is one of their options) as long as they all can provide profits. 
Before selecting opportunities, they conducted in-depth market research to examine market 
conditions and to evaluate the feasibility of each opportunity in their opportunity sets.  In the 
evaluation process, they gradually understand the market requirements and their 
advantages/disadvantages in relation to the opportunities.  
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In contrast, the entrepreneurial determinants of operation-driven ventures and user-
driven ventures came from their founders perceptions of particular unmet needs. The 
founders of both operation-driven ventures and user-driven ventures had a clear goal in mind 
before they started their business. The transition from entrepreneurial determinants to first-
person opportunity beliefs, thus, was implicit. The founders of operation-driven ventures 
aimed to solve problems they perceived in their previous operational experiences in related 
market domains. This entrepreneurial determinant directed them to focus on utilizing the 
bundle of market-related resources they had which is a less fungible experience and only can 
generate profits in related market segments (Danneels, 2011; W. Mitchell, 1992). The 
founders of user-driven ventures perceived the needs from their personal frustration, which is 
not fungible experience and cannot generate profits outside current markets. The founders of 
use-driven ventures may have technological expertise or market knowledge in other market 
domains. However, their ideation process usually took place by entrepreneurial theorizing 
without direct experiences and not by analogy with what they have known and the resources 
they had. Their new product innovation, thus, was close to a pure exploration process 
(Danneels, 2002).  
The main difference between operation-driven ventures and the user-driven ventures 
was the possession of related knowledge and experience. Although operation-driven ventures 
lacked substantial market research, their founders’ related market and technology knowledge 
made them capable of anticipating the challenges they might face. However, in most cases, 
the founders of user-driven ventures started their business without necessary resources at 
hand. In addition, instead of conducting proper market research in terms of what technology-
driven ventures did, they had their entire focus on creating a technological solution to solve 
the problems they found. As such, they usually failed to anticipate potential challenges they 
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may face. It implies that new venture creation is not always based on a rational analysis but 
has some emotional issues involved.   
In addition, our results show empirically that in an almost identical market, different 
paths of opportunity identification (either through opportunity search-evaluation-exploitation 
or through entrepreneurs’ imagination based on founders’ operational experiences or past 
searching experience for a satisfactory product) can co-exist. The approach to identify 
opportunities is an option for entrepreneurs and determined by their entrepreneurial 
determinants. The entrepreneurs of technology-driven ventures followed an opportunity 
search-evaluation-exploitation process, while the entrepreneurial beliefs of the operation-
driven ventures and user-driven ventures emerged from entrepreneurs’ imagination.  
 
3.4.4 Entrepreneurial determinants, opportunity exploitation strategies, and resource 
application  
The product development phase (before the first product launch)  
New ventures starting with different entrepreneurial determinants usually have been 
through different processes of opportunity identification, which results to different level of 
understanding of the challenges they may face in their opportunity exploitation phase. Also, 
different entrepreneurial determinants tend to induce new ventures to use particular types of 
resources to exploit opportunities, which may influence the path of their future development.  
We compared the initial opportunity exploitation strategies of focal firm (e.g., 
delineating customer demands, leveraging resources, and building resources) to investigate 
the impact of entrepreneurial determinants on the opportunity exploitation strategies (see 
Table 15). Technology-driven ventures aimed to maximum economic returns of their 
technologies. In order to ensure the possibility to earn the expected profits, they conducted 
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rigorous market research which made them capable of anticipating the challenges they might 
face and the specific skills they might need. The understanding guided their following 
strategic actions to effectively exploit opportunity. Therefore, after entering into the mHealth 
market, they leveraged technology resources and naturally hired or consulted experts to help 
product development and had close connection with potential buyers to ensure their product 
matched customer demands. By doing so, they started developing their market resources.  
Table 15 Market testing strategies after market entry 
Venture 
Types 
1 2 3 
Technology-driven 
ventures 
Operation-driven ventures User-driven ventures 
Understanding customers and the market 
Delineating 
customer 
solutions  
1. Listened to early 
adaptors’ feedback 
2. Consulted or hired 
experts  
Relied on founders’ market 
experience and knowledge 
Relied on founders’ 
perception of unmet needs in 
the current market while 
they were searching for 
products for their own 
demands. 
Resource leverage 
Experience 
of business 
operation 
Leveraged some 
experiences and learned 
from market research 
Leverage operational 
experiences in the medical 
device/ solution market 
Leverage operational 
experiences but some of 
them are not unsuitable to 
the mHealth market 
Technology 
resource 
Leverage technology built 
while operating in other 
market segments 
Leverage technology built in 
founders’ past career in 
related market segments. 
(No direct technology 
resources to be leveraged) 
Human 
resources 
Leverage personal 
connections 
Leverage personal 
connections 
Leverage personal 
connections 
 
However, we found operation-driven ventures and user-driven ventures did not conduct 
complete market research before entering into the mHealth market and had fewer interactions 
with customers while developing their ‘first’ devices. Their entrepreneurial determinants lead 
them to quickly focus on developing a technical solution to satisfy the unmet needs they 
perceived rather than doing market research. In this case, related knowledge played a 
determined role to exploit opportunities and create business models. Because the 
entrepreneurial ideas of operation-driven ventures originated from their founders’ well-
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known domains, they can draw on their founders' market knowledge to guide their business 
development and technological resources to develop new products. 
But for user-driven ventures, the formation of their entrepreneurial ideas was not from 
aligning capabilities of their existing resources with potential demands in a particular market 
but from their founders’ personal frustration in finding a product to successfully satisfy their 
needs. This opportunity identification process exposed them to higher operational risks. In 
most cases, they lacked required knowledge and resources to exploit their chosen 
opportunities. Ideally, they should conduct rigorous market research as what technology-
driven ventures did to understand the market conditions and the resource gaps between their 
current resource endowments and the opportunity required. However, they usually quickly 
focused on developing a technical solution to solve the problems they faced. The lack of 
related resources and complete market research, thus, made them unable to be alert to the fit 
between the resources and experiences that they were leveraging and the market requirements. 
Thus, they usually misidentified target customers and their demands. For example, after 
product development, Company F found that no hospital would buy their product if they only 
can monitor one vital sign. Company G initially kept everything secret and directly faced the 
end-user market but the mHealth market lacked a clear product concept and the adaption of 
new solutions in the healthcare market took longer than that in the consumer product market. 
Ideally user-experience driven ventures should hire experts to help them define the direction 
of their strategic moves since the ventures were founded. However the lack of market 
research and market knowledge made them underestimate the difficulty of operating in the 
mHealth market. Therefore, they hired experts to help them bring their devices to the market 
after they faced vital challenges (see Table 16).   
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Table 16 Building resources after market entry 
Venture 
Types 
1 2 3 
Technology-driven 
ventures 
Operation-driven ventures User-driven ventures 
R&D 
R&D for necessary 
technology 
R&D for necessary 
technology 
R&D for necessary technology 
Constructing 
supply 
chains  
Mostly leveraged the 
supply chain systems they 
built in other markets. 
Relied on founders’ personal 
connections 
Relied on founders’ personal 
connections or manufactured 
internally 
Improving 
human 
resources 
Hired experts since the 
ventures were founded 
Relied on founders’ related 
market experience and 
knowledge 
Hired experts after the ventures 
made mistakes 
Accessing 
financial 
resources 
Gradually acquired 
institutional investors as 
their strategic partners 
Gradually acquired 
institutional investors as 
their strategic partners 
Gradually acquired institutional 
investors as their strategic 
partners 
 
The performance review and strategy modification phase (after the first product launch) 
 Although all focal firms considered the impact of product-related factors and market 
condition-related factors on their firm performance, different entrepreneurial determinants 
influenced the weights of these factors which work in focal firms’ performance review (see 
Table 17). Technology-driven ventures tended to pay substantial attention to overall market 
conditions (e.g., the speed of innovation adoption, policy, market size); while operation-
driven ventures and user-driven ventures emphasized more the performance of their products 
(e.g., the profit structure of their product portfolios). The focus of performance reviews led 
focal firms to approach different growth paths.  
 In addition, their entrepreneurial determinants influenced their initial attention on 
resource application to exploit opportunities. The impact of their entrepreneurial determinants 
continually existed on focal firms’ growth strategies. The main purpose for technology-driven 
ventures was to exploit the economic value of their existing technologies which have higher 
fungibility. The high fungibility allowed these ventures to create a wider range of strategic 
choices when the environment changed. In our study, we found once the market conditions of 
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the initial target markets were not as good as expected, technology-driven ventures initiated a 
new round of opportunity search and pivoted their technologies to other market domains. 
Operation-driven ventures aimed to solve the problems that their founders found in 
their past work experiences in related market domains. This determinant led these ventures to 
focus on utilizing their market resources. Compared with technology resources, operational 
experiences are less fungible and cannot be applied to a wide range of market domains. 
Therefore, we found after the ventures achieved early growth in their initial target market 
domains, operation-driven ventures were more likely to penetrate into related market 
segments based on their market knowledge. 
User-driven ventures were established because their founders failed to find a product 
to satisfy their own demands in their personal lives. The product searching experiences for a 
particular demand is not fungible and only exhibits value in one particular market. In addition, 
the lack of related resources and knowledge made them struggle in defining their customers 
and an appropriate business model. In order to successfully commercialize their 
entrepreneurial ideas, they usually had to fine tune their initial business models. After user-
driven ventures had a viable business model, their entrepreneurial strategies turned to be the 
same as that of operation-driven ventures to diversify their product portfolios.  
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Table 17 Performance review and strategy modification 
Venture 
Types 
1 2 3 
Technology-driven 
ventures Operation-driven ventures User-driven ventures 
Performance 
review 
Reviewed market 
conditions and customer 
reactions to their products 
but emphasised more on 
“market conditions” 
Reviewed market conditions 
and customer reactions to 
their products but 
emphasised more on 
“customer reactions” 
Reviewed market conditions 
and customer reactions to 
their products but 
emphasised more on 
“customer reactions” 
Strategic 
experiments 
Approached other related 
market segments when the 
initial market conditions 
became worse  
(1) Changed the focus of product portfolios to react to 
changes in market demands. 
(2) Expanded product portfolios and tried to penetrate into 
the fitness, wellness, or serious disease markets. 
Interacting 
with 
customers to 
upgrade 
products  
All ventures intensively interact with customers after they launched the first products in 
order to upgrade their products or develop second devices. 
Business 
model 
redesign 
(no radical change) (no radical change) 
Company F: Hired experts to 
make a radical change in the 
business model. 
Product 
redesign 
(no radical change) (no radical change) 
Company F: Hired experts to 
make a radical change in 
product design. 
 
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 Our study unpacks the entrepreneurial process in a nascent market from the formation 
of entrepreneurial ideas to the pursuit of opportunities. We empirically show the role of 
entrepreneurial determinants in leading the formation of first-person opportunity beliefs, and 
how entrepreneurial determinants and the process of opportunity identification jointly 
influence new ventures’ opportunity exploitation modes.  
 Firstly, we identify three entrepreneurial determinants (technology-driven, operation-
driven, user-driven determinants) to start a new business and how these forces lead 
entrepreneurs to take different paths to search opportunities and form first-person opportunity 
beliefs (see Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Table 18). Technology-driven ventures aim to 
profit from exploiting current technologies such that they search and evaluate opportunities 
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rationally. Operation-driven ventures and user-driven ventures aim to satisfy particular needs 
observed in their founders' past operational experiences or their dissatisfaction of current 
products. They do not go through a clear opportunity-search process and their transition from 
the third-person opportunity recognition to the first-person opportunity beliefs is implicit. In 
addition, the ideation process of user-driven ventures usually takes place without considering 
whether they have required resources at hand.  
 In addition, we empirically show that the rational process of opportunity identification 
through rigor opportunity search and evaluation makes new ventures capable of anticipating 
the special skills and resources they may need to effectively exploit opportunities. However, 
opportunity identification through imaging particular customers will benefit from using 
particular products may increase operational risks. In this case, related market knowledge is a 
very important element of entrepreneurial success.  
 Secondly, our results present that entrepreneurial determinants influence 
entrepreneurs' decision of initial resources application, which in turn leads to different 
opportunity exploitation modes (pivoting strategy, diversification strategy, and business 
model refinement) (see Table 18). The entrepreneurial process of technology-driven ventures 
starts from exploiting existing technology to make profits. Technology is a fungible resource 
and can generate profits for end users in multiple market domains. The high fungibility 
allows technology-driven ventures to conduct pivoting strategies to apply technologies to 
other market domains when the expected economic returns may not be realised. Operation-
driven ventures are driven by their founders’ past operational experiences and aim to find a 
technological solution to solve the problems they observed. Operational experience is less 
fungible and only can generate profits in the related market segments. It makes operation-
driven ventures more likely to penetrate into related market segments where they can 
leverage their operational experiences after they well establish in the initial markets. User-
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driven ventures are established because their founders fail to find a suitable product to satisfy 
their personal demands. This searching experience is not fungible and cannot generate profits 
outside current market domains. In addition, user-driven ventures usually lack sufficient 
market understanding such that their opportunity exploitation usually includes business 
model refinement. Once they successfully establish in their initial target markets, they 
gradually penetrate into related market segments.   
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Figure 2 The entrepreneurship process of technology-driven ventures 
Pre-market entry to the mHealth market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-market entry into the mHealth Market 
The first medical device development  
               and commercialization 
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 Considering market 
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Figure 3 The entrepreneurship process of operation-driven ventures 
Pre-market entry to the mHealth market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-market entry into the mHealth Market 
The first medical device development  
               and commercialization 
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Figure 4 The entrepreneurship process of user-driven ventures 
Pre-market entry to the mHealth market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-market entry into the mHealth Market 
The first medical device development  
               and commercialization 
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      then penetrating to related                      
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Table 18 The interrelationships between entrepreneurial determinants, opportunity beliefs and opportunity exploitation strategies 
 Technology-driven ventures Operation-driven ventures User-driven venture 
Entrepreneurial 
determinants 
Find a new market domain to exploit current technology 
Perceive particular unmet needs found in past 
operational experiences 
Perceive particular unmet needs found in 
personal frustration 
The formation of 
opportunity 
beliefs 
Opportunity Search - Searching opportunities within a 
certain technological distances to current technology 
Opportunity Evaluation - 
1. Desirability-  
No special preference for particular opportunities as long 
as  they can maximise the value of current technology 
2. Feasibility-   
Evaluating every opportunity recognised including 
economic returns, market condition, policy, etc. 
Desirability- 
Satisfy unmet needs found in past career 
Feasibility - 
Considering the market size of the targeted 
opportunities and technology abilities 
 
Lacking substantial market research 
 
Desirability- 
Satisfy unmet needs found in past career 
Feasibility - 
Considering the market size of the targeted 
opportunities. 
 
Lacking substantial market research 
Fungibility of 
founders’ prior 
knowledge 
applied in  the 
new business  
Fungible 
(The technology applied in the medical market is  
fungible and can create benefits for end users in multiple 
market domains) 
Less fungible 
(The operational experience applied in the 
medical market is less fungible and only can 
create benefits for end users in related market 
domains)  
Not fungible 
(The perception of an unmet need found in 
founders’ searching experience for a suitable 
product  is not fungible and cannot create 
benefits in other market domains) 
Strategies of 
opportunity 
exploitation 
1. Product development:  
Leveraging technology resources 
R&D for necessary technology  
Building market resource (e.g., hiring experts) since the 
early stage of product development.  
2. Performance reviews 
More focus on examining market reactions and conditions 
3. Business development strategy 
Pivoting Strategies (Initiate a new round of opportunity 
search when market conditions are not good)  
1. Product development:  
Leveraging technology and market resources 
(exploiting technology resources is not the 
main purpose to start a new business) 
R&D for necessary technology  
2. Performance reviews 
More focus on examining customer reactions  
3. Business development strategy 
Diversification strategies (Penetrate into other 
related segments after well establish in the 
initial target markets) 
1. Product development:  
Leveraging experiences which may or may not 
suit target opportunities 
R&D for necessary technology  
2. Performance reviews 
More focus on examining customer reactions  
3. Business development strategy 
Refining Business Model (Lacking related 
knowledge usually leads to inappropriate 
strategies and business models)   
→ Diversification strategies (Penetrate into other 
related segments after well establish in the initial 
target markets) 
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3.5.1 Implications for Theory  
Contributing to theories of the evolving entrepreneurial process and micro-foundations 
Our research unpacks empirically how entrepreneurial decisions made in one phase 
impact entrepreneurial decisions and behaviours in the next phase, thereby contributing to 
entrepreneurial and strategy theories on decision making in three ways. Firstly, we reposition 
entrepreneurs at the centre of the process of new firm creation to show how the 
entrepreneurs’ situated cognitions – such as their expression of their beliefs – determine their 
entrepreneurial actions. Different knowledge structures, cognitive frameworks, or aspirations 
may lead to different entrepreneurial decisions (Krueger, 2000). We indicate three types of 
entrepreneurial determinants for new venture creation. Different determinants lead to 
different cognitive processes on opportunity search and evaluation which in turn lead to 
diverse entrepreneurial decisions of opportunity selection.  
Some of our results confirm previous findings about how entrepreneurs based on prior 
knowledge to be alert to promising opportunities (R. A. Baron, 2006; Gaglio, 2004; Gaglio & 
Katz, 2001; Grégoire et al., 2010; Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012). In addition, apart from prior 
knowledge, our findings illustrate multiple entrepreneurial determinants which also influence 
the formation of first-person opportunity beliefs. For example, extant entrepreneurship 
literature mainly assumes that entrepreneurs without sufficient resources would not start their 
business but the fact is they do. In this research, we indicate the impact of subjective concerns 
(e.g., personal frustration) on entrepreneurial decision making to explain the existence of 
those companies whose business developing processes differ from the patterns that current 
literature suggest (e.g., user-driven ventures). 
 In addition, our findings show that the way to identify opportunities can be an act of 
entrepreneurial agency rather than being determined by the environment. In an almost 
identical environment, different opportunity identification paths can co-exist. 
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 Secondly, our research gives insights to the literatures on micro-foundation of the 
entrepreneurial actions by showing the transitions between entrepreneurial phases 
(opportunity search, evaluation, and exploitation). Although entrepreneurship have long been 
considered as a process (Bhave, 1994; Davidsson, 2003; Gartner, 1985, 1990), current 
research usually distinguish entrepreneurial actions into the phases and study entrepreneurial 
behaviours in each discrete phase (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Gruber et al., 2008, 2013; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Our integral approach shows how the strategic decisions made 
in one phase influence the following entrepreneurial process. Different entrepreneurial 
determinants lead to multiple paths of opportunity identification and evaluation, which 
influence the extent of market understanding that new ventures have before their market entry. 
Different extents of understanding lead to different levels of operational risks and challenges 
that new venture may face in their opportunity exploitation. Thus, by considering the 
entrepreneurial process from an integrated view, our research presents a next step in the 
understanding of cognitive dynamics that support and foster entrepreneurship.  
Thirdly, our research bridges entrepreneurial theories with strategy and  
organizational theories. Extant research in organization theories (Stinchcombe, 1965) and 
corporate strategy and governance (Boeker, 1989; Nelson, 2003) argues that firms become 
different not only because of adaption but because policies, procedures, and culture at the 
time of founding determine the evolution of firms (Stinchcombe, 1965). The founder 
imprinting literature has suggested that the early choices that entrepreneurs make can affect 
the policies, procedures, and culture of the organization (J. N. Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 
1996; Boeker, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1965). Therefore, the way entrepreneurs ideate and 
conceptualize their ventures may imprint on the ventures’ development strategies (Hsu & 
Lim, 2014). Our findings show that new ventures founded because of different 
entrepreneurial determinants manifest different strategies to exploit opportunity and enhance 
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their growth. We suggest that founders' imprinting effects may start in an earlier phases of 
company development, that is, venture ideation and opportunity recognition and then 
determine the direction of the venture's business development. Our results show that founding 
decisions have long-lived effects on shaping the ventures' evolution to generate innovative 
possibilities, which explains the inter-firm differences in the strategies of their business 
development.    
Bridging the gap between resource application and entrepreneurial intention in the current 
literature 
 Our research enriches the knowledge on the factors determining the agent’s subjective 
perception of selecting particular resources to develop a new product. Resources lie upstream 
from the end product. They may be utilised in a range of applications for different market 
domains (Danneels, 2003, 2007; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Innovative activities and 
opportunity identification are contingent on the agent’s subjective perception of which 
products or services that the firm can or cannot do for which markets (Penrose, 1959). In this 
research, we indicate three entrepreneurial determinants for new venture creation which 
determine entrepreneurs' venture ideation and the way they reconfigure resources to generate 
new innovative possibilities. We associate the literature of competence-based new product 
innovation (Danneels, 2002) and the literature of opportunity identification and further 
consider the role of entrepreneurial determinants in the interrelationships between 
opportunity identification, resource application, and new product innovation.  
 
3.5.2 Implications for Practice  
 The results of this study can guide practitioners in several ways. Although there is a 
substantial amount of studies investigating entrepreneurial actions in different phases of the 
entrepreneurial process, less considers the process from an integral point of view. The 
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entrepreneurial decisions made at different stages of new venture development are not 
supposed to be independent but strongly associated with each other. Our results reveal the 
interrelationships between decisions on opportunity search, evaluation, and exploitation. In 
this way, our research guides practitioners in their own decisions about opportunities by 
reaffirming the importance of their initial entrepreneurial determinants and its lasting impact 
on opening or restricting the scope of their cognitive processes in decision making.  
By emphasizing the lasting impact of founding decisions on the entire entrepreneurial 
process, our research guides practitioners to not only focus on how to realize their chosen 
entrepreneurial ideas but also consider the aid that their other resources which are neglected 
in current entrepreneurial actions may provide to their survival and growth. Entrepreneurial 
determinants may lead practitioners to focus on particular types of resources and the 
fungibility of the resource may restrict the scope of identifying alternative strategies for firm 
growth.   
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CHAPTER 4 – ENDORSING LEGITIMACY TO AVOID IPO UNDERPRICING 
WHEN THE MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY FAILS 
 
(The first paper of my PhD study) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Bringing institutional theory and the signalling effect of patents into the debate, we 
investigate how to mitigate IPO underpricing caused by R&D investment in different appropriability 
regimes. Empirical evidence shows that in the industry with a transparent link between R&D 
expenditures and value appropriation, the level of R&D expenditures does not even have a positive 
impact on IPO underpricing, and a venture’s patent stock effectively mitigates investors’ concerns 
regarding its future prospect. Conversely, when the link between innovations and future returns is 
unclear, the endorsing legitimacy is extremely prevalent, especially for high-tech IPOs. Post hoc 
analysis shows that it does decrease the level of IPO underpricing caused by innovation-based 
information asymmetry, proxied by the R&D expenditures. The result extends information asymmetry 
theory by considering institutional prospective and by contextualizing firm information. It also 
contributes to institutional theory by showing how this theory contributes to our understanding of firm 
behaviour in the absence of well-functioning markets (e.g., market for technology). 
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4.1 Introduction 
Young ventures usually have balance sheets that are characterized by a high amount of 
intangible assets; they have a P&L which shows only negative cash flow and face substantial 
technological and/or market uncertainty during their first few years of operation. In the start-
up process, they tend to rely on external sources of finance such as venture capital to 
commercialize their innovation (Baeyens & Manigart, 2003; Chemmanur, Krishnan, & 
Nandy, 2011). However, once they have grown out of the venture capital phase, they need to 
raise money on the stock market to finance their growth path. Despite the fact that the extant 
venture capital literature considers IPOs to be success stories (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy Iii, & 
Vetsuypens, 1990; A. Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Lerner, 1994), substantial evidence 
shows that entrepreneurs tend to sell their shares at a price lower than the actual market value 
of their initial public offerings (IPOs) in order to attract investors (Chambers & Dimson, 
2009; Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Zheng & Stangeland, 2007). In the IPO market, information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders is the widely accepted explanation for 
IPO underpricing (Rock, 1986). Young ventures which are based on novel technologies 
generate many information asymmetries because it is difficult to assess their real potential 
(Aboody & Lev, 2000; Heeley et al., 2007). This explains why young technology based 
ventures are usually more seriously underpriced than companies with a track record in an 
easy-to-understand industry. However, information asymmetry theory explains why the 
innovation-based information asymmetry occurs but has little to say regarding how to 
mitigate this underpricing. 
 Early research on IPOs concentrated mostly on financial issues such as offer pricing 
and share allocation (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Ibbotson, 1975; Welch, 1989). In the past two 
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decades, pricing in the IPO market has received increasing attention from management and 
entrepreneurship scholars. Some research focuses on who is involved with IPOs (e.g., venture 
capitalists, top managements teams, underwriters). The research in this theme suggests that to 
prevent increases in the level of information asymmetry from agency issues (e.g., firms and 
underwriters' adverse selection (Stiglitz, 1985), managers’ moral hazard (Bergemann & Hege, 
1998; Yung & Zender, 2010), firms are required to disclose information on top management 
team (TMT) members, board members, primary underwriters, compensation contracts, and 
institutional investors (Aggarwal, Prabhala, & Puri, 2002; Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; 
Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003). In addition, better and more reputable top managers 
may communicate the value of their firms’ credibly to the equity market prior to IPOs 
(Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007; Certo et al., 2003; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Some 
research focuses on social influence and emphasizes the impact of venture capitalists (VCs), 
institutional investors, and alliances partners in terms of fundraising in the equity market 
(Chemmanur et al., 2011; Echols & Tsai, 2005; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; Stuart et 
al., 1999). Some research focuses on innovation issues and has a particular interest in the role 
of R&D expenditures on the performance of IPOs (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Heeley et al., 2007). 
Although R&D activities affect a firms’ inventive success and may significantly impact on 
firm performance (Helfat, 1994), invention causes knowledge asymmetries between 
corporate insider and external parties (Anton & Yao, 1994) and increases the difficulty in 
assessing a firm’s real potential, which results in the fact that younger ventures with more 
novel technologies are underpriced more. However, in contrast to the research on corporate 
governance providing some solutions to reduce information asymmetries caused by agency 
issues, underpricing scholars have little to say regarding how to mitigate the underpricing 
caused by innovation-based information asymmetries. Also, current research has highlighted 
126 
 
the importance of other mechanisms (e.g., VC backing, the reputation of prestigious 
underwriters and alliance partners) in reducing information asymmetries in the IPO market 
but pays less attention to the roles that those mechanisms play when innovation-based 
information asymmetries happen and how public investors actually render the information 
delivered by those mechanisms.  
Some researchers argue that the outcomes of innovation (e.g., patent stocks) can be a 
quality signal to convey a firm's value to investors (Haeussler, Harhoff, & Müller, 2009; 
Teece, 1986). Conceptually speaking, patents not only reveal information regarding the 
technological and managerial capabilities of ventures but also provide legal rights against 
infringement (Cohen et al., 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Levin et al., 1987; Teece, 1986). 
Thus, some research argues that patents not only serve an isolating role against imitation, but 
also serve a signalling function (Haeussler et al., 2009; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Long, 2002). 
However, the disclosure is only sufficient to someone who is “skilled in the art” to practice 
the innovation and provides limited information regarding the way in which the innovating 
firms will use the patent to capture profits (Heeley et al., 2007). Public investors usually lack 
related technology knowledge and are different from VCs who are involved in operational 
management and can sit in board meetings to understand the value of each innovation. It is 
difficult for them to predict the potential of each innovation. Therefore, although patent 
stocks can be a quality signal, Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) found that patenting matters more as 
a signalling device in early financing stages. Moreover, patents rarely confer perfect 
appropriability as they are supposed to do in theory. Their function – as well as the level of 
value appropriability – change across industries (Cohen, 2010; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; 
Heeley et al., 2007; Kash & Kingston, 2001). In some industries, patents safeguard monopoly 
control but in other industries patents are bargaining chips, so that the returns generated from 
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patents are determined by the strength of the appropriability regime (Kash & Kingston, 2001). 
In some, industries such as the software industry, patents are less useful because the market 
changes rapidly and it is difficult to patent an entire product in the software industry (Graham, 
Merges, Samuelson, & Sichelman, 2009; Mann, 2004). Managers struggle to decide whether 
to use limited funds for patent-related activities or for hiring programmers (Mann, 2004). 
Thus, it is worth unravelling the fundamental insights of patent stocks and their efficacy as a 
quality signal in order to reduce the information asymmetry in the IPO market in different 
industrial contexts.  
Since in some cases a venture’s innovation activities, including innovation input 
(R&D expenditures) and output (e.g., patent stocks), may not clearly convey its value, in light 
of this challenge prior studies have suggested that a venture can lease the reputation of third 
party affiliations (e.g., venture capitalist, alliances partners) to increase its own legitimacy to 
justify its actions as meaningful and trustworthy (Hsu, 2004; Jepperson, 1991; Podolny, 1994; 
Stuart et al., 1999). Some researchers argue that VCs provide access to resource bundles and 
prestigious VCs provide a powerful signal of a venture's quality to outside investors (Hsu, 
2004). However, the relationship between VCs and IPO underpricing is complex. Some 
researchers argue that once the industry effects and underwriter quality are controlled, there is 
no difference in underpricing between VC backed IPOs and non-VC backed IPOs (Bradley & 
Jordan, 2002). Some research argues that VC backed IPOs experience larger underpricing 
than comparable non-venture backed IPOs because higher underpricing leads to more future 
flows of capital into venture capital funds and the effect of underpricing is attenuated for 
younger VCs (Lee & Wahal, 2004). Another explanation is the timing when IPOs are issued. 
VC backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-VC backed IPOs during normal periods of 
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activity but are more underpriced than non-VC backed ones during “hot issue” periods 
(Franzke, 2004; Rossetto, 2008).  
Apart from VCs, among varying quality signals, researchers have identified that the 
most central of these combines signalling theory with institutional theory (Certo, 2003). 
Organizational behaviour is embedded in an institutional environment which imposes 
significant pressure on ventures to legitimate their actions (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 1999; 
Scott, 1995). A venture’s legitimacy enhances its persistence and credibility (Iakovleva & 
Kickul, 2011; Parsons, 1960; Suchman, 1995) and helps to access resources (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon, & Trahms, 2011). Thus, young ventures which endorse 
their legitimacy might be able to decrease the information asymmetry that is generated 
through the uncertain technological and/or market environment in which they operate. The 
importance of endorsing legitimacy might be even more prevalent in those industries where 
the appropriability regime is rather weak. In a complex product technology industry where 
value appropriability is unclear, legitimacy may be a good signal for ventures to convince 
potential investors about their earning potential and mitigate information asymmetries, so that 
the market for technology (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003) is not a potential exit option for investors. 
However, current research has focussed more on how new ventures transfer their prestigious 
partners’ status to improve their performance (Stuart et al., 1999) but devotes less attention to 
how the impact of endorsing legitimacy changes in different contexts, especially in a R&D 
intensive market, and how public investors consider the information delivered by a venture’s 
endorsing legitimacy. 
This study attempts to understand how new ventures, especially technology-intensive 
ones, mitigate the information asymmetry caused by R&D expenditures. In order to fill in this 
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gap, this research includes an analysis of the signalling effect of patent stocks and introduces 
an institutional perspective to the debate. Research questions include: (1) how the signalling 
of patent stocks and endorsing legitimacy affect a venture’s IPO price when taking into 
account the level of information asymmetry, and (2) how the appropriability regime of the 
industry in which the venture operates moderates the importance of patent stocks and 
endorsing legitimacy.  
Empirical results from a sample of 770 IPOs issued by manufacturing firms during 
1995-2006 support our hypothesis that the link between R&D expenditures and value 
appropriation plays a more important role than initially thought. In the industries with a tight 
appropriability regime, the level of innovation-based information asymmetry does not even 
have a positive impact on IPO underpricing, and a venture’s patent stock can effectively 
mitigate potential investors’ concerns regarding its future prospects. Conversely, when the 
transparency of innovations in relation to future returns is unclear, affiliations are more 
prevalent in serving as a credible and observable signal for the investment community to 
make an accurate assessment of firm value. Post hoc analysis shows that endorsing 
legitimacy mitigates the level of IPO underpricing and the innovation-based information 
asymmetry in those industries where the appropriability regime tends to be weak. This 
research extends information asymmetry theory by introducing institutional theory into the 
debate. The endowment of legitimacy is a critical quality signal for younger ventures, 
especially for high-tech IPOs to influence investors’ assessments of their value. This research 
also contributes to institutional theory by showing how this theory contributes most to our 
understanding of firm behaviour in the absence of well-functioning markets (such as the 
market for technology). 
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4.2 The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and Information Asymmetries  
Underpricing of initial public offerings occurs when the initial offered price is 
significantly lower than the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. Substantial 
evidence shows that when young ventures have grown out of the venture capital phase, they 
tend to discount their offering prices on their initial public offerings (IPOs) to attract 
investors (Ibbotson, Sindelar, & Ritter, 1988; Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Rock, 1986). In the 
1980s, the average underpricing discount was around 7.4%; it then rose to 14.8% from 1990 
to 1998; and from 1999 to 2000, it increased sharply to 65%. In dollar terms, from 1990 to 
1998, IPO firms left 29.62 billion on the table and from 1999 to 2000 they left 66.63 billion 
in the U.S. IPO market alone. Compared to the average profits that these same companies 
earn in the year before they go public (approximately $8 billion), the amount of money they 
left on the table is even higher than their three-year aggregate profits (Loughran & Ritter, 
2004; Loughran & Ritter, 2002)53. 
Researchers have examined a variety of explanations for the underpricing 
phenomenon in the IPO market, such as underwriter reputation (Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; 
Corwin & Schultz, 2005), venture capital backing (Barry et al., 1990; Chemmanur et al., 
2011; Echols & Tsai, 2005; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007), firm size (Ibbotson et al., 
1988), and firm age (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). The leading theory is Rock’s (1986) 
argument, the ‘winner’s curse’ model, which expounds Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem and 
argues that information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders causes the 
investor community’s hesitation regarding the potential of the issuing firms (Christensen, 
                                                             
53 Underpricing averages are based on data available on Jay Ritter’s website  
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm) 
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2002). The information gaps force investors to reduce investments in order to avoid their 
anticipated agency costs (Chahine & Filatotchev, 2008). An increase (or decrease) in the 
level of information asymmetry related to assessing the true value is positively associated 
with a corresponding increase (decrease) in the amount of underpricing (Heeley et al., 2007).  
Underpricing is very costly for younger ventures. It not only dilutes the value of the 
shares that they retained after the IPO, but also makes securing financial resources 
challenging (Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya, 2003; Loughran & Ritter, 2002). Bridging 
information gaps, therefore, is particularly important, yet a difficult activity due to the 
absence of an observable history of performance of new ventures and uncertainty about their 
technology. Although information asymmetry theory explains why underpricing happens in 
these cases, the theory has little to say regarding how to mitigate it. In entrepreneurship 
literature, previous research has investigated a range of mechanisms such as founders’ 
backgrounds (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), TMT 
structure and reputation (Beckman et al., 2007; Certo et al., 2003; Kroll et al., 2007), and 
endorsements from third parties (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004; 
Stuart et al., 1999), which are used to reduce information asymmetries. However, there are 
relatively few studies considering how the signalling effects of those mechanisms change in 
different contexts and how investors actually render those signals.  
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
4.3.1 Innovation and information asymmetry 
 Although it is widely accepted that R&D activities affect a firm’s inventive success 
and may significantly contribute to organizational performance (Helfat, 1994), a considerable 
amount of research has noted the problems associated with financing research and R&D (see 
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Hall, 2008 for a review). In the IPO market, previous studies have found that information 
asymmetries correlate substantially with a firm’s R&D expenditure due to the nature of 
uncertainty (Guo, Lev, & Shi, 2006; Heeley et al., 2007). As the level of R&D expenditures 
increases, so does the amount of information necessary to judge the value of innovations. 
Before innovation can be successfully commercialized in a product, it is just a R&D 
expenditure on financial statements rather than direct information on the value of the 
innovation itself. Thus, high-tech ventures generate more information asymmetries because it 
is difficult to assess their real potential. For investors, the higher the R&D expenditures, the 
more uncertainty regarding the future performance of the ventures (Anton & Yao, 2004; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Knight, 1921), notwithstanding the fact that that future 
performance might be significantly higher. Thus, a higher level of R&D expenditures 
increases the need for more firm specifics and project information (Heeley et al., 2007). Also, 
because of the information gap, corporate insider gains are relatively larger for R&D 
intensive ventures than ventures without R&D (Aboody & Lev, 2000). When investors find it 
difficult to evaluate the quality of the R&D investment, ventures might find it hard to secure 
financial backing (Hall, 2008; Leland & Pyle, 1977). 
However, the level of uncertainty or information asymmetries is not uniform in 
different contexts (Cohen, 2010; Levin et al., 1987; Warshofsky, 1994). For instance, young 
ventures have a choice between competition strategy (e.g. entering the product market) and 
cooperation strategy (e.g. entering the technology market) (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans, 
Hsu, & Stern, 2002; Gans & Stern, 2003). The success of the strategy chosen depends on the 
venture’s unique capabilities and resource configurations (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986). 
Ventures which choose to license their technologies focus on developing their technology 
basis and building up a strong IP portfolio (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Gans, Hsu, 
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& Stern, 2008; Ziedonis, 2004) and compete on the upper stream of the value chain (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006). In contrast, ventures participating in the market for products generate 
value from production-related activities which might require significant investments in co-
specialized assets (Arora et al., 2001; Teece, 1986). They need capabilities to manage 
multiple uncertainties which are related to transforming the technology into new products and 
convincing customers of a new value proposition (Gans & Stern, 2003). Thus, these different 
strategies (entering the market for products or the market for technology) influence the 
amount and complexity of information necessary for investors to evaluate a venture’s 
potential (Gans et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2009; Teece, 1986).   
Value appropriability of a venture’s commercialization strategy  
 A venture’s commercialization strategy is determined by the relative returns from a 
competition (entering the market for products) versus cooperation strategy (entering the 
market for technology). The profits from different strategies are contingent on the strength of 
the appropriability regime within the industry and the extent to which incumbent firms 
control complementary assets (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans & Stern, 2003).   
A regime of appropriability refers to the environmental factors (excluding firm and 
market structure) that influence an innovator’s ability to capture the profits created by 
innovations. The key determinants of the appropriability regime are the efficiency of legal 
mechanisms of protection and uncertainty about the value of the technology (Arora & 
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Gans et al., 2002; Teece, 1986). The strength 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) substantially affects the expropriation threat (Anton & 
Yao, 1994; Arrow, 1962; Ziedonis, 2004) and influences the relative returns to cooperation. 
While bargaining with incumbents, ventures in environments with tight IPR can avoid the 
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threat of expropriation and increase the venture’s outside option (e.g., terminating the 
negotiation and entering the product market). Moreover, certain types of IPR such as patents 
reduce the transaction costs (Gans et al., 2002). However, even with tight appropriability 
regimes, the appropriability of innovation also skewed. Many innovations, in the end, 
generate no or very little value. The difference between high and not low innovation values 
can be 10 million Euros (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2007). Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
distinguish between valuable innovations and poor ones. The uncertainty about true 
technology value may hinder bargaining between focal firms and other contingent contracting 
provisions (Arora et al., 2001; Gans et al., 2008). The increase in the transaction cost might 
dilute the potential earnings from each innovation. 
 In addition, cooperation strategy (entering market for technology) allows innovators 
to exploit complementary assets owned by incumbents (Teece, 1986). When specialized 
complementary assets are required, firms tend to avoid duplication and the sunk costs related 
to competition in product markets by collaborating with incumbents for the transactions of 
technologies (Arora et al., 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003). Therefore, firms are more likely to 
participate in the market for technology when IPR is tight, transaction costs are low, and sunk 
costs to enter product markets are high. In weak IPR regimes, the market for product seems to 
be the only option (Gans et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the environment in which a venture operates is another potential factor 
which might affect the returns from cooperation strategy (entering market for technology) 
and competition strategy (entering market for products). Empirical evidence suggests that the 
economic value of innovation is not uniform across sectors (Cohen et al., 2000; Graham et al., 
2009; Levin et al., 1987). Cohen et al. (2000) attribute this sector-level variation to the 
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technology complexity (complex technologies and discrete technologies) in each market. 
They categorize complexity of product technologies by ISIC (International Standard of 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities)54 classification which groups together 
firms producing the same type of goods or service or who use similar processes. The key 
difference is whether it is a process consisting of numerous separate elements versus 
relatively few elements (Kash & Kingston, 2001; Kusunoki, Nonaka, & Nagata, 1998; Levin 
et al., 1987). For example, on average new drugs make up a relatively small number of 
patentable elements. Electronic products, however, are comprised typically of a larger 
number of elements and, thus are characterized as complex technology (Cohen et al., 2000; 
Heeley et al., 2007). Kusunoki et al.’s (1998) research also proposes a similar concept. In 
their study, they categorize “material” and “system” industries. However, they exclude food, 
steel, and metal products because they are difficult to classify based on their category 
definition. Under different industrial situations, the appropriability regime as well as the 
possibility to control complementary assets changes (Cohen, 2010; Graham et al., 2009).  
In the discrete product technology industry, the value of one commercializable 
product is characterised by a relatively low innovation number. The potential outcomes 
generated by each dollar of R&D investments are relatively high and easy to predict (Levin et 
al., 1987). The value of each innovation usually can be understood by an individual and 
precisely transmitted across firms (Rycroft & Kash, 1999). For example, pharmaceutical 
formulae are comprehensible to all trained chemists. The consensus on components of the 
technology shared by experts helps firms to demonstrate monopoly rights and make 
technology licensing possible. Therefore, given that the value of each innovation is clear and 
                                                             
54 ESDS International (http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/unido/isic_guide.asp)  
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the bargaining with incumbents is comparatively easy, the transaction cost in the market for 
technology is relatively low, so that the returns from innovations in a discrete product 
technology industry are more predictable.  
However, in the complex product technology industry, the quantity of knowledge that 
each innovation relies on is too large and diverse to be understood by an individual (Rycroft 
& Kash, 1999). It is difficult to conceive of each innovation’s usefulness in the future; hence, 
many technologies lack a predictable market (Kash & Kingston, 2001). As the value 
appropriability is not transparent, evaluators need more firm-specific information, which 
further increases information asymmetries (Heeley et al., 2007). For example, complex 
technologies are synthetic systems which consist of diverse knowledge (Kash & Kingston, 
2001; Rycroft & Kash, 1999). Technology transfer is a complicated process. Also, the 
complex systems need a large number of separate elements and the same performance can 
normally be achieved by different designs or combinations. Incumbents find it difficult to 
determine which innovation is more valuable than others to improve the efficiency or 
performance of the systems. Competitors can also destroy the value of one innovation simply 
by filing ‘engineer around’ patents (Kash & Kingston, 2001). In addition, ventures in a 
complex product technology industry normally lack proprietary controls over all the essential 
complementary components underlying their products. The mutual dependence between 
firms may constrain a firm’s earning (Cohen et al., 2000). Consequently, the large quantity of 
knowledge that complex technology combines makes technology transactions difficult and 
increases mutual dependence between firms. New ventures need extra efforts to communicate 
specific information about their innovation with incumbents in order to eventually turn their 
R&D expenditures into profits. Investors necessitate more information to assess a venture’s 
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value and possible returns from its R&D expenditures. Therefore, this research hypothesizes 
that:      
Hypothesis 1: In a complex product technology industry, the impact of information 
asymmetries caused by R&D expenditures on IPO underpricing is higher than that in a 
discrete product technology industry, holding other venture characteristics constant.    
 
4.3.2 Quality signals of ventures 
Bridging information gaps between corporate insiders and outsiders is the first 
priority for young ventures to secure their financial capital from the public investment 
community. Previous research has investigated a range of proxies to reduce information 
asymmetries, such as patent stocks (Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, 2011; Hsu & Ziedonis, 
2013), venture capital backing (Bradley & Jordan, 2002; Hsu, 2004; Megginson & Weiss, 
1991), and third-party affiliations (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Levitas & McFadyen, 2009; 
Stuart et al., 1999). However, most of them assume signal receivers only play passive roles 
and are placed on the receiving end of discourse. Few studies consider evaluators’ active 
cognitive processing and how they actually render quality signals in different industrial 
contexts.  
The signalling effect of patents  
Patents, the outputs of innovation (albeit an intermediate one), are a potential proxy 
for ventures to shows their innovation achievements (Conti et al., 2011; Haeussler et al., 2009; 
Heeley et al., 2007; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013). Theoretically patents not only reveal information 
regarding the technological and managerial capabilities of ventures but also provide legal 
rights for ventures, which influence profit expectations. The exclusionary rights are supposed 
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to assist ventures to appropriate returns from investments in R&D and to commercialize their 
technologies (Cohen et al., 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Levin et al., 1987; Teece, 1986). 
However, the signalling effect of patents is too noisy. Firstly, according to Patent Law 35 
U.S.C. 112, the disclosure is technical information and only sufficient to someone who is 
“skilled in the art” to practice the innovation. Thus, the patent disclosure only provides 
limited information to a majority of investors and does not convey the way in which the 
innovating firms will use the patent to capture profits (Heeley et al., 2007). Secondly, the 
function of patents as well as the level of value appropriability changes across industries 
(Cohen, 2010; Graham et al., 2009; Heeley et al., 2007; Kash & Kingston, 2001). Rarely do 
patents confer perfect appropriability as they are supposed to do in theory. Surveys of large 
manufacturing firms (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987) and small ventures (Ceccagnoli, 
Graham, Higgins, & Lee, 2010) show that in chemical industries, there is a comparatively 
clear standard to evaluate a chemical patent’s validity and to defend against infringement. 
The protection of patents is stronger for firms in life science and chemical industries than for 
companies in hardware sectors (Graham et al., 2009). Surveys of firm-level patenting 
behaviours during 1979-1995 in the U.S. market also support this point. Even though there is 
a remarkable increase in patenting in the semiconductor industry (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), the 
main purpose for semiconductor firms to file patents is to use these as a trading currency to 
access other technologies (Kash & Kingston, 2001). The effectiveness of patents as 
bargaining chips correlates strongly with the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
(Gans et al., 2002; Levin et al., 1987; Teece, 1986). If the market for technology works, firms 
may capture profits generated by their innovation by licensing their technologies and using 
their innovations to exchange complementary technologies by cross-licensing. In addition, in 
some industries – such as the software industry – patenting has limited function to protect a 
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company’s intellectual property or increase organizational performance because the market 
changes rapidly and it is hard to patent an entire product (Graham et al., 2009; Mann, 2004).  
In the complex product technology industry, a large number of the interacting 
components which a product needs not only makes it difficult for investors without diverse 
knowledge to discern the usefulness of each innovation in the future, but also causes the 
relatively weak utility of each patent (Cohen et al., 2000; Rycroft & Kash, 1999). Moreover, 
if any of the components is patented, without being licensed the profit which a venture can 
capture from its innovation is limited, even though the venture can integrate the remaining 
components (Kash & Kingston, 2001). Therefore, patenting as many components of the 
technology as possible is an inevitable investment to avoid possible lock-out and to establish 
the strongest position for cross-licensing. However, compared with incumbents’ boundaries 
of specialized and co-specialized assets, the innovation stocks of younger ventures are 
comparatively small, so that it is difficult for ventures to turn their efforts regarding 
developing technologies into profits. The stock of innovations eventually only increases R&D 
expenditures and provides a limited guarantee for future returns. Furthermore, uncertainty 
about the value of each technology in an industry with complex product technology further 
increases the transaction costs connected with technology licensing. Thus, the market for 
technology might be not a profitable option for ventures in this industrial situation. 
Combining the above reasons, this research hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 2: In a discrete product technology industry, the impact of patent stock on 
reducing IPO underpricing is higher than that in a complex product technology industry, 
holding other venture characteristics constant.  
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The signalling effect of third-party affiliations   
A good signal of quality should be easily detected (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & 
Reutzel, 2011) and correspond honestly to the sought-after quality of the signaller (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003). When a venture’s innovation outcomes (e.g., patent stock) fail to convey the 
potential of its value to public investors, some research suggests that ventures can try to lease 
the reputation of third-party affiliations, including venture capitalists and alliance partners 
(Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Stuart et al., 1999). Some 
researchers suggest that venture capitalists (VCs) help ventures attain business and financial 
resources (e.g., alliance partners, management teams, and reputable investment bankers) to 
increase a venture’s dynamic capabilities related to product and management development 
(Hsu, 2004). Therefore, VC backing may be a good signal to convey a venture’s quality in 
the IPO market. However, the relationship between VCs and IPO underpricing is complex. 
Financial research has indicated various positive and negative impacts of VCs on IPO pricing. 
Some found no difference in underpricing between IPOs with and without VC backing after 
controlling industry effects and underwriter quality (Bradley & Jordan, 2002). Some found 
the impact of VC changes depending on the timing when an IPO is issued (Franzke, 2004; 
Rossetto, 2008). Some found that VC backed IPOs are more underpriced because higher 
underpricing leads to greater future flows of capital into venture capital funds (Lee & Wahal, 
2004). Apart from the signalling from the affiliation with VCs, among varied quality signals 
researchers have identified that the most central of these combines signalling theory with 
institutional theory which considers firms’ endeavouring for legitimacy in order to survive 
(Certo, 2003). Legitimacy, on the one hand, is embedded in a system of institutionalized 
beliefs. Audiences are more likely to supply resources to organizations that seem desirable, 
proper, or appropriate (Parsons, 1960); therefore, legitimacy serves as a critical signal which 
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contributes to a firm’s persistence. On the other hand, the cultural congruence captured by 
legitimacy increases firms’ credibility and provides rational explanations for firms to justify 
what they are doing and the reasons for doing this (Jepperson, 1991). 
While legitimacy is important to all firms, it is more critical for young ventures that 
need to establish themselves in business environments (Carroll, 1983; Hannan, Pólos, & 
Carroll, 2007; Stuart et al., 1999). With little or no observable history and given the high 
uncertainty of technologies, the investor community normally doubts an issuing firm’s 
qualities which determine its success in the long run (Certo et al., 2001; Daily et al., 2003) 
and the firm’s true intention in seeking external financing (Mouri, Sarkar, & Frye, 2011). As 
Stuart et al. (1999:317) states, “because the quality of young companies often cannot be 
observed directly, evaluators must evaluate the company based on other observable attributes 
that are thought to co-vary with its underlying but unknown quality. Resource holders, 
therefore, assess value by estimating the conditional probability that a firm will succeed, 
given by a set of observable characteristics of the organization”. Previous research has found 
endorsements from ventures’ inter-organizational exchange relations serve as a certification 
of their intrinsic value and enhance their perceived quality (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Podolny, 
1994; Stuart et al., 1999). Their affiliations can alleviate misgivings that external investors 
may have by showing that they are able to access abundant resources which can increase their 
survival prospects (Reuer & Tong, 2010; Singh & Mitchell, 2005). 
In a complex product technology industry where the link between innovation and 
value appropriation is not transparent (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986) and the market for 
technology is imperfect, investors lack certain standards to assess the value of a venture. 
Moreover, even though the market for products is another option, it is very challenging for a 
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venture to develop its technology and establish production and distribution activities 
simultaneously (Pries & Guild, 2007). The profit which a venture may gain from product 
markets is, hence, extremely doubtful, whereas their operating risk normally increases. The 
uncertainty of a venture’s earning potential in either market might hinder investors from 
correctly evaluating a venture’s quality, so that the importance of endorsing legitimacy might 
be more prevalent for ventures in a complex product technology industry. Affiliations are 
presumed to be correlated with quality and yet are more observable than quality itself 
(Podolny, 1994). Moreover, affiliation generates positive information by showing that 
ventures are able to access more resources which increases their survival prospects and 
growth opportunities (Reuer & Tong, 2010; Singh & Mitchell, 2005). Thus, signalling 
legitimacy might be a good way for young ventures to convince potential investors about 
their earning potential in an industrial context.  
Hypothesis 3a: In a complex product technology industry, the impact of signalling 
legitimacy on reducing IPO underpricing is higher than that in a discrete product 
technology industry, holding other venture characteristics constant. 
For ventures with more investments in R&D, endorsing legitimacy plays a more 
critical role in helping them establish confidence about their quality. Compared with large 
firms which have experiences of innovation projects (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) and the 
resource slack to absorb failure (Danneels, 2002; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Majchrzak, 
Cooper, & Neece, 2004), young ventures face high existential risks if the innovation fails and 
they normally lack experience in running innovation projects. Moreover, given the low 
transparency of value appropriation and the absence of well-functioning markets in a 
complex product technology industry, only young ventures which endorse their legitimacy 
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are potentially able to decrease the information asymmetry that is generated through the 
uncertain technological and/or market environment in which they operate. Different from 
ventures in a discrete product technology industry with clear commercial promise, the 
endorsing legitimacy may be the only way for ventures with high R&D expenditures in a 
complex product technology industry to signal their unobservable value and make their 
behaviours more predictable and trustworthy (Jepperson, 1991). Thus, this research 
hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 3b: In a complex product technology industry, the impact of signalling 
legitimacy can reduce IPO underpricing which is caused by high R&D expenditures, 
holding other characteristics of ventures constant.  
The influence of endorsing legitimacy from affiliations is not equal across different 
types of alliance partners. Stuart et al. (1999:321) show that there is an “implicit transfer of 
status across inter-organizational exchange relations (such as inter-corporate equity and 
alliance ties), which builds confidence about the quality of a new venture among potential 
customers, suppliers, employees, collaborators, and investors ” According to Washington and 
Zajac’s (2005:284) definition, status refers to “a socially constructed, inter subjectively 
agreed upon and accepted ordering or ranking of individuals, groups, organizations, or 
activities in a social system”. It emphasises social justification and captures differences in the 
actors’ social ranks that generate privilege or discrimination (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; 
Washington & Zajac, 2005).   
Status includes a dual character. On the one hand it is an attribution which firms 
depend on to infer their quality when that cannot be directly or easily observed (Shapiro, 
1983). On the other hand, a firm’s status develops not only from past performance but also 
144 
 
from the status of their exchange partners. Ventures with high-quality partners are more 
likely to gain access to valued expertise in other firms and thereby reduce the transaction 
costs of dealing with less trustworthy partners. These ventures are also more likely to form 
advantageous alliances in the future, hence, enhancing their future competitive potential 
(Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Previous research also shows that 
alliances with prominent partners can improve a firm’s visibility among numerous 
unaffiliated organizations and enlarge its set of prospective investors (Reuer & Tong, 2010). 
Therefore, the ties to higher-status partners increase the esteem of a firm and the evaluation 
of its quality. 
 For young ventures, the relationship with prominent organizations might be a 
convincing quality signal to investors, given their relatively low status. Prominent firms need 
to risk their reputation when they build relationships with young ventures; thus, prominent 
firms have a correspondingly strong incentive to avoid low-quality exchange partners 
(Podolny, 1994; Stuart et al., 1999). Exclusiveness turns to be an endorsement for a venture 
attempting to distinguish itself from low quality ventures and a form of certification by virtue 
of the fact that it has withstood the due diligence process of a selective and highly capable 
evaluator (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). This endorsement is more prevalent for 
R&D intensive ventures. Partners with technological prominence – referring to firms with 
many influential innovations – are competent and selective judges of the technological 
potential of ventures in their areas of expertise; hence, the affiliation with technological 
prominent partners is like a certification of a venture’s technological ability (Stuart et al., 
1999). For high-tech young ventures, this signal is particularly important to reduce the level 
of information asymmetry regarding the novelty and uncertainty of their technologies. In 
addition, in complex technology industries, investors require information not only regarding 
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the technology itself but also relating to the portion of the rent from the innovation that will 
accrue to a venture. It is incredibly hard for investors without professional and diverse 
knowledge to judge the value of each technology and the possible profit generated by each 
innovation. Thus, affiliations with partners with technological prominence might serve as a 
critical signal for ventures to demonstrate their technological achievements (Baum & Oliver, 
1991). 
Hypothesis 3c: In a complex product industry, the signalling impact of alliances partners’ 
technological status can reduce IPO underpricing caused by high R&D expenditures, 
holding other characteristics of ventures constant. 
  
4.4 Data sources and variable definitions  
This research collected a sample of IPOs issued by manufacturing industries (SIC 20-
39) in the U.S. from 1995 to 2006. The research used the Securities Data Corporation 
database to identify IPO firms and collect information regarding their alliance relationships in 
the five years prior to their IPOs. First-day trading information was obtained from the Centre 
for Research in Security Prices tapes. Patent data in the five years prior to focal firms’ IPOs 
was obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office database. The sectoral patenting 
trend was gained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website. Firms’ ISIC code, 
assets, sales, ages, and R&D expenditures in the year prior to their IPOs were obtained from 
Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT data tapes. Underwriter quality was measured with 
Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) update of the underwriter reputation ranking developed by 
Carter and Manaster (1990). This research deleted firms with (1) an offer price below $5 
dollars or (2) incomplete data (Heeley et al., 2007). 
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Dependent and independent  variables  
IPO underpricing is measured by the percentage change in the stock price of a firm 
during its first day of trading ([closing price – offering price]/offering price). R&D intensity 
was measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure divided by sales in the year prior to a firm's 
IPO and was taken log transformation to account for skewness in the data and controlled by 
assets in the year prior to the initial public offering (Guo et al., 2006). Patent stock is 
measured by the number of patents a firm had in the five years prior to its IPO. This research 
concentrated on patents in the five years prior to the IPO for two reasons. Firstly, recent 
patents show a firm’s inventive abilities at the time of IPO. Secondly, previous research 
shows that patent protection rarely lasts for 20 years from the date of filing, but instead lasts 
for a relatively short period (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981). The alliance dummy is 
measured by whether a firm has an alliance relationship in the five years prior to its IPO. (A 
five year window is widely accepted in the literature as an adequate period to measure a 
firm’s alliances (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), because normally the duration of 
alliances is no more than five years (Kogut, 1988, 1989)). The technological prominence of 
the alliance partners55 was measured by the number of patent citations in the five years prior 
to a focal firm’s IPO. To measure the appropriability regime, this research used ISIC code to 
separate IPOs into discrete or complex product technology industries. ISIC code classifies 
enterprises according to their economic activities. Firms which produce the same type of 
goods or services or use similar processes (e.g., the same skills or technology) will be 
grouped together. It is different from NAICS, which is based on a production-oriented 
concept and groups industries by the similarity of the processes used to produce goods or 
                                                             
55 In unreported models, we measured a partner’s technological prominence scores by using total patent citations. 
This is generated by averaging patent citations to account for the possible bias if the addition of low-prestige 
partners might lower perceptions of a focal firm’s quality, and by selecting the maximum prominence score of 
any of a focal firm’s partners. The results of these measurements were the same. 
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services56. Industries with ISIC codes lower than 2900 were defined as discrete product 
technology industries (e.g., pharmaceuticals), whereas those with an ISIC code of 2900 or 
higher were identified as complex product technology industries (e.g., computers and 
electrical equipment) (Cohen et al., 2000; Heeley et al., 2007). This coding scheme is similar 
to Kusunoki’s (1998) study. 
Control variables  
This research controlled firm ages, measured as years since founding and took log-
transformation into account in order to adjust for skewness in the data. On average, older 
firms have more public information and records about their value, which can reduce 
information asymmetries. To control for the effect of firm size, this research took log-
transformation of firm assets in the year prior to the IPO. On average, larger firms have more 
patents and low information asymmetry about their earning potential. This study used a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a firm was founded by venture capital or not. To account 
for the effect of underwriter reputation, this research followed Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) 
prestigious underwriter backing. This research also counted the number of IPOs in the same 
industry in one prior year to a focal firm’s IPO to control the effect of hot markets 
characterized by rotating periods of significant activity (Heeley et al., 2007). Prior research 
has found that hot markets are related to higher underpricing than cold markets (Ritter, 1984). 
This research used lagged market return measured by weighted return for the 30-day pre-IPO 
period to control the impact of recent market conditions which are excluded in the final 
offering price. To account for firm-level effects, this research included industrial technology 
dummies to control the level of technology (high, low and stable), following by Chandler’s 
(1994) industry classifications. Finally, to account for macroeconomic factors which are not 
                                                             
56 United States Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/) 
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controlled by the above measures, this research used annual dummy variables in all 
regression analyses. Since the influences of annual dynamics have been controlled, this 
research did not include another set of dummy variables to control the impact of the internet 
bubble. The sectoral patenting trend was measured by the number of patents granted per year 
in each sector. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of IPO firms. The mean of 
IPO underpricing is 25.16 percent. 87.4 percent of our sample conducted R&D and 50 
percent filed patents prior to the IPO, which shows the importance of innovation for 
manufacturing firms. The means of R&D intensity and patent stocks were 5.07 percent and 
18.38 respectively. In full sample, 25.5 percent of focal firms had effective alliance partners 
and the mean of partners’ patent citations was 341.11 times. The average age of focal firms 
was 18-year old, average asset was 440.53 million dollars at the time of IPO. In addition, 
55.7 percent of focal firms were backed by venture capitalists and their underwriters’ average 
reputation score was 5.95. To further examine how the effects of R&D intensity and quality 
signals on IPO underpricing change in different contexts, we separated our sample into two 
groups based on the transparency of value appropriation: the complex product technology 
industries, where value transparency was low, and the discrete product technology industries, 
where value transparency was high. 
Comparing the prominence of innovation in two groups, we found that the 
proportions of focal firms conducting R&D and filing patents prior to their IPOs were similar 
in both groups, but the mean of R&D intensity was greater in the group characterized by high 
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value transparency (8.1%) compared to the other group (4.12%). This pattern means that the 
level of innovation-based information asymmetry was higher in the discrete product 
technology industries. However, the average number of patents was higher in the complex 
product technology industries. This result is consistent with the real situation because 
complex product technology is comprised of many patentable elements. The proportion of 
ventures with alliance partners was not different between the two groups but the mean of 
partners’ technological status was relatively higher in the discrete product technology 
industries (the average number of patent citations was 552.6) than that in the complex 
product technology industries (average number of patent citations, 275.65). In addition, 
comparing firm assets, firm size in the discrete product technology industries (914.8 million 
dollars) was larger than that of the other group (292.72 million dollars), but the average age 
of firms in the discrete product technology industries (12.97 years) was younger than the 
other (19.62 years).  
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Table 19 Descriptive statistics 
 
a  Expressed as a percentage      
b In the number of patents granted in each year     
 c The  total number of patent citations     
 d In millions of dollars 
 
In Table 20, we conducted bivariate correlations to further explore the relationships 
between variables. We found that the sectoral patenting trend was positively correlated with 
IPO underpricing, which means that IPO firms in the industry with a stronger patenting trend 
experienced more underpricing. Firm age was negatively correlated with IPO underpricing, 
suggesting that older firms were less underpriced. There was a positive correlation between 
underpricing and the measure of lagged market returns, which supports previous research 
which argues that offering prices did not fully reflect recent market situations (Logue, 1973; 
Loughran & Ritter, 2002). We also found a negative correlation between stable-technology 
and underpricing and a positive correlation between high-technology and underpricing. This 
result means that higher R&D expenditures correlate with a higher level of information 
asymmetries and uncertainty. In addition, the result also shows that venture capital backing 
and underwriter reputation were positively correlated with underpricing. This pattern means 
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that the role of venture capital is consistent with Lee and Wahal’s finding (2004) and that 
agency problems of underwriters which Loughran and Ritter (2004) argued do exist.   
The result also shows a negative correlation between R&D intensity and our measures 
of patent stocks and firm assets. However, the correlations between R&D expenses and these 
two measures (r=0.299, p<0.001 and r=0.557, p<0.001 respectively) and between sales and 
these two measures (r=0.864, p<0.001 and r=0.244, p<0.001 respectively) were positive. The 
correlation between R&D expenditure and firm sales was positive as well (r=0.350 p<0.001). 
In addition, even though the correlation between R&D expenditures and firm age was not 
significant, the coefficient was positive and the correlation between sales and firm age was 
positive (r=0.327, p<0.001). These patterns mean that firms with higher R&D expenditures or 
higher sales have more patents and larger or elderly firms have more R&D expenditures and 
sales. However, the increase in sales was higher than the increase in R&D expenditure. There 
was no significant correlation between R&D intensity and underpricing, patent stock and 
underpricing, and endorsing legitimacy and underpricing. In the next section, we further 
divided the sample into two groups to explore how the relationships change in different 
contexts. We expected that the roles of R&D intensity, patent stocks, and endorsing 
legitimacy would vary across industries. 
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Table 20 Bivariate correlations 
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4.5.2 Empirical analysis 
Table 21 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis in two groups. We started 
by estimating a model that shows the effect of control variables (Model 1). The result shows 
that in the discrete product technology industries, the asymmetry in the information about a 
firm’s value or viability is relatively low; thus, most of the effects of control variables 
regarding IPO underpricing were not significant. In the complex product technology 
industries, we found that effect of venture capital backing was positive and significant, 
providing support for Lee and Wahal’s findings (2004) which argue that VC-backed offerings 
were more underpriced. As with previous research, the result also shows that the effect of 
lagged market returns was positive and significant. Even though the effect of a hot market 
was not significant, the effect of hot markets could be encapsulated in the annual dummies. 
The result also showed no differences in the level of underpricing between low-technology, 
stable-technology, and high-technology groups. However, the absence of an effect of firm 
age and assets was surprising. The pattern suggests that relationships between information 
asymmetries, firm age, and assets have become more complicated in recent years; thus the 
result is different from previous research (Ibbotson et al., 1988; Megginson & Weiss, 1991). 
The absence of a negative underwriter reputation effect was unexpected. Nevertheless, to 
some extent, the positive effect is in line with Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) agency 
hypothesis regarding the role of underwriters.  
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Table 21 Results of regression analysis of the IPO underpricing a 
 
a  Values are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; all regressions include annual dummies. 
b  Logarithm 
                                  c * p <.05   **p < .01   ***p < .001 
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In examining the effect of R&D intensity on IPO underpricing, we found a significant 
curvilinear effect in the complex product technology industries but no significant effect in the 
discrete product technology industries, meaning that the information asymmetry caused by 
R&D expenditure did not cause IPO underpricing in the industries with transparent links 
between innovation and value appropriation (Model 2). Figure 5 depicts the relationship 
between R&D intensity and IPO underpricing in the complex product technology industries. 
The absolute effect of R&D intensity on underpricing was positive until the level of R&D 
intensity reached 139.7 (ln [R&D intensity*100 +1] =9.54). In our sample, this value is above 
the 99th quantile in the R&D intensity distribution, meaning that the impact of R&D intensity 
on IPO underpricing is positive for most cases in the complex product technology industries 
in Model 2. According to the result of log-rank tests, the impact of R&D intensity on IPO 
underpricing is stronger in a complex product technology industry; thus, we found support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
In looking at the effect of patent stocks, we found a significantly negative effect (p < 
0.05) on reducing IPO underpricing in the discrete product technology industries but not in 
the complex product technology industries. The result of log-rant tests also shows that the 
impact of patent stock on reducing IPO underpricing is stronger in the discrete product 
technology industries. This result is qualified to support Hypothesis 2. Moreover, in Model 2, 
the result also revealed negative effect (p < 0.05) of endorsing legitimacy on IPO 
underpricing in the complex product technology industries but no significant effect in the 
discrete product technology industries, supporting Hypothesis 3a (the result of log-rank tests 
supported this hypothesis). Young ventures with endorsing legitimacy in the complex product 
technology industries can mitigate IPO underpricing.   
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Figure 5 Plot of regression slope for Underpricing against R&D intensity a in the complex 
product technology industries 
 
a Underpricing is a percentage and R&D intensity is a logarithm 
 
In Model 3, we examined the impacts of alliance partners’ technological status on 
reducing IPO underpricing caused by high R&D expenditures in the complex product 
technology industries. We found no significant moderating effect of alliance partners’ 
technological status; thus there is no support for Hypothesis 3c.  
To examine the moderating impacts of alliance relationships on reducing underpricing 
caused by innovation-based information asymmetries in the complex product technology 
industries, we further separated the sample into two groups, one with alliance partners and 
one without alliance partners. For young ventures with alliance partners, Table 22 shows no 
support for the positive relationship between R&D intensity and IPO underpricing; whereas, 
for ventures without alliance partners, higher R&D intensity was a significant cause of their 
IPO underpricing (Model 7). Thus, this result supports Hypothesis 3b (the result of log-rank 
tests supported this hypothesis). 
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Table 22 The impact of alliance relationships on reducing underpricing which caused by high 
R&D expenditures in the complex product technology industries a 
 
a  Values are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; all regressions 
include annual dummies. 
b  Logarithm 
c * p <.05   **p < .01   ***p < .0001 
 
4.5.3 Supplemental analysis  
To investigate the effect of endorsing legitimacy further, we compared the impacts of 
effective alliances and announced alliances (parts of them were in the pending phrase). In 
Model 5 in Table 21, we found that both of them can significantly reduce IPO underpricing. 
Thus, the respective impacts of effective and announced alliances are no different. 
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions  
Previous research has established how information asymmetries cause IPO 
underpricing, especially because of the information gap resulting from high R&D 
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expenditures (Guo et al., 2006; Heeley et al., 2007). We have contributed to the further 
exploration of how the level of this innovation-based information asymmetry changes in 
different industrial contexts and eventually has a different impact on IPO underpricing. In 
addition to examining how the level of information asymmetries increases/decreases, we 
consider how to mitigate this underpricing by delivering positive quality signals (e.g., patent 
stocks and endorsing legitimacy).  
Our results show the level of information asymmetries on IPO underpricing is 
context-dependent. In the discrete product technology industries, information asymmetries 
are reduced. Even though R&D expenditures increase, ventures’ offering prices on their IPOs 
are not significantly discounted. In contrast, in the complex product industries, innovation 
activities increase the need for firm-specific information; thus, information asymmetries and 
underpricing increase. In looking at the impact of quality signals on bridging information 
gaps between corporate insiders and outsiders, we consider how investors actually render 
these signals in different contexts. Firstly, the signalling effect of patents is contingent on the 
transparency of innovations to value appropriation. In the discrete product technology 
industries, the value of one commercializable product consists of a relatively small 
innovation number (Levin et al., 1987) and the technologies applied in a discrete product 
technology market can usually be precisely transmitted across firms (Rycroft & Kash, 1999). 
Thus, in this case, increasing patenting is a signal of higher profit-earning potential and a 
strong safeguard of monopoly rent from innovation investments, which reduces information 
asymmetries associated with underpricing. Conversely, in the complex product technology 
industries, the value of patents is constrained by industrial appropriability regimes and the 
complexity of technologies. Because the quantity of knowledge on which a product relies is 
too large and diverse to be understood by an individual (Rycroft & Kash, 1999), it is difficult 
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to conceive of each innovation’s usefulness in the future and to transfer technologies across 
firms. Due to the imperfect function of the market for technology, many technologies lack a 
predictable market (Kash & Kingston, 2001). Thus, even though patents are intermediate 
outputs of innovation, patenting is only linked with higher R&D expenditures and an absence 
of clear potential profits.  
Secondly, this research introduces an institutional perspective to the debate. When the 
market for technology is imperfect (such as in a complex product technology industry), 
patents cannot guarantee a positive cash flow in the future. The importance of endorsing 
legitimacy, hence, becomes more prevalent for ventures. Affiliations communicate the 
positive information by showing that ventures are able to access more resources which 
increase their survival prospects and growth opportunities (Reuer & Tong, 2010; Singh & 
Mitchell, 2005). Thus, in this case, signalling legitimacy can help young ventures to convince 
investors about their earning potential. Moreover, effective alliances and announced alliances 
deliver the same positive information to the investment community. Even though parts of 
announced alliances will not turn out to be a real cooperation, the announcements are strong 
enough to increase IPO market evaluations of a venture’s value.  
In examining the moderating impacts of quality signals, including alliance affiliations 
and alliance partners’ technological status on reducing IPO underpricing caused by high 
R&D investments, young ventures’ affiliations do establish confidence about their quality 
and significantly reduce innovation-based information asymmetries. However, we do not find 
significant support for the effect of partners’ technological status. The possible reason is that 
only a very small portion of ventures’ partners have patent citations (only 17.5% in the full 
sample and 15.6% in the group characterized as forming a complex product technology 
industry). Therefore, the sample size is too small to analyse the impact of partners’ 
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technological status on reducing innovation-based information asymmetries. Besides, some 
alliances were built to create new technologies or products (e.g., exploration alliances); while 
some alliances were used to refine existing technologies and products (e.g., exploitation 
alliances) (Rothaermel, 2001). Exploitation alliances focus on coupling one firm’s technology 
with the complementary assets (e.g., distribution, manufacturing) of a partner to extend the 
scope of an existing technology; thus, those partners (e.g., distributors) might not have high 
technology status (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). However, because our data is across 
industries, our data set cannot distinguish alliances into exploration alliances and exploitation 
alliances.       
In considering endogenous bias, one criticism might be that high quality ventures 
normally experience less underpricing because of their intrinsic quality, not because of the 
effects of quality signals such as endorsing legitimacy which ventures reveal to investors. 
However, previous research has confirmed that underpricing is also one of the quality signals 
for high quality ventures to distinguish themselves from poor competitors (Allen & Faulhaber, 
1989; Garfinkel, 1993). Information asymmetries do exist in the IPO market. Low quality 
ventures usually imitate all the strategies which high quality ventures use to beautify their 
value. Underpricing is the only signal which is too costly for low quality ventures to mimic. 
Good ventures are confident in their growth prospects which will be at least partly revealed in 
the future; thus, they know that a loss on the IPO market can be recouped after their 
performance is realized. In contrast, the managers of low quality ventures know that they 
cannot recoup the initial loss at some future date, so they cannot afford to use this signal. In 
other words, if high quality ventures cannot find a better signalling proxy to differentiate 
themselves from low quality competitors, underpricing is one option for them to attract the 
investment community. Therefore, an endogeneity problem does not exist.   
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This research contributes to information asymmetry theory in two ways. Firstly, we 
introduce institutional theory to the debate. In the IPO market, underpricing is not the only 
way for firms to induce investors. Previous research overlooked the impact of institutional 
factors. The endowment of legitimacy is a critical quality signal for young ventures, 
especially for high-tech IPOs to increase investors’ assessments of their value. Secondly, we 
contextualize information asymmetry theory in different appropriability regimes. The level of 
information asymmetries in IPO markets is not uniform across industrial contexts. In the 
industries with a transparent link between innovations and value creation, the level of 
information asymmetry, proxied by the R&D expenditures of those ventures, does not have a 
negative impact on IPO underpricing. Therefore, the judgment of value creation from 
innovation is only meaningful within a context.  
Our results also extend institutional theory by considering how evaluators actually 
render legitimacy and by showing how this theory contributes most to our understanding of 
firm behaviour in the absence of well-functioning markets (such as the market for 
technology). Previous literature focussed mostly on how a firm establishes its legitimacy in 
terms of increasing its survival prospects. However, from this point of view, evaluators, thus, 
only play passive roles and are placed on the receiving end of discourse. This research 
considers evaluators’ active cognitive processing and how their evaluations of an IPO firm 
change because of the quality signals they receive. In addition, our results show the function 
of institutional factors when the market for technology is imperfect. Endorsing legitimacy 
serves as an important proxy to mitigate information asymmetries and makes the market for 
technology a potential option for investors.  
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation examines the emergence of opportunities, the early development of 
new ventures, and the legitimation strategies of young ventures to gain resources from 
targeted resource-holders. In this investigation, I contextualise the entrepreneurship process, 
thereby unpacking the micro-foundations of entrepreneurial actions and new ventures’ 
investor communications through quality signals to finance their growth path.    
5.1 Review and Focus 
 Entrepreneurial actions are complex and include considerable variation in the process 
associated with these actions and their outcomes (Iversen, Jørgensen, & Malchow-Møller, 
2008). This implies that entrepreneurship research needs a richer set of indicators of these 
variables to reflect the complexity of the entrepreneurial activities, including differences in 
entrepreneurial motives, multidimensionality of the entrepreneurial process itself, diverse 
decision making processes, etc. (Zahra & Wright, 2011). In the past couple of decades, 
abundant empirical studies based on either an economic or a psychology perspective have 
been conducted. Research based on different theoretical foundations (e.g., an economic 
perspective or a psychology perspective) applies different definitions of entrepreneurship and 
measures to tackle different issues associated with entrepreneurship (Westhead et al., 2011). 
However, the studies of the associations between different measures have been minimal. 
Entrepreneurship has been long conceptualized as a process (Bhave, 1994; Davidsson, 2003; 
Gartner, 1985, 1990), including one's cognitive process of opportunity identification, 
judgment decisions about opportunities (Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Gruber et al., 2008, 2013; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), and entrepreneurial actions to exploit opportunities (Autio et 
al., 2013; Minniti & Bygrave, 2001). Both psychological cognition and economic concerns 
are part of entrepreneurship. The dialogues between psychology-based and economics-based 
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entrepreneurship research is necessary to enrich the understandings of entrepreneurship. 
Extant research has not yet paid sufficient attention to the types and variety of opportunities 
that entrepreneurs might recognize through a single discovery (Dimov, 2011), the way that 
entrepreneurs motivated by different entrepreneurial determinants organize their firms or 
apply new business models to exploit opportunities (George & Bock, 2011), how the 
entrepreneurship process changes in different contexts, and the micro-foundations of 
entrepreneurship (Zahra & Wright, 2011).  
In addition, even though contextual influences on entrepreneurial actions have long 
been acknowledged (Aldrich, 1999; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Welter, 2011), research on 
entrepreneurial behaviours tends to provide “general laws” of entrepreneurship (Autio et al., 
2014; Hjorth et al., 2008; Zahra & Wright, 2011). Overlooking contextual impacts 
empirically contradicts the widespread conceptual recognition of the importance of studying 
the context of entrepreneurial activities. Salience of research questions, theoretical merits of 
an argument, and the identification of casual relationships are usually context-specific (Van 
de Ven, 2007). Rather than treating contextual issues as a control variable, researchers may 
enrich the findings of entrepreneurship studies by including contexts into the story. Besides, 
environmental contingencies not only determine the entrepreneurship process but also the 
growth path of ventures. Current research has highlighted how resources endowments are 
related to venture growth (Clarysse, Wright, et al., 2011; Ensley et al., 2002; Heirman & 
Clarysse, 2004; Hindle & Yencken, 2004) but pays less attention to how ventures grow 
(McKelvie & Wiklund, 2010) and how contextual issues influence the configuration of 
resources (Clarysse, Bruneel, et al., 2011; Dess & Beard, 1984).    
In this dissertation I distinguish the contextual influences on the entrepreneurship 
process between effects on entry behaviours and effects on post-entry behaviours (Autio et al., 
164 
 
2013). The most general motivation of this dissertation was to develop process theories of 
entrepreneurship in particular on:  
1. Entry behaviours – The impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on the decision 
making associated with entrepreneurial tasks 
2. Post-entry behaviours – the micro-foundations of entrepreneurial phenomena and  
new venture legitimation strategies to gain resources 
5.2 Findings    
5.2.1 Entry behaviour – The impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on the decision 
making associated with entrepreneurial tasks 
Chapter 2 addresses research focus 1: How the variance in entrepreneurial 
determinants influences entrepreneurs’ cognitive-processes to approach different 
entrepreneurial opportunities. This question aims to fill in the gap that what specific mental 
connections are influential in spurring a certain type of opportunity idea in the first place. To 
explore this question, I integrate research about the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities 
with cognitive research and focus on two opportunity characteristics – the superficial and the 
structural similarities between new ventures’ current technology and market knowledge and 
the knowledge required in a target market where they will operate.  
Our findings illustrate three types of entrepreneurial determinants – technology-driven, 
operation-driven, and user-driven determinants – which direct the process of opportunity 
recognition. Ventures driven by technology aimed to look for a new market to exploit current 
technologies; ventures driven either by the founders’ past operational experiences or personal 
frustration in using current products were looking for a technical solution to satisfy unmet 
needs in a particular market (in this case, the mHealth market). Technology-driven ventures 
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used their current technologies as a basis to search opportunities. As such, the opportunities 
they pursued usually had high technology similarities with their current knowledge. In 
addition, to avoid operating their new business from scratch, they preferred opportunities 
with at least a medium level of structural similarities in terms of market knowledge. 
Operation-driven ventures were established to solve the problems found in their founders' 
past careers. Therefore, the opportunities they pursued tended to have high technology and 
market similarities with their prior knowledge and their prior knowledge helped them to 
evaluate the feasibility of the opportunities. User-driven ventures were established because of 
their founders' dissatisfaction with current products. This entrepreneurial determinant 
directed their attention to solve the problems they faced even if these tasks had no obvious 
connection with their prior knowledge. In addition, they tended to generalized market 
demands from their own needs and relied on their knowledgeable peers to evaluate 
technological feasibility of the opportunities they targeted.   
5.2.2 Entry and post-entry behaviour  
The micro-foundations of entrepreneurial phenomena  
Chapter 3 addresses research focus 2-1 and 2-2: how entrepreneurs come up with 
entrepreneurial ideas and how entrepreneurial behaviours conducted in one phase impact on 
entrepreneurial behaviours in the next phase, which eventually turns an idea to a real business. 
These questions aim at filling the research gap in the lack of an integral study to unpack the 
micro-foundations of entrepreneurial phenomena to turn opportunity ideas to real business. 
To explore this question, we contextualized entrepreneurship in a particular market setting to 
know how entrepreneurs identify opportunities and how their ventures exploit opportunities.  
Our findings unpack empirically the influences of entrepreneurial determinants for 
new firm creation to opportunity identification and opportunity exploitation. In an almost 
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homogeneous environment, entrepreneurs with different entrepreneurial determinants take 
different paths to identify opportunities. Three of the seven ventures in our sample can be 
labelled as “technology-driven ventures”. They start with a particular technical prototype and 
only exploit opportunities after rigorous opportunity search and evaluation. Therefore, their 
entrepreneurship process is more like a planned behaviour (search-evaluation-exploitation). 
In contrast, four of the seven ventures in our study begin with a perception of unmet needs in 
a particular market. Two of them are motivated by founders' operational experience and two 
are motivated by founders' personal frustration in searching for a satisfactory product. We 
label them as “operation-driven ventures” and "user-driven ventures" respectively. Both of 
them focus on the search for a technical solution to solve a particular problem their founders 
observed, e.g. by using mobile technology. The entrepreneurs of these four ventures had a 
very clear goal in mind before they started their companies such that they do little market 
research and have few interactions with customers in their “first” product development. In 
this case, related market experiences and knowledge become critical. In addition, our results 
indicate the impacts of entrepreneurial determinants on new ventures' resource application 
strategies. Entrepreneurs starting with different entrepreneurial determinants have different 
mindset to exploit opportunities, which direct their attention to apply particular resources and 
eventually leads to different exploitation modes (e.g., pivoting, diversification, business 
model refining).  
New venture legitimation strategies to gain resources 
Chapter 4 addresses research focus 3-1: How the signalling of patent stocks and 
endorsing legitimacy affects a venture’s IPO price when taking into account the level of 
information asymmetry and research focus 3-2: How the appropriability regime of the 
industry in which the venture operates moderates the importance of patent stocks and 
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endorsing legitimacy. These questions aim at filling the research gap in that current research 
pays less attention to the impact of quality signals (patent stocks, and endorsing legitimacy) 
on mitigating the underpricing caused by innovation-based information asymmetries in 
different appropriability regimes and how public investors actually render the information 
delivered by those quality signals. 
 Empirical results from a sample of 770 IPOs issued by manufacturing firms during 
1995-2006 support the hypothesis that the link between R&D expenditures and value 
appropriation plays a more important role than initially thought. In industries with a tight 
appropriability regime, the level of innovation-based information asymmetry does not even 
have a negative impact on IPO underpricing and a venture’s patent stock is an effective 
quality signal to mitigate public investors’ doubt of the venture’s future prospects. In contrast, 
when the transparency of innovations to future returns is unclear, affiliations are more 
prevalent in serving as a credible and observable signal for the investment community to 
make an accurate assessment of firm value. 
5.3 Contributions 
This dissertation developed process theories of entrepreneurship by unpacking the 
interrelationships between entrepreneurial decisions made in different phases of 
entrepreneurship process and by bridging economics-based and psychology-based research 
on entrepreneurship. This dissertation reveals how entrepreneurial determinants affect new 
ventures’ occupational choices and their attitude toward risks. I also integrate psychological 
and economic concerns of entrepreneurship to investigate their combining impacts on new 
ventures’ decision making and entrepreneurial actions to exploit opportunity. In addition, I 
further investigate how environmental contingencies determine ventures’ growth path and 
how ventures finance their innovation.   
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Firstly, this dissertation contributes to the theory of entrepreneurial cognition by 
showing how different cognitive frameworks and varying entrepreneurial determinants lead 
to different entrepreneurial decisions. Opportunity identification is not simply the result of 
alertness and connecting dots but a reflection of people’s situated cognition (Haynie, 
Shepherd, Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010). I revisit the role of entrepreneurial determinants 
and indicate three entrepreneurial determinants for new firm creation and how different 
determinants lead to different processes of opportunity recognition and evaluation. In 
addition, we integrate cognitive research with the nature of entrepreneurial opportunities to 
show how different entrepreneurial determinants eventually lead new ventures to pursue 
opportunities with different levels of similarities with their current knowledge.  
Secondly, this dissertation contributes to theories of the evolving entrepreneurial 
process and micro-foundations by investigating empirically the interrelationships between 
entrepreneurs’ decisions made in each phase of the entrepreneurial process and the 
entrepreneurial actions conducted in the next phases, which eventually leads new ventures 
exploit opportunities in diverse ways.  
Thirdly, our research bridges entrepreneurial theories with strategy and organizational 
theories. Our results show that founding decisions have lasting effects on shaping the 
ventures' evolution to generate innovative possibilities, which explains the inter-firm 
differences in the strategies of their business development. In addition, our research enriches 
the knowledge on the factors determining one’s subjective perception of selecting particular 
resources to develop a new product. We associate the literature of competence-based new 
product innovation and the literature of opportunity identification and further consider the 
role of entrepreneurial determinants in the interrelationships between opportunity 
identification, resource application, and new product innovation.  
169 
 
Fourthly, this dissertation shows the impacts of the industrial, technological, and 
institutional contexts on the innovation development of young ventures by showing how 
institutional pressure forces pre-IPO firms, especially firms with high R&D expenditures, to 
conform to expected structures and behaviours as the mechanism to gain legitimacy. Also I 
indicate the impact of appropriability regimes on young ventures’ strategic choices to finance 
their growth path. In addition, this dissertation further considers the interactions between 
young ventures and external parties. By targeting one of the external parties, public investor 
communities, this dissertation illustrates how ventures interact and communicate with 
external societies through quality signals to gain necessary resources and how signals 
revivers actually render the information that young ventures deliver. 
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